Abstract Many subjects within the arts, humanities and social sciences are judged harshly by some within society, particularly those who believe that they lack the heft and intrinsic usefulness of the hard sciences. Rishi Sunak, the former British Prime Minister, implied the primacy of maths within the subject hierarchy when he argued it should be privileged amongst subjects by being taught to all students in the UK in some format until they were 18. He also implied within this that some students were taking other subjects rather than maths and that this was detrimental to British business, although it was not stated so overtly (Sunak, 17th April 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-outlines-his-vision-for-maths-to-18). The necessity of social sciences, particularly Political Science within the UK context will be discussed in this paper. Political Science as a subject area has always been viewed with some suspicion by those who fear the education of individuals on the mechanisms of power within a nation and those who confuse education with indoctrination. This fear has, yet again, become a prevailing concern in many countries and this paper will explore that concern. It will conclude that the social sciences and humanities perform a vital role within society and academia and the elevation or denigration of subjects focusing on contentious issues should not be tolerated when driven by political expediency or the desire of some to close down debate.

In a late October 2022 international YouGov public opinion poll, findings indicated that more Indians attributed responsibility for the Russian invasion of Ukraine to ‘the West’ rather than Russia (28% compared to 27%, while 45% indicated both were accountable or expressed uncertainty). This study seeks to elucidate why such perceptions prevail, drawing upon the longstanding strategic partnership between the former Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, with India dating back to the 1950s and the portrayal of the Russian invasion within Indian broadcast news media. We argue that the media coverage of the conflict exhibits three main frames: the invasion as an attack by Russia on Ukrainian sovereignty, an anti-West pro-Russia frame, and a perspective aligning with Indian national interests. Both international and domestic proponents of these frames actively seek to shape the narrative presented, with media organizations deciding which frames to prioritize and which political actors to endorse. Consequently, we argue that the news media plays a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the conflict, influencing the Indian government's approach toward the war.

Abstract The article’s main purpose is to understand the differences in the perceptions of Russian narratives in post-communist European countries by examining the role of the local media after February 2022. The research question is: What factors determine the degree of official Russian narratives’ influence on media discourses about the Russian–Ukrainian war of 2022 in Central and South-Eastern Europe (the cases of Poland and Serbia)? The paper is based on a discourse analysis of articles in major Polish and Serbian quality national broadsheet daily newspapers and online news portals (Rzeczpospolita and Politika) for a six-month period (February 24–August 23, 2022). The article aims to show that the official Russian rhetoric is regularly spread by the local media and that it should be perceived as a tool of the Kremlin's task to change the public opinion in the region.

Jean Blondel’s personal and scientific biography deserves to be illustrated, as it can in many ways also be an illustration of the laborious making of a genuinely European (though not only) political science from the ashes of World War 2, and the failures (uncertainties) of pre-WWII political science. Here it will briefly be recalled how an enthusiastic and innovative institution builder gained a central place in the making of the new European political science, and how Blondel coupled this with his tireless exploration of new fields of comparative politics, while being at the same time a generous mentor of PhD students and younger scholars and, for many, a great friend.

Abstract When and why do economic grievances result in support for populist parties? We address a long-standing puzzle in understanding populist voters. Existing studies have produced mixed results about how economic characteristics drive support for populist parties. We argue this is because scholars have overlooked the central importance of internal political efficacy, i.e., a belief in one’s ability to affect political outcomes. Using three pooled waves of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014, 2016, and 2018) with over 80,000 individual observations over time, we find that the economic determinants of populist support are contingent on internal political efficacy. Although there are reasons to think that the combined effect of economic circumstances and efficacy may be stronger on support for the populist left because of their stronger emphasis on social justice, we do not find evidence of this with the limited observations of the populist left in our sample. Critically, our findings contrast with the simplified and theoretically unsatisfying explanations of populist support we often encounter in the literature that are based solely on economic dissatisfaction. Instead, our results imply that recent trends in European politics are not only about economic issues but also about a voter’s belief in having agency and competence to affect change.

Abstract Political polarisation is a pressing political issue, as it can worsen democracy and has been rising in many countries in the past two decades. However, the exact scope of the problem is unclear, because conflicting measurements and conceptualisations have created disagreement about which countries are polarised. Scholars usually only measure one type of polarisation, even though multiple types are salient to the concept. Furthermore, little comparative data are available that measure multiple types of political polarisation simultaneously. This article introduces the comparative political polarisation index (CPPI), which provides a comparative measure of political polarisation that incorporates multiple dimensions of polarisation. This article first conceptualises political polarisation as a four-dimensional concept, operating through ideological and affective aspects and at the mass and elite levels. Then, it creates a comparative index that uses cross-national surveys and party manifesto data to measure all four types in more than 100 countries and over 25 years. This article finds that polarisation has not uniformly risen; only elite affective polarisation rose in this time period. Both types of ideological polarisation stayed stable, and mass affective polarisation decreased. These results encourage a closer look at the relationship between different types of polarisation and specify causes and solutions focused around particular types, rather than viewing political polarisation as uniform.

Writing a well-researched, evidence-based book on European migration policies during an unexpected pandemic, must not have been fun.Writing a review of said book in the midst of Europe's worst security crisis since World War Two, and against the backdrop of mounting inflation and a looming energy crisis, is not either.So many of the things we took for granted about the EU before 24 February 2022 are not true any longer that reading anything written before then becomes almost like a historical exercise.And yet, most of the forces at play in Giles Merritt's People Power: Why We Need More Migrants are still there.Maybe they are just less acute than they used to, or some tenets may have changed, but the author's main thesis-that migration is not only inevitable but also desirable-remains one of this mad world's few immovable truths.People Power begins with a necessary disclaimer about the COVID-19 pandemic, which seems to have taken the author as much by surprise as the rest of the world, with the additional difficulty of trying to predict what labour markets, or even European borders, will look like once (or if) the pandemic abates.Merritt then bravely endeavours to dispel ten myths about migration that we all have heard at family gatherings, in the supermarket, at work.From "migrants steal jobs" to "migrants are a security risk" to "migrants are costly to the taxpayer", the first chapter of the book tries to debunk pre-conceived ideas while making a strong economic case in favour of more, and not less, migration.In later chapters, Merritt delves deeper into the merits of migration, by explaining how the economics of migration (we need more migrants and that is a good thing) have nothing to do with the politics of it (we want zero migration).But the author does not forget that migration has a third, sociological angle: newcomers have an impact in their host societies, so it is important to look at how European societies have been integrating migrants over the past century and whether their respective models-"assimilation" versus "integration"-have worked (scoop: they have not, at least not all, all the time).

Abstract In a 2021 Special Issue in European Political Science, Anika Gauja and Karina Kosiara-Pedersen review the sub-field of party politics research. In doing so, they argue party politics scholarship reflects the broader development of the political science discipline, illustrating the evolving relationship between politics researchers and the organisations they study. In this reply, we argue that the party politics sub-field reflects the wider discipline in another crucial respect—it continues to marginalise gender politics scholarship. We demonstrate that a gendered lens fundamentally transforms key questions in the field around what party politics scholars study, and how and why they conduct their research, with relevant consequences for whose work is included. In failing to engage with this scholarship, “mainstream” party politics scholars are (re)producing unequal power relations and hierarchies within the discipline, while also depriving themselves of the capacity to address fully key questions of representation, democracy, continuity and change.