Since antiquity, humans have traditionally been characterised as animal rationale or homo sapiens. Such a definition takes into account, on the one hand, the physical aspect, referring to the human body, but also, on the other hand, the mental aspect. With this in mind, the present article seeks to develop a philosophical approach to the problem posed in its title. Various aspects of human language use and cognition are, in the era of the information revolution, being increasingly taken over by AI. So what still remains specific to humans—or, more precisely, to human, natural intelligence, given this dynamically developing context? The article addresses this question in a series of steps. Initially, it considers whether rationality is a good candidate for a uniquely human trait. In defence of the distinctiveness of human intelligence, and using Robert B. Brandom’s semantic inferentialism, it then points to our ability and skill in understanding, as well as the normativity of language use and cognition. The ensuing discussion focuses on the normative categories of deontic status and deontic attitude, and related notions of commitment and entitlement that these in turn imply.

Arguments against naturalism and materialism have a long history, from Plato to Plantinga. The paper has three parts: First, I reconstruct an argument from reason found in Plato’s the Phaedo. Second I consider whether the argu‑ ment is relevant to contemporary forms of naturalism. I argue that the argument does constitute a serious objection to some forms of naturalism. I then defend the argument against objections from GEM Anscombe, Graham Oppy, and Peter van Inwagen.

In his book „The Edge of Evolution”, Michael Behe draws on a metaphor of arches and spandrels. The arches are what holds a cathedral together and spandrels are the “fillings” that may carry beautiful ornaments, however, they have no say in whether a building stands or collapses (Behe 2007, 171-203). Behe explains that it is similar with life – some minor and non-substantial elements of living organisms can be explained by neo-Darwinism, but the complex biochemical systems, which are essential for survivability of any living organism – cannot. Thus neo-Darwinism may explain the spandrels, but not the arches of life. I think Behe’s metaphor can be taken more broadly and applied to the context of our debate. Here I will understand it as a mental attitude by which one focuses on the irrelevant spandrels at the same time pretending to be unable to grasp the arch (“core” or “essence”) of a problem. In his response Mr. Kemp reduces my critique to four points (P1-P4) which he claims we disagree on and shows why – on his view – I am mistaken. Here I will order my response according to his four points.

This article explores Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of “critique” (Kritik) and his critical method. The most important components of Hartmann’s critical philosophy are the distinction between problem-thinking and system-thinking (problem-oriented and system-oriented thinking), the criterion of presuppositionlessness (neutral attitude, “this side” stance, which also highlights the priority of the phenomena over theory), the preference accorded to the natural attitude (toward the object) as opposed to the reflective attitude, the emphasis on the aporetic, the critique of the common philosophical methods, the critical review of Kant’s philosophy, and lastly the theory of critical realism. Linked to the analysis of Hartmann’s critical ontology, critical epistemology and critical metaphysics I also point out an uncritical concept in those. The discussion of the elements of Hartmann’s critical methodology (transcendental, descriptive, and dialectical) shows that the various meanings of the concept of “critique” in Hartmann’s philosophy converge in the methodology of aporetic phenomenology.

Despite the fact that natural language has always been one of the most important resources for the study of ontology, many authors continue to regard it as a deceptive guide to the inquiry into what there is. The notion of natural language as a trap is carried over into contemporary metaontological studies, which typically reject natural language as ontologically committing. From a deflationary perspective, this paper aims to argue that ontological commitment occurs in natural languages, with implications for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. To this end, a view based on naturalized epistemology and other aspects of Quine’s philosophy is presented. The perspective of Natural Language Ontology proposed by Moltmann is also introduced, with the goal of offering a new approach that allows a specific analysis of the ontological commitments of natural languages. While Moltmann herself indicates some motivations for this, its potential attractiveness for the study of linguistic relativity will be emphasized here. Finally, it will be suggested that there may be a linguistic bias around the proposed criteria of ontological commitment.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the protagonist of his most famous book, can be regarded as a philosopher who works towards becoming a sage—something that, towards the end of the narrative, ultimately seems to happen. Over the course of the account, he travels between his lonely cave and human society several times, walking up and down a mountain. In this article, I focus on how Nietzsche describes those walks using language that breaks with Cartesian dualism through its employment of such expressions as “lead-drop thoughts.” As a systematic frame of reference intended to support the analysis of these descriptions, I make use of Antoni Kempinski’s concept of energetic-informational metabolism. Then, motivated by the preceding observations, I outline the philosophico-therapeutic hypothesis of a human transformation taking place as a two-phase procedure: (1) replacing the view of Cartesian dualism with what I call the “theatre of forces,” and (2) “de-selfing” the stage, or regarding this theatre as impersonal. Finally, reaching out to a Buddhist philosophical conception of the impersonal, I consider the possibility of a metaphysics entirely derived from sensations.

<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Editors’ Note</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span>Front Matter,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">A Christian Theodicy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Christian Philosophy, Christian Philosophers or Christians Making Philosophy?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Demarcating the Foundations of Analytic Theology and Philosophical Theology</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">How Can Christian Philosophers Improve Their Arguments?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Logical Culture and Critical Thinking</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Greek Philosophy as a Religious Quest for the Divine</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Athens and Jerusalem Redux</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Monastic Mystical Discourse and the Rule of Faith</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Kim and the Pairing Problem for Dualism</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">In Defense of a Thomistic Dualist Substance Ontology of Agent Causation</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Paolo Valori on Searching for Truth Everywhere as a Feature of Christian Philosophy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">On the Need for Distinctive Christian Moral Psychologies</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">How Kant Can Figure into Christian Ethics Today</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Franciscus Bargieł: Jan Morawski SJ (1633–1700) Philosophy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Report from the debate: How to think with Heidegger against Heidegger?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Christian Philosophy facing Naturalism</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Conference Invitation Letter</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Note about Forum Philosophicum</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span>

<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Editors’ Note</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span>Front Matter,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">A Christian Theodicy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Christian Philosophy, Christian Philosophers or Christians Making Philosophy?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Demarcating the Foundations of Analytic Theology and Philosophical Theology</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">How Can Christian Philosophers Improve Their Arguments?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Logical Culture and Critical Thinking</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Greek Philosophy as a Religious Quest for the Divine</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Athens and Jerusalem Redux</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Monastic Mystical Discourse and the Rule of Faith</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Kim and the Pairing Problem for Dualism</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">In Defense of a Thomistic Dualist Substance Ontology of Agent Causation</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Paolo Valori on Searching for Truth Everywhere as a Feature of Christian Philosophy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">On the Need for Distinctive Christian Moral Psychologies</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">How Kant Can Figure into Christian Ethics Today</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Franciscus Bargieł: Jan Morawski SJ (1633–1700) Philosophy</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Report from the debate: How to think with Heidegger against Heidegger?</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Christian Philosophy facing Naturalism</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Conference Invitation Letter</span><span xml:lang="en" lang="en">Note about Forum Philosophicum</span>,<span xml:lang="en" lang="en"></span>

Analytic theology is a thriving research program at the intersection of theology and analytic philosophy. Prior to Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea’s launch of “analytic theology” in 2009, the discipline functioned under the moniker “philosophical theology.” Considerable ink has been spilled on what is analytic theology in the past decade, and most recently by William Wood (2021). Some theologians (e.g., Abraham 2009) have argued that it is systematic theology while others (e.g., Coakley 2013) have been content to remain in a family resemblance class rooted in philosophical theology. At the same time, analytic theology has welcomed Christian philosophers (e.g., Beall 2021) who have migrated into Christian doctrine via philosophy of religion. These philosophers are not systematic theologians, but, rather, philosophical theologians. This essay analyzes the relation between analytic theology, philosophical theology, and philosophy by examining their starting points and how they perceive and access truth, and then proposes a spectrum to graph their overlapping zones of research. I conclude that philosophical theology stands at the heart of the disciplines and thus remains an appropriate term for analytic theologians and Christian philosophers working somewhere in the vicinity of Jerusalem.

The dispute between naturalism and anti-naturalism has been underway almost since the very beginnings of philosophy. Christian thinkers, by proclaiming that God as Creator transcends the reality He has created, and that human beings as persons transcend the material world, have entered this dispute on the anti-naturalist side. The contemporary dominance in culture of the naturalistic paradigm requires Christian philosophy to reflect on naturalism in the broadest sense (in its various forms), together with its conditions and consequences, and to rethink its relationship to this philosophical tradition. Naturalism rejects the possibility of something existing, being known, or being explained that is separate from the material reality given in empirical cognition. Along with this, it denies human beings transcendence with respect to the natural or social world. In its contemporary iteration, this tradition appeals to the solutions and methods of domain-specific forms of scientific inquiry, relying on them for its own authority. For Christian philosophy, naturalism represents a powerful challenge. It is possible to see in it a threat to Christian philosophy, but it is also possible to discern in it an opportunity for a more critical evaluation of Christian philosophy’s previous solutions, and an opportunity to develop new ones. There is a need for a better understanding of naturalism itself, as well as of what the various domain-specific sciences (including the natural and social sciences, as well as the humanities and, currently, neuroscientific research in particular) have to say about the world and about human beings. Systematic and historico-philosophical questions equally still call for debate – in relation to the centuries-old dispute between naturalism and anti-naturalism, as well as the changing place of Christian thought within it. In our own time, one can witness diverse attempts by Christian thinkers both to critically discuss naturalistic positions and to implement naturalistic approaches or solutions within Christian thought itself. Certainly, the latter cannot ignore the fact that naturalism allows philosophy to maintain cognitive contact with domain-specific forms of scientific inquiry. The organizers plan to conduct this conference in hybrid mode, combining both online and onsite elements. This model will allow all interested persons to participate, while also offering those wishing to actually come to Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow the possibility of doing so.