Abstract In recent years, many efforts have been made to bring quantitative and qualitative methods into dialogue. This article also moves in that direction. However, in contrast to most works, the present attempt does not concern the large-N/small-N issue but focuses instead on the sole single case study framework. Within this framework, two counterfactual methods, the historical counterfactual method, the qualitative one, and the synthetic control method, the quantitative one, have gained great importance without however meeting. This paper aims to advance mixed-methods research by bridging the gap between these two approaches. More precisely, it has assessed whether these two methods can be used together to understand what would have happened in a single case Z in the absence of an event X. The case study of the impact of Thatcher’s election on the UK pension system is then presented as an example of the joint use of the two methods.

Abstract Over the course of European integration, European Union (EU) institutions have gained increasing authority – but since the 1990s, this process has triggered backlash from Member State governments and citizens. We examine whether this transfer of authority has also led to greater legal contestation in cases before the Court of Justice of the EU involving Member States. Drawing on original data covering all amicus briefs in direct actions with government parties from 1954 to 2022, we find growing mobilization against EU legislation, implementation, and enforcement. While challenges to legislation became more salient without becoming more polarized, litigation over implementation decisions grew more controversial yet remained low-profile. Meanwhile, the Commission’s enforcement of EU law has faced mounting intergovernmental pushback, leading to greater restraint on the side of the Commission. These partly diverging trends reflect uneven shifts in the EU’s authority to legislate, implement, and enforce binding rules.

Abstract When do citizens vote against autocratizing incumbents? A growing body of literature addresses this question, yielding mixed results. I argue that an important component is how visible autocratization is to the average citizen. I conceptualize “visibility of autocratization” and posit that it is essential for understanding when citizens vote out incumbents attempting to entrench their power. I test the relationship between visible autocratization and incumbent re-election in the universe of competitive African elections since 1990. I show that voters punish autocratizing incumbents by voting them out, but they only do so when autocratization is visible. Additional analysis of Afrobarometer data in four countries experiencing autocratization shows that citizens’ perception of autocratization is systematically related to preference for opposition candidates, even after controlling for partisanship and economic performance, and irrespective of levels of partisan animosity. This study contributes both theoretically and empirically to understandings of political behavior under autocratization.

Abstract Deliberative mini-publics are increasingly embraced by policymakers, marking their integration into the mainstream of contemporary democracy. However, their rising importance also makes them more attractive targets for elite capture. Surprisingly, existing scholarship has mostly neglected the threat of elite capture to deliberative mini-publics. This article fills this gap by proposing a framework to examine capture during the input, throughput, and output phases of mini-publics. The framework is consequently applied to a pioneering case: the Permanenter Bürgerdialog (PBD) in the German-speaking Community of Belgium. The PBD is a randomly selected assembly collaborating with the regional parliament on a permanent basis, rendering it an attractive target for elite capture. Drawing on original interview data, a qualitative analysis examining threats and resilience in the PBD yields three main findings. First, due to its complex procedures, there is considerable leeway for capture in the PBD. Second, the PBD is barely covered in the media, which renders its more vulnerable for elite capture. Finally, the PBD demonstrates how checks and balances through a separation of powers can significantly mitigate capture threats.

Abstract The higher-educated were long supposed to be winners of technological change, but recent evidence indicates that they feel (and are) increasingly exposed to the risk of technological redundancy. Based on what is known about how lower- to medium-skilled workers respond to technological exposure, this new sense of vulnerability among the higher-educated could have significant political effects – specifically increased support for right-wing populist parties – but empirical evidence on this is still lacking. I address this gap and investigate the effects of technological vulnerability on the party preferences of the higher-educated using survey data from the 2022 Risks that Matter survey. I find that feeling technologically vulnerable does indeed increase support for populist right-wing parties and reduce support for left parties among the higher-educated. I also conduct mediation analyses to explore the mechanisms behind these patterns and find evidence for a significant but substantively small mediation effect of social policy preferences.

Abstract Can public diplomacy in times of crisis shape citizens’ attitudes towards international politics? Using a survey experiment in Italy, we evaluated whether information cues about public diplomacy efforts by the United States and China to assist the country in dealing with the COVID-19 emergency shifted the importance citizens attached to Italy’s international allies being democracies. We found that citizens who receive positive cues about USA efforts to assist Italy report a stronger preference for Italy interacting with democracies. At the same time, when they received positive cues about China’s efforts to assist Italy, they discounted the importance attached to international allies being democracies. We further found that these effects are conditional on the participants’ support for democracy at home. We argue that these findings are consistent with a cognitive dissonance framework where citizens update their attitudes to decrease dissonant cognitions when they receive information that challenges prior beliefs or expectations.

Abstract There is extensive evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic has mostly affected the less well-off in society, boosting economic inequality. In contrast, little is known about how much such rising economic disparities affected the involvement of individuals in politics, thereby enhancing political inequality. Extending the research on political inequality to a key and somewhat neglected dimension of citizens’ involvement with politics - political engagement - this article claims that the COVID-19 depressed engagement and promoted political inequality. The analysis relies on a comparative European approach and on data before and after the emergence of the pandemic. Besides generally finding an overall socioeconomic gap with regard to political engagement, results also suggest that the pandemic somewhat lessened engagement, increasing the gap between the more and less socioeconomically advantaged. Generally, this is not strictly due to a tendency to decrease engagement among the latter but also to increase engagement among the former.

Abstract In Western European welfare states, research shows that support for welfare chauvinism, or the notion that welfare benefits for immigrants should be restricted, is highest among white, blue-collar working-class voters. On the other hand, higher-educated, middle-class voters are more likely to reject welfare chauvinism and support the inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state. For social democratic parties, this might pose an electoral dilemma between generous welfare states and open borders: They rely on both middle- and working-class constituencies and are ideologically tied both to a universal welfare state and the protection of (national) workers. To what extent does such an electoral dilemma between classes exist for social democratic parties? How do social democratic parties solve this dilemma when in government? In this paper, we postulate that a class divide around welfare chauvinism exists within the electorate for social democratic parties and that these parties’ policies in government reflect these divides: If the social democratic electorate has a high share of working-class voters, they should act more welfare chauvinist than if their electorate is mostly middle class. We test these hypotheses by combining survey and macro-level policy data in 14 Western European countries from 1980 to 2018. We find consistent evidence of the existence of a working-class/middle-class divide regarding welfare chauvinism, even within social democratic electorates. On the macro-level, we find partial evidence that social democratic parties in power respond to the class demands of their electorate: They are less welfare chauvinist when they have a higher proportion of middle-class voters, whereas their working-class vote share does not significantly condition their policies at all, contrary to assumptions in the literature. We therefore conclude that as social democratic parties become parties of the middle classes, the likelihood that they will retrench immigrant welfare rights reduces.

Abstract Research on intra-coalition control shows that monitoring increases with the ideological distance between coalition partners. However, the focus of scholarship has been primarily on parliamentary regimes, not mixed regimes. In mixed regimes, intra-coalition control becomes more complex due to a dual executive. Parties must simultaneously monitor each other and the directly elected Head of Executive (HoE). This article examines intra-coalition control in mixed regimes by analyzing parliamentary questions from 21 German city councils. The German local level resembles a mixed regime. The executive consists of the coalition cabinet supported by the council majority and the directly elected mayor as the HoE. The results show that the division of governmental responsibilities affects intra-coalition control. When a coalition party is aligned with the HoE, the balance of power within the coalition is affected, and the other partners intensify controlling the aligned party. Additionally, policy divisiveness and issue salience are driving factors for intra-coalition control.

Abstract Electoral engineering strategies in majoritarian electoral systems, in particular the possibility to contain insurgent parties by manipulating electoral districts for partisan gain, are key determinants of parties’ positions on the adoption of proportional representation (PR). Providing both qualitative and quantitative evidence, this paper demonstrates that partisan districting can be an effective strategy to protect incumbent parties’ dominant political positions. In addition, it shows how insurgent parties push for the adoption of PR to end the practice of partisan districting. Finally, it demonstrates that incumbents – in the face of increasing electoral threats – cling to the existing majoritarian system if partisan districting allows them to influence vote-seat distortions in their favor. Together, these findings suggest that the possibility to contain insurgent parties by means of partisan districting is an important but overlooked alternative to the adoption of PR. Moreover, by demonstrating that vote-seat distortions moderate the relationship between district-level electoral threats and legislators’ support for PR adoption, this paper offers an important corrective to Stein Rokkan’s influential electoral threat thesis.