ABSTRACT In the light of the dramatic escalation of the Russian war on Ukraine since February 2022, questions concerning the handling of Russia in the post-Cold War era, and the enlargement of NATO in particular, are timelier than ever. This article scrutinises the views of George F. Kennan, one of the most influential critics of the decision to expand NATO. It is widely accepted that Kennan’s opposition to NATO was grounded in realism about international affairs. A careful study of the development of his thinking, based on his private papers and archival sources from many countries, suggests that his perceptions of developments inside Russia and his imagination of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were more important than any foreign policy doctrine. Kennan’s criticism was grounded in his ‘geopolitics of sympathy’, understood as a fusion of mental maps, sympathies and personal connections towards the region affected by NATO enlargement. However, Kennan’s geopolitics must be considered in conjunction with his ideas about international order, in particular with his defence of empire.

ABSTRACT This article studies US-Italian ‘stay-behind’ cooperation between 1943 and 1976, when it was terminated, within the context of US covert anti-communist activities in Italy. The paper first provides an overview of the operational activities jointly conducted by the US and Italian intelligence between 1943 and 1947, while detailing the US penetrations of the Italian intelligence system and the early stages of development of a US covert network. Subsequently, it delineates the proliferation of US covert anti-communist networks in north-east Italy, the rise of S/B cooperation and its institutionalisation in the Gladio agreement, as well as the CIA pressures for ‘offsets’ in exchange for its financial support of the Italian S/B programme. In the third part, after analysing the temporary hiatus in US intelligence covert activities, the paper describes the decline and end of US-Italian S/B cooperation and the stepping up of covert operations by both the CIA and the US military intelligence. It demonstrates that Gladio did not occupy a central role in US covert operations against communism until 1976 and that CIA pressures on the Italian military intelligence represented an opportunistic attempt at maximising the ‘return’ on the financial investment in the Italian S/B programme. The article concludes by summarising the pattern of US intelligence activities in Italy in the period under scrutiny and the role of Gladio, and laying out implications for theory-development in the realm of intelligence cooperation.

"The Spectre of War: International Communism and the Origins of World War II." Diplomacy & Statecraft, 34(3), pp. 615–616

"The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster: How Globalized Trade led Britain to its Worst Defeat of the First World War." Diplomacy & Statecraft, 33(3), pp. 605–606

ABSTRACT This article explores the preparation made by the British government, primarily the Foreign Office, for the state visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to the United States three months before the outbreak of the Second World War. It considers the dynamics of the relationship between the officials in Whitehall, the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, the agenda of the Roosevelt administration and the role of the British royal family as ambassadors in their own right. Lindsay’s role was also pivotal because he was a personal friend of the King and was also on much respected and influential figure in Washington. The article does not discuss the course of the state visit, although there is discussion of the literature that relates to it. However, it does reveal that securing a concrete alliance with the United States was not the priority of the British government in the summer of 1939; that the focus of the Foreign Office, in particular, was on the growing diplomatic crisis in Europe. Lastly, the article argues that in the months leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Foreign Office was confident in its own ability to lead the formulation of British foreign policy; that it was not eclipsed by Neville Chamberlain’s very personal involvement in appeasing the fascist dictators.