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Abstract Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.

Abstract If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27, that is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing.

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Abstract My intention in this paper is to investigate the structural and dynamic relationships between philosophy and science, particularly the view that philosophy anticipates and leads into science. This investigation shades some light on the nature of both, philosophy and science, and on their mutual relations.

The first aim of this paper is to sketch an account both of the process of identifying and of identifications, the results of the process. I treat identifications as sorts of files of information, or identification files. The role of identification files as devices for use in reidentification is central to my account. The process of identifying x is explained in terms of the perception of x and the formation of an identification file that has x as its topic. The topic is the entity the identification file is about. My proposal does not aspire to capture every aspect of the usage of ‘identification’ in ordinary philosophical discourse. ‘Identification’ is a theoretical term, as noted by G. Evans1. My proposal should be judged by its theoretical consequences. The second aim of this paper is to outline the way how the cognitive system (or mind) yields two remarkable kinds of correlation between identifications and topics: equivocal identifications (identifications with two or more topics) and, in addition, different identifications of the same topic. To illuminate the issue, I introduce the distinction between vertical and horizontal information connecting. I propose the notion of supermap as a useful metaphor for explaining the nature of information connecting by mind. Let me make a concise observation about thought and reference. I am providing an account of identification that aims to be serviceable for theories of thought and reference. It is plausible that a full theory of how a thought is about something rather than anything else needs some account of identification. What makes a thought be about a cer-

Abstract The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself.

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Abstract The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.

This text was presented by M.S. Lourenco as the inaugural lecture of the First Meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy, ENFA1, in Coimbra 2002.