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Abstract Governments often compensate communities for hosting disruptive industries. Sometimes compensation comes with restrictions that preclude highly‐valued investments. I exploit policy discontinuities at the Pennsylvania‐Ohio border to understand how restrictions affect local investment. Ohio delivers unrestricted revenues to schools and municipalities with shale development. Pennsylvania leaves out schools, and requires that municipalities address the industry's impacts. Municipalities in both states save most of the revenues. Ohio schools leverage them to increase borrowing and finance capital investments. This suggests that affected residents have greater demand for school investments, and that broad use of compensation may benefit communities more than allocating it narrowly.

Abstract We conduct a field experiment to test the non‐monotonic effect of deadline length on task completion. Participants are invited to complete an online survey in which a donation goes to charity. They are given either 1 week, 1 month, or no deadline to respond. Responses are lowest for the 1‐month deadline and highest when no deadline is specified. No deadline and the 1‐week deadline feature a large number of early responses, while providing a 1‐month deadline appears to give people permission to procrastinate. If they are inattentive, they might forget to complete the task.

Abstract We investigate if increased deportations under the Secure Communities (SC) program impacted the marriage patterns of immigrant women in the United States. We focus on country of origin‐MSA deportation rates, arguing this is appropriate given the dominance of endogamous marriage among immigrants and large heterogeneity in removal rates. We find that rising deportations increased marriage rates and endogamous marriage, decreased exogamous marriage to immigrants from other countries, and had no impact on marriage to native‐born men. This is striking because SC likely reduced same ethnicity partners in marriage markets. We find some evidence that increased network effects may explain these results.

Abstract We explore monopolistic competition with asymmetric preferences over a variety of goods provided by heterogeneous firms, and compute equilibria (approximating Cournot and Bertrand equilibria when market shares are negligible) through average Morishima elasticities of substitution. Further results concerning pricing and entry emerge under homotheticity and when demands depend on a common aggregator, as with Generalized Additively Separable preferences. Under additivity we can determine which goods are going to be provided under free entry, as well as the selection effects associated with changes in market size, consumers' income, aggregate productivity, and preference parameters.

Abstract This study examines the relationship between career concerns of organizational decision‐makers and their investments by analyzing data from Major League Baseball's (MLB) annual player draft. Career concerns for MLB general managers (GMs) can create incentives to prioritize near‐term success and thus spend fewer draft resources on high school players (who, being younger than college players, are less likely to provide near‐term benefit to an MLB team). Findings are consistent with this: underperforming expectations in the prior season leads teams to spend significantly smaller proportions of signing bonus dollars on high school players, an effect driven by GMs with relatively short tenures.

Abstract Theoretical and experimental literature have provided mixed insights on the ability of financial markets to perfectly aggregate private information into asset prices. We conduct an experiment designed to benchmark information aggregation in markets. In our lab experiment, we randomly assign subjects to different institutional environments, either a market or a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism. We find evidence that market interaction is worse for information aggregation. The difference between the two environments is driven by price‐insensitive traders who seem unable to learn from market prices. Price‐sensitive traders, by contrast, learn equally well in both environments.

Abstract This article argues that, in the presence of dispersed information, individual‐level idiosyncratic noise may propagate at the aggregate level when agents are connected through a social network. When information about a common fundamental is incomplete and heterogeneous across agents, it is beneficial to consider the actions of other agents because of the additional information conveyed by these actions. We refer to the act of using other agents' actions in the individual decision process as social learning. This article shows that social learning aimed at reducing the error of individual actions with respect to the fundamental may increase the error of the aggregate action depending on the network topology. Moreover, if the network is very asymmetric, the error of the aggregate action does not decay as predicted by the law of large numbers.

Abstract In this article, we review the rapidly growing literature on the real effects of banks' corporate credit supply. We cover recent methodological advances and provide an in‐depth survey of the existing evidence. The literature consistently shows that credit supply contractions lead to adverse real outcomes, but economic magnitudes vary across samples and identification strategies. This variation has become smaller in more recent work, using highly granular data. We further document heterogeneity in firm outcomes and show that the evidence is more ambiguous for expansionary shocks. Our analysis allows us to identify current knowledge gaps and worthwhile avenues for future research.

Abstract How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.