ABSTRACT This article analyses the impact of data-linked kill chains and advanced algorithmic warfare on combined arms warfare (CAW), drawing empirical evidence from the Russo – Ukrainian war and engaging Stephen Biddle’s Modern System theory. It asks whether these technologies merely amplify established doctrinal practices or introduce conditions under which the logic of modern warfare may evolve. The analysis spans three levels. At the technical level, data-linked kill chains enhance transparency by compressing sensor-to-shooter cycles and enabling near-real-time coordination. At the tactical level, algorithmic systems – including drone swarms and cross-domain synchronization – create new forms of adaptive coordination, while remaining exposed to electronic warfare and deception. At the strategic level, operational success increasingly depends on informational and algorithmic dominance rather than force concentration alone. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that kill chains provide a necessary but insufficient platform for battlefield advantage; adversary adaptation rapidly erodes algorithmic superiority; and doctrinal integration remains decisive. The article concludes that while Biddle’s Modern System continues to explain most battlefield outcomes, algorithmic systems introduce a conditional pathway toward transformation in CAW.

ABSTRACT This article challenges the prevailing emphasis on technological superiority within contemporary deterrence frameworks, contending instead that adaptive force employment remains decisive in modern conflict. It develops a hybrid analytical model that systematically extends Stephen Biddle’s “modern system” of force employment to grey-zone conflict and synthesises it with Sun Tzu’s principles of deception and psychological targeting. Drawing on original case studies of North Korea’s UAV incursions, coordinated cyberattacks, and the 2024 “filth balloon” campaign, the study demonstrates how low-cost, low-tech operations can achieve strategic effect by exploiting doctrinal blind spots and societal vulnerabilities in high-capability adversaries. These cases reveal how hybrid tactics bypass conventional defence systems, undermine public morale, and disrupt political cohesion – often without kinetic escalation. The findings question the adequacy of traditional deterrence-by-punishment approaches in grey-zone conflict and advocate a shift towards deterrence-by-resilience, emphasising doctrinal adaptability and societal robustness. The analysis contributes to a growing body of scholarship on asymmetric coercion and the evolving character of warfare in the twenty-first century.

ABSTRACT The Nepal Army has never attempted a coup or overtly obstructed transfer of power between different governments. Yet, the Nepal Army remains the most powerful institutions in Nepal, continues tower over civilian institutions, and prevails when civil–military relations are contested. This article explores the explanations for this “discreet dominance” of the military. While extant scholarship has focused on domestic variables to account for the military’s covert dominance, this article highlights the paradoxical effect of two external factors which contribute to the military’s discreet dominance: security assistance from international partners ranging from Western states as well as regional partners, India and China and increased demand and opportunities for UN peacekeeping deployments. Tracing the causal mechanism of the phenomenon, the article highlights how, on the one hand, prohibitions associated with troop contribution to UN’s peacekeeping missions, and security force assistance, have pressurized the Nepal Army to adapt some form of civilian control, notably the “anti-coup norm” leading it not to overtly intervene in civilian affairs through coups or interference in transfer of power. However, on the other hand, such external factors bestow significant political, economic and institutional benefits which enables the military to dominate its civilian counterparts and contributes to deterioration in civil–military relations.

ABSTRACT Formulated by the Marcos Administration, the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Doctrine stemmed from the Philippines’ long-drawn recognition that China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea poses a clear and present danger to Philippine national security. As a component of the Philippines’ hard-balancing policy toward China, the CADC prepares the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for a possible armed conflict in the South China Sea, and even over Taiwan. In conclusion, the article argues that in the implementation of the CADC, the Philippines must hurdle the following: a) the increased cost of acquiring the necessary weapon systems, force restructuring, and personnel training; b) the tendency of a presidential form of government to revise or discontinue previous foreign and national security policy; and c) the Philippines’ growing isolation from the other ASEAN member-states. However, the failure of the current and succeeding administrations to implement the CADC will deprive the Filipino nation of the opportunity to explore, control, manage, and exploit the natural resources of its archipelagic domain.

ABSTRACT After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine many European states began to change their foreign and defence policies. The paper develops and test-drives a new framework to account for variations in the timing, scope, scale, speed, and longevity of changes. Why did they happen at this point and not sooner? The Event-Agency-Structure framework revolves around the interplay of factors situated on three analytical planes to explain transitions between political times and degrees of policy change. It is then used to analyse Germany’s foreign and defence policy prior to and after the Chancellor’s Zeitenwende speech. The paper shows that focusing events in 2008 and 2014 differed in their cognitive, functional, and affective consequences for Germany from those of the 2022 crisis. It also highlights the growth in international agency together with gradual shifts in ideas. The post-2022 changes under the “traffic light” coalition are found to be multi-faceted, contested, uneven, and fluctuating, thereby challenging initial diagnoses of the country undergoing a profound international orientation change or becoming a Militärmacht. The reasons can be found in the interplay of coalition politics, weak leadership, and the electoral appeal of pacifist and Russia-friendly attitudes. Yet, it is premature to diagnose the end of Zeitenwende as key drivers supporting change under future governments persist.

ABSTRACT The ability to adapt to a constantly evolving security environment has been critical to the success of NATO, yet this is being tested anew as the Alliance faces a second term of Donald Trump in the White House and re-embraces collective defence in light of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Despite notable solidarity and unity in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion and significant progress in rebuilding the Alliance’s defence and deterrence architecture, the list of challenges facing the NATO Alliance is significant. This paper focuses on four of the most critical gaps: in the fields of command structure, military capabilities, force posture, and asymmetric defence. It also offers actionable recommendations for progress in advance of NATO’s Hague Summit in June 2025.

ABSTRACT The first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 brought the Atlantic Alliance back to its original mission of collective defence. In the meantime, domains of modern warfare – traditionally land, sea and air – have expanded to include two more domains: cyber and space. In those domains military actors rush to gain a technological or strategic advantage mindful of the fact that these domains also make them more vulnerable to attack. Every domain of warfare is thus a delicate balancing act between the ability to defend a given space and the ability to exploit it. This article looks at how the two domains of cyber and space have evolved over the last decade and how NATO has responded to these evolutions. It contends that while many of the cyber- and space-related activities fall within the realm of states rather than NATO itself, there is still a lot that the Alliance as such can do to better protect its 32 Allies.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the interplay between capability and complexity within the context of military forces. The findings here describe how these two concepts intersect and highlight the capability definitions, themes, challenges, opportunities, and applications. By running a thorough review of 314 articles, 10 key research themes have been identified, including: 1) Capability Development and Assessment, 2) Regional Defence Studies, 3) Technological Advancements in Military, 4) Strategic Analysis, 5) Operational Tactics, 6) Defence Industry Dynamics, 7) Organisational and Management Aspects, 8) Cybersecurity and Network Capabilities, 9) Military Training and Exercises, and 10) Policy and Political Implications. Among these themes, the literature highlights the importance of a subtle understanding of capability and complexity for well-informed decision-making in military and defence domains. Moreover, this study identifies gaps in existing research and emphasises the need for a coherent theoretical framework to guide decision-makers for military capability acquisitions. The findings have implications for enhancing national security, defence capability planning and resource allocation strategies.