ABSTRACT While predominant theoretical and comparative research on autocracies assumes autocrats to be self-interested power and wealth maximizers, qualitative research often assigns more nuanced motives to dictators. However, the motivations of autocrats are rarely studied systematically. This article provides the first systematic and representative study of dictators’ motivations and shows that dictators are often driven by policy-seeking motivation, that is, broader beliefs and ideology, and are not merely office-seekers interested in personal power and wealth. By identifying a battery of unique, observable implications of policy-seeking motivation related to sacrificing power and wealth for policy goals, the motivations of twenty randomly selected dictators are meticulously investigated in case studies. The results show that dictators have very diverse motivations, and as much as 60% of the dictators investigated are found to be strongly motivated by policy. By bringing motivation, including ideological beliefs, into our models of policymaking in autocracies we can significantly enhance our understanding of and ability to explain authoritarian politics and outcomes.

ABSTRACT How do opposition actors react to democratic backsliding? Using interviews with party elites and nationally representative survey data, this article explores the motivations behind the formation of the six-party “United for Hungary” coalition and the selection of candidates through primaries open to the whole Hungarian electorate, in the run-up of the 2022 general elections. We find that democratic erosion is at the core of opposition parties’ decision to run under the United for Hungary banner and one of the most important drivers of individuals’ participation in the United for Hungary primaries. Our interviews with opposition party elites show that the decision to run in a coalition was guided by pragmatic reasons originating in the electoral constraints they face after years of democratic backsliding in Hungary. Furthermore, participation in the primaries and electoral support for the coalition is associated with pro-democratic attitudes, dissatisfaction with democracy and experiences of non-electoral participation. Based on our analysis, we argue that democratic erosion leads opposition parties in two directions. First, they are encouraged to run together in ideologically diverse coalitions. Second, they are more likely to incorporate social movement-like characteristics. Furthermore, we argue that these changes go in line with the preferences of their electorates.

ABSTRACT Tunisia was seen as a democratic success in the Arab world, yet the 2019 parliamentary elections exposed issues. Voter turnout was low, and partisan ties were weak, leading to unprecedented fragmentation and volatility. These trends, linked to citizen dissatisfaction, help explain the widespread support for populist outsider Kaïs Saied in the presidential race, and for populists like Nabil Karoui or Abir Moussi in the parliamentary elections. Since the mid-2010s, citizen dissatisfaction has been evident through increasing social mobilizations and surveys regarding perceptions of institutional performance. This study explores the electoral behaviour of a dissatisfied electorate in the 2019 parliamentary elections and its effect on Tunisia’s transition. Dissatisfaction is crucial for understanding the rise of populist forces and the current authoritarian drift. The principal findings reveal general declining voter participation, frequent shifts in political allegiance within the same ideological bloc and perceiving a lower level of engagement in the secular-right bloc. Finally, a notable response to populist claims, with the emergence of new populist parties in all ideological spheres, is revealed.

ABSTRACT This study addresses a gap in Intelligence Studies by conducting an empirical investigation into how various civil society actors perceive their role in promoting accountability within the intelligence services. Applying the theoretical frameworks of democratic agonism and institutional logics, the study explores how civil society actors perceive their role in ensuring intelligence accountability and rationalize their contributions as potential enhancers of intelligence legitimacy. Through in-depth interviews with seven civil society organizations in Denmark (NGOs, labour unions, interest groups, and member-funded associations), the research analyses their values, beliefs, and institutional rules concerning intelligence accountability. The findings reveal a tension in which actors advocate for deeper democratic values and contestation, but adapt to existing institutional oversight practices, leading to an imbalance between their ideals and the limited impact of their actions. To explain this imbalance, we discuss the institutional and symbolic dimensions that influence the role of civil society, addressing institutional design, power imbalance, symbolic performativity, and imaginaries of security. Ultimately, this research contributes to ongoing debates on democratic accountability and suggests paths for studying and enhancing civil society's impact on intelligence accountability and policy-making processes.

ABSTRACT In recent decades, Americans have grown more dissatisfied with the performance of their democracy, while respect for basic democratic norms has eroded. In this article, we suggest a mechanism which links these two phenomena to the partisan dynamics of political competition. As affective polarization has increased, partisans have become more likely to favour institutional norms that offer their own side political advantage. As a result, supporters of the Republican Party de-emphasize norms of accountability, civility or judicial independence, while supporters of the Democratic Party favour bureaucratic or technocratic modes of governance. We link such patterns of norm evaluation to changes in underlying democratic attitudes, and argue that the main cleavage between the parties is not around support for democracy versus “authoritarian” values but rather a divide between anti-establishment and technocratic approaches to politics. We suggest this pattern may be typical of societies that have been divided by populism, and can help scholars to understand how democratic institutions can be undermined even in the context of apparently robust democratic support.

ABSTRACT Does encouraging young people to become entrepreneurs also generate more engaged citizens? Policymakers and donors have promoted entrepreneurship as an engine of both economic development and political participation. Yet we know little about whether and how these two things are linked at the individual level. Entrepreneurs who develop greater self-efficacy and specific economic interests may advance democratization, or they may eschew politics to protect their economic activities. Drawing on 40 interviews with university students and entrepreneurs in Jordan, we argue that there is little evidence that entrepreneurship either enhances or diminishes engagement in formal politics. Rather, family influence and social networks drive involvement in both entrepreneurship and politics. Nationally representative survey evidence shows that self-employed youth are slightly more likely to vote than most others, but do not participate more in other formal or informal political activities. Promoting entrepreneurship without strengthening support networks may reinforce status quo politics rather than deepening democratization.

ABSTRACT Does the impact of aid punishments on recipient states’ democratization depend on their timing after a coup? In this study, we argue that to prompt donors to lift aid punishments, recipient governments improve multipartyism in elections to signal democratization without endangering their survival. However, prolonged punishment can weaken their motivation for such democratic reforms as these efforts need to be backed by the prospect of aid rewards. We test these arguments using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data from 1967 to 2016. We find that the effect of aid punishments on multipartyism diminishes as the time since the last coup increases. The results suggest that donor states can effectively promote partial democratization in coup-affected recipient states by strategically transitioning from aid punishments to rewards at an opportune moment after the coup.

ABSTRACT This article examines the Xi Jinping regime’s strategic intent behind its activities that, in effect, facilitate the global autocratization trend. I argue that the Xi regime’s ideological policies are driven by a defensive goal: strengthening the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and authority against the ideological influence of Western liberal democracy. Borrowing the concept of “active defence,” China’s military strategy that emphasizes preventive actions, this article provides a nuanced understanding of China’s global engagement in the ideological sphere. The concept frames China’s actions as measures to defend the regime, rather than attempts to spread authoritarianism, unlike cases like the Soviet Union’s expansion of communism. The article compares the ideological policies of the Jiang-Hu administrations and the Xi Jinping government, illustrating the continuity and shifts in China’s ideological approaches, with a particular focus on the expansion of these policies to foreign audiences. The analysis contributes to the literature on autocracy promotion by offering a new conceptual framework and presents policy implications for democracy promoters, urging a more indirect, developmental approach to engaging with developing countries.