Anyone approaching the study of the English law of trusts comes across “the rule in Saunders v Vautier”, named after the 1841 decision of the Court of Chancery in which it is currently assumed that it was laid down. In its narrowest form, the rule provides that the beneficiary of a trust of shares and their dividends, which is to take effect “when” the beneficiary reaches the age of majority, with no gift over, is entitled to have the shares transferred to him as soon as he comes of age. The effect of the implementation of the rule is to terminate the trust, notwithstanding the settlor's contrary intention, which is simply overridden. In this article we intend to show that a distinction between two meanings of “when” in testamentary dispositions underpinned the rule: a conditional meaning and a dispositive meaning. That distinction was taken from the jurisprudence of the spiritual courts in England, based on a development of Roman law sources in the European ius commune which then found its way into the French and other civil law codes. Academic writings have ignored this side of the story, which is highly relevant from a comparative law perspective.

Recent decades have seen an increased interest in end-of-life matters, with several jurisdictions introducing laws to permit assisted death, a form of end-of-life.1 As part of this growing movement, the Scottish Parliament is currently considering the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill (“the Scottish Bill”).2 It comes against the backdrop of years of public3 and political activity4 in Scotland. A public consultation took place in 2021 based on a draft Bill.5 A final proposal was supported by 36 MSPs, thus granting Liam McArthur MSP the right to introduce it formally on 27 March 2024.<br/>In this analysis piece, we comment on aspects of the Scottish Bill that we find most significant from a criminal and medical law perspective. We argue that the introduction of the Scottish Bill will clarify the criminal law in the area of assisted suicide, which is currently vague and unclear. The proposed legislation addresses the legal grey area that currently exists in Scotland and has left many who require assistance in suicide at risk of potential criminal charges. We also comment on how the Scottish Bill introduces a distinct offence of coercing someone to request assisted suicide, marking a significant departure from previous Scottish Bills and the latest Irish Bill.6 The Scottish Bill treats coercion as a distinctive wrong, further protecting autonomy.<br/>On the medico-legal aspects, we note the Scottish Bill’s terminal illness definition as a basis for eligibility; we welcome the absence of a requirement for a prognosis but warn that it may still be subject to challenge. On the medical aspects, we also note the crucial role of healthcare professionals (“HCPs”) in the operation of the Bill and propose further actions in directly consulting with them via professional and membership organisations. We also note the importance of consulting with patients and others with lived experiences on the matter. We hope that this analysis, alongside the further review currently undertaken by the Health, Social Care and Sport Committee, will give MSPs the best start when the Bill returns to Parliament for Stage 1 and a vote. There are significant developments in UK Crown dependencies7 and Ireland,8 which will affect Scotland because of their geographical proximity. This fundamental “divergence in legislation” must be urgently addressed.9 The Scottish Bill is, therefore, timely.