Once only coordinating the foreign policy of its member states, the European Union (EU) now endeavors to speak on behalf of non-EU states. In the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), its declarations are often backed by a large number of countries. This article enquires into the function of diplomatic alignment. Its findings question the use of alignment as a normative benchmark for European integration. It argues that adherence to EU norms is not the only rationale for alignment, and, more interestingly, that there are valid reasons not to align, which do not contradict EU norms, as well as more questionable reasons to align, which do. This article, in conclusion, argues that the function of alignment supports the EU's claim for international leadership, and that the reactions of non-EU states should be gaged in the light of this venture.

This article explores the political and strategic implications of Scottish Independence for existing transatlantic security arrangements. It examines the potential institutional, legal and political obstacles Scotland might face during the transition to independence and discusses the specific challenges in the area of security and defence, including the nuclear issue and the question of what form an independent Scottish Defence Force (SDF) would need to take to allow and facilitate integration in transatlantic security structures. It argues that a number of strategic and political issues could be mitigated in the course of negotiations between Edinburgh and London. Moreover, Scotland's geostrategic position and political orientation make it an important prospective partner in international security cooperation across the Eastern Atlantic, High North and North Sea, which suggests that an advanced partnership with NATO, and eventually full membership, seems like an option that is both politically viable and more likely than any scenario that predicts seeing an independent Scotland (IS) outside these structures. This challenges some of the main strategic and security political arguments against independence and thus seeks to spark a debate about the realistic options for Scotland should it become independent after 2016.

The book provides an extensive overview of EU approaches to region-building in the post-Soviet space. It seeks to explain the absence of such policies vis-a-vis the region. The case study is contra...

Danish nuclear policy is at a crossroads. Looking back, Denmark's relationship to nuclear technology has been a difficult balancing act for successive governments, trying to soothe an anti-nuclear domestic sentiment on one side and the membership of a nuclear military alliance on the other. This history produced an enduring double approach to nuclear policy by Copenhagen throughout the cold war. Looking ahead, this history is of particular relevance as Denmark and Greenland are considering lifting their twenty-five-year ban on mining radioactive elements and allowing the production of Greenland's uranium. With Greenland's large reserves potentially catapulting this otherwise non-nuclear and non-mining kingdom into one of the world's top suppliers of uranium, the policy debate has to include a look back at Denmark's relationship to nuclear technology, for both peaceful and military purposes.

Transparency, international credibility, democratic accountability, a new realism in defense expenditures – these basic policy goals fit awkwardly with the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) on Dutch territory. Most parties in the Netherlands want the NSNW removed. Some are even willing to challenge the idea that only consensus among all 28 NATO Allies can lead to the removal of the NSNW. The new Dutch minister of foreign affairs for example, Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. Without NATO consent if necessary. His appointment fits with the political shift that we have seen over the past few years in Dutch politics. This article looks at the political rationale behind that shift: who are the main political actors involved? How have domestic and international pressures influenced party positions? The article also looks at the possibilities a new Dutch Government has were it to challenge the NATO consensus on NSNW. Would the USA refuse to take the NSNW away? How would NATO react and what could mitigate Allied concerns?

This article refers to:Engaging environmental turbulence: drivers of organizational flexibility in the armed forces

This article examines the case of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland's (CFNI) experience as a primary recipient of peacebuilding aid from the European Union (EU) under the Special EU Programmes Body Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (SEUPB-EUSSPPR). The case serves as a lens into the tensions that such efforts create for community-based organizations as they seek both to honor their funder's accountability claims and their own needs to ensure legitimacy and efficacy with those with whom they interact so as to secure space and discretion to seek to catalyze social experimentation and learning. This paper argues the Foundation's experience and frustrations with EU accountability claims point up a difficulty with the SEUPB's comprehensive conceptualization of peacebuilding: It tends in practice to favor Union-prescribed aims and objectives over those its ‘partners’ derive from their daily efforts.

This article addresses conceptually the European Union (EU)'s security actorness, explaining its meaning, identifying the factors that are constitutive to the concept, and analyzing whether the EU is a security actor in Georgia, through its increased presence and engagement in the country and its eventual implications for the South Caucasus. The article argues that the complementary nature of the different EU tools deployed on the ground and their comprehensive nature have contributed to the EU's consolidation as a security actor in the South Caucasus. However, and despite the successful assessments of the European Union Monitoring Mission in the context of common security and defense policy development, the mission's deployment and its contribution to regional stability are influenced to a great extent by the role and involvement of external players, in particular in this case, that of Russia.

Critics of the Obama administration's ‘reset’ with Russia claim that it has failed to improve bilateral relations and has conceded too much to Russia at the expense of American interests. In fact, the reset has delivered significant improvements in key areas and established the institutional basis for continued cooperation in the future, benefiting both states. Although disagreements remain on several important issues including missile defence, humanitarian intervention, and democracy, the reset has been broadly successful on its own terms, which were always limited in scope and based on a pragmatic recognition of the limits of possible cooperation. Future progress is uncertain, however – obstacles include differences of national interest; the complicating effects of relations with third party states and the impact of domestic politics. A continuation of the pragmatic approach underpinning the reset represents the best chance for stability in the US–Russia relationship.

The construction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has seen the pooling of a significant amount of national sovereignty at the European Union (EU) level through the establishment of internal EU competences. This process has also had the important side-effect of an increasing development of an EU interest in various areas of security, including in counter-terrorism. This article examines the processes through which the EU interest in counter-terrorism is constructed. It argues that, in line with social constructivist literature, it is important to conceptualise interests as being mutually constituted through interactions amongst political actors. It further develops two arguments in this respect. First, the United States (US) has exercised significant influence on the shaping of the EU interest in counter-terrorism. This point is particularly well-illustrated by the Passenger Name Record case. The second argument put forward by this article is that the process through which the EU interest is shaped has become increasingly complex, in particular following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which reinforced the powers of the European Parliament. A particularly apt illustration of this argument is the case of the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) Agreement.