Dans le cadre d’une enquête sur un terrain ultranationaliste turquiste, de nombreuses questions méthodologiques et éthiques se posent. Si le concept de « terrain par empathie » a fait l’objet de nombreuses recherches, certains aspects des « terrains difficiles » sont moins souvent abordés lors de conférences et de réflexions collectives. Trois questions particulières se posent : peut-on « entrer sur un terrain » sans informer les enquêtés de notre de statut de chercheur ou chercheuse ? Est-il possible de faire preuve d’empathie dans un contexte où l’idéologie des acteurs peut susciter de l'antipathie ? La recherche menée dans des contextes difficiles doit-elle prendre parti, et quelles sont les implications du partage des résultats avec les enquêtés ?

This article analyses the relationship between religion and the state in the AKP era and discusses whether AKP policies represent a rupture with the republican era or a continuity. The AKP developed a multi-faceted and comprehensive policy for controlling the religious realm in Turkey. Employing the Diyanet as the true representative of Islam and forging alliances with cemaats have strong historical precedents, yet the amount of resources the AKP invested are significantly greater. Moreover, it is not only that AKP devoted more resources to the religious field (quantitative change), but also that it did this in novel ways (that amount to a qualitative change). First, these institutions are not being developed as alternatives to each other but as parts or layers of a more complementary strategy. Second, these various institutions and communities are merging with the AKP and losing their autonomy. By co-opting all these institutions and organisations, Erdoğan controls most of the religious realm in Turkey. If one of the unique dimensions of Turkish secularism is the state’s desire to maintain control over all religious activity, ironically, it is Erdoğan who has come closest to achieve this.

Increasing access to higher education is often perceived as a threat to authoritarian regimes because, as liberal theory suggests, universities would cultivate critical citizenry and oppositional politics. However, Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, contradicts this assumption and necessitates a rethinking of the relationship between the university and democracy. Although university-educated sections of society are generally more embracive of democratic values, universities have also played an important role in nationalist indoctrination, elite reproduction, and class inequality. Moreover, emerging evidence indicates the role of universities in authoritarian regimes. This paper focuses on the double processes of the remarkable growth of access to universities associated with democratization in liberal theory and the simultaneous intensification and consolidation of authoritarian rule in Turkey. It argues that the changes in higher education have not only been a reflection of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule but also serve as one of its building blocks. Universities fulfill this function by extending political patronage to new clientele and fortifying control and coercion among students and academics, who have historically been central to democratic politics in the country.

Studies on the Ottoman sciences have long emphasised heritage from the past (Greek, Arab, etc.), or the circulation of knowledge as understood exclusively from the European viewpoint, especially starting from the sixteenth century; this is even more evident from the nineteenth century onward. In the case of medicine, thirty years ago Rhoads Murphey (1992) invited historians to consider Ottoman science as an original cross-cultural synthesis that produced knowledge, rather than as a mere rece...

« Le conservatisme ne se définit pas, il est : en d’autres termes, son existence précède – en même temps qu’elle la subsume – son essence » (Baruch 2016 : 438). Cette formule de Marc-Olivier Baruch, issue de l’ouvrage Conservatismes en mouvement. Une approche transnationale au XXe siècle paru en 2016, exprime la complexité des enjeux qu’affrontent les sciences sociales dans leur appréhension de l’objet « conservatisme », répertoire de discours et de pratiques du champ politique et social. Po...

“France’s government needs to take a harder look at its latest competitiveness agenda, now that researchers have had time to study the impacts of such policies elsewhere. It should strive for the best of both worlds: to produce research that benefits society, balanced with support for the well-being of those on the academic front line.” (Nature 2020: 8)It will soon be a year since the editorial staff of the EJTS joined the mobilization provoked in France by the draft “multiannual research pr...

En 2010, quelques ultras du groupe de supporters Çarşı du club de football Beşiktaş forment le groupe Beleştepe (la « colline gratos » en français) afin d’élaborer une action collective contre le football industriel capitaliste. Le nom de ce groupe vient d’une colline qui se trouve à côté du stade İnönü à İstanbul. Depuis cette colline, il est possible de voir 70% de l’intérieur du stade, les supporters qui n’ont pas suffisamment d’argent pour acheter un ticket s’y installent afin de regarder le match. La décision de ces supporters de se rassembler en un groupe restreint vient de leur positionnement politique plus engagé que leur maison mère, Çarşı. Il s’agira dans cet article d’analyser les différents modes de politisations de Çarşı et de Beleştepe.