Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many countries’ carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.

COVID-19 emerged as a cross-cutting problem across governance sectors and levels, urging the creation of a European Health Union. There are already a number of integrated European governance strategies – such as the European Energy Union (2015) and the European Green Deal (2019) – adopted for overcoming problems of governance fragmentation and inadequacy of fragmented policy responses to cross-cutting policy challenges. Past studies focused on the interaction between crisis and policy change and investigated the activation of different mechanisms to enhance integration. This article contributes to the debate over the creation of a European Health Union by unpacking the acknowledged dimensions of policy integration – policy frame, subsystem involvement, policy goals and policy instruments – in order to assess their manifestations in the new EU4Health policy and to establish what contextual conditions triggered the activation of the integration-enabling mechanisms that led to a more integrated European Health Union. In so doing, it offers an analytical illustration and discusses implications for decision-making.

Based on a mix of conceptual insights and findings from cases, this paper discusses three ways in which the effectiveness of regulation in the areas of competition, data and consumer protection can be improved by tailoring substantive protections and enforcement mechanisms to the extent of market power held by firms. First, it is analysed how market power can be integrated into the substantive scope of protection of data protection and consumer law, drawing inspiration from competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms. Second, it is illustrated how more asymmetric and smarter enforcement of existing data protection rules against firms possessing market power can strengthen the protection of data subjects and stimulate competition based on lessons from priority-setting and cooperation by consumer authorities. Third, it is explored how competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms can be further strengthened in analogy with the principle of accountability in data protection law. Similarly, it is discussed how positive duties to ensure fair outcomes for consumers are developed in consumer law. The analysis offers lessons for improving the ability of the three regimes to protect consumers by imposing greater responsibility on firms with greater market power and thus posing greater risks for consumer harm.

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On 23 October 2019 the European Union enacted the Whistleblower Protection Directive. The directive introduces important common standards of protection for whistleblowers reporting on breaches of EU law and significantly increases the level of protection afforded to whistleblowers in many EU Member States. Many of the features of the directive go further than pre-existing national whistleblower protection regimes, particularly in relation to the categories of persons who may benefit from the protections under the directive and in terms of the flexibility of the prescribed reporting procedures. Nevertheless, the directive's effectiveness may be limited by certain grey-areas and missed opportunities in the final text of the instrument.

Personalised nutrition, the tailoring of nutrition products, services or advice to individual characteristics such as genetics, phenotype, nutritional intake and/or exercise routine, is increasingly attracting the interest of industry, consumers and researchers. This article provides an overview of the current European Union (EU) regulatory framework as applying to personalised nutrition and draws attention to the important role of EU food law in the regulation of this innovative approach to nutrition. It is argued that personalised nutrition challenges the regulatory borderline between health and lifestyle products or services and, furthermore, also pushes the boundaries of current food safety and health claims legislation.

This article analyses the administrative measures and, more specifically, the administrative strategy implemented in the immediacy of the emergency by the Italian government in order to determine whether it was effective in managing the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the country. In analysing the administrative strategy, the article emphasises the role that the current system of constitutional separation of powers plays in emergency management and how this system can impact health risk assessment. An explanation of the risk management system in Italian and European Union (EU) law is provided and the following key legal issues are addressed: (1) the notion and features of emergency risk regulation from a pandemic perspective, distinguishing between risk and emergency; (2) the potential and limits of the precautionary principle in EU law; and (3) the Italian constitutional scenario with respect to the main provisions regulating central government, regional and local powers. Specifically, this article argues that the administrative strategy for effectively implementing emergency risk regulation based on an adequate and correct risk assessment requires “power sharing” across the different levels of government with the participation of all of the institutional actors involved in the decision-making process: Government, Regions and local authorities.“And the flames of the tripods expired. And Darkness and Decay and the Red Death held illimitable dominion over all”.Edgar Allan Poe, The Mask of the Red Death, Complete Tales and Poems(New York, Vintage Books 1975) p 273

Pharmaceutical science has provided humans with better and cheaper treatments. However, with improved access to medicines, the amount of pharmaceutical waste also grows. Pharmaceutical waste is regularly mismanaged by households, which is considerably and unnecessarily adding to the “pharmaceuticals in the environment” problem. Redesigning existing pharmaceutical takeback schemes and their regulation is a potential step towards a reduction of the problem. Interdisciplinary research between the fields of psychology, law, public health and medical science is necessary to tackle the issue and to design effective regulation steering responsible patient behaviours.

Due to its borderless nature, COVID-19 has been a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter. Member States adopted their own different, uncoordinated and at times competing national responses according to their distinctive risk analysis frameworks, with little regard1 for the scientific and management advice provided by the European Union (EU), notably its dedicated legal framework for action on cross-border health threats.2 To justify such an outcome as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health is a well-rehearsed yet largely inaccurate argument3 that calls for closer scrutiny.

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