Abstract: Hume doubted that the immediate experience of order, goodness, or beauty in the world, on which religion depends—“the feeling of design,” as J. C. A. Gaskin put it—is anything other than the product of an overactive imagination. But what were his reasons for doing so? And were they sufficient? Since the Dialogues are the locus classicus of Hume’s critique of religion, I propose to read them carefully, if critically, with both of these questions in mind. I conclude that Hume’s critique of religion, while powerful in its way, does not ultimately succeed.

Editors’ Introduction Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Mark G. Spencer This issue opens with the winning essay in the Second Annual Hume Studies Essay Prize competition: “Hume’s Passion-Based Account of Moral Responsibility,” by Taro Okamura. Dr. Okamura’s essay was chosen as the 2022 winner from among papers submitted by emerging scholars from August 2021 through July 2022. Dr. Okamura received his Ph.D. from the University of Alberta in 2022. He is currently a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow at the Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology at the University of Tokyo. The competition for the Third Prize closed on August 1, 2023, and the winner will be announced in our next issue. Please see the Call for Papers for the fourth competition in the back of this issue. The competition is open to authors ten or fewer years from the Ph.D. A special aspect of our current issue is its spotlight on Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Renowned Dutch Enlightenment scholar, Frederic L. van Holthoon, presents his analysis of some of Hume’s essays, which he argues constitute Hume’s project of writing on political, or public, issues—a goal he did not get to complete with the Treatise. Also, established Hume scholar Lorne Falkenstein offers an extended review of the newly published Clarendon edition of Hume’s essays, in two volumes (edited by Tom L. Beauchamp and Mark A. Box, with Michael Silverthorne, J. A. W. Gunn, and F. David Harvey). Finally, we want to bring to the attention of our readers that, in fewer than two years, Hume Studies will be marking the 50th anniversary of its first publication. For this event, we are planning a special jubilee issue, 50:1 (April 2025). We hope to include among the unique features of that issue paragraphs or statements from our readers in answer to this query: “Of all of the articles that have been published in Hume Studies over the past 50 years, which one is most noteworthy to you? Why so?” Please see the “Call for Entries” in the back of this issue and on the Hume Studies website. We invite your responses! [End Page 193] Copyright © 2023 Hume Studies

Editors’ Introduction Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Mark G. Spencer We are pleased to say that Hume Studies has awarded its second annual Essay Prize, with an announcement featured in this issue. The winning paper will be published in November 2023 (Hume Studies 48:2). We thank the members of the 2022–23 Prize Committee, who are acknowledged in the announcement. Please see the Call for Papers for the Third Annual Essay Prize on page 189 of this issue. Along with five original articles and three book reviews, our current issue features a symposium on Margaret Watkins’s book, The Philosophical Progress of Hume’s “Essays” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). The symposium is a development from an Author-Meets-Critics panel that was held at the 47th Hume Society Conference, sponsored by the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Columbia, July 2021. We thank the organizers and the panelists. With the end of 2022, we have had a changing of the guard among the Hume Studies Editorial Board. The Hume Society Constitution allows that Editorial Board members can serve no more than two consecutive 6-year terms. Consequently, we have had to say farewell to Helen Beebee, Don Garrett, and James Harris. We are grateful for their many years of fine service to the journal. Lisa Shapiro’s appointment has been renewed for another term. We are pleased to welcome new members to the Editorial Board: James Fieser (University of Tennessee at Martin), Peter S. Fosl (Transylvania University), and Ruth Weintraub (Tel Aviv University). We also bring to your attention the Call for Papers for the 50th annual Hume Society Conference, to be held at Oxford University in the summer of 2024. The conference planners hope to present an exceptional program for this golden jubilee. Please check out their “Call” on page 191 of this issue for information about the conference themes and the submission deadline. Finally, we remind our readers that we are always looking for excellent submissions at Hume Studies. We usually get referee reports to authors in about eight weeks’ [End Page 5] time, and time to publication after acceptance is approximately one year. Our issues are online in April and November at three websites: the Hume Society (for members, https://www.humesociety.org), Project Muse (https://muse.jhu.edu), and the Philosophy Documentation Center (https://www.pdcnet.org). Paper issues arrive at U.S. locations by mail just a few weeks later. International mailing takes several weeks longer. Information on submitting a paper to our online portal can be found here: https://www.humesociety.org/ojs/index.php/hs/information/authors. In the case of technical difficulties, please contact one of the editors. [End Page 6] Copyright © 2023 Hume Studies

Reviewed by: Hume’s Epistemological Evolution by Hsueh M. Qu Dan Kervick Hsueh M. Qu, Hume’s Epistemological Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 280. Hardback. ISBN: 9780190066291, $90. Every interpreter of Hume is compelled to grapple at some point with the problem of the relationship between Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and his two enquiries: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748) and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Readers are often guided in this area by Hume’s own later reflections and directions to his readers, particularly by the witty, but terse comments in “My Own Life,” where Hume acknowledges his youthful disappointment when the Treatise “fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots,” and then reports a longstanding conviction that his literary failure with the Treatise “had proceeded more from the manner than the matter.” This famous self-assessment suggests the relationship between the earlier work and the later ones is more a matter of style, exposition, and clarity than of differences in philosophical substance. Close readers of the Treatise and the two Enquiries, however, have often found a significantly more perplexing and far less straightforward relationship among these works. Hsueh M. Qu’s delightful and thought-provoking Hume’s Epistemological Evolution is the first book-length treatment of the relationship between Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Qu’s book ties together many of the strands of earlier commentary on the subject, synthesizes and critiques them, and develops its own comprehensive and original interpretation. The style is precise and detailed, yet easygoing and fluent, and the book will no doubt serve as the starting point and benchmark for future research on its subject for many years. One important general theme of Qu’s interpretation is the contention that in Book 1 of the Treatise, epistemological issues take a backseat to psychological issues, and epistemological issues tend to arise in the earlier work as “offshoots” of psychological ones, whereas the focus of the Enquiry is much more epistemological. More controversially, Qu rejects the view that the philosophical differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry are only differences in manner, not matter. He argues that Hume disavowed the Treatise treatment of skepticism “because of his dissatisfaction with the response to scepticism offered in the former work: he finds the Treatise’s epistemological framework to be philosophically inadequate” (Qu, 1). Qu believes that Hume defends mitigated skepticism in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, so “his final position is indeed the same in both works.” However, he also argues that the “arguments and frameworks” that lead to this position differ between the two [End Page 183] works, with the Treatise offering defective arguments for this “same philosophical endpoint” (12). As a preliminary step toward justifying his contention that the Enquiry is more normatively focused than the Treatise, Qu begins by comparing and contrasting the stated aims of the two works, as set out in the Treatise’s “Introduction” and in EHU part 1. The most important difference he finds is the emphasis in EHU part 1 on the project of driving out false metaphysics. While the Treatise is focused on establishing a psychological science of man, the Enquiry, “in emphasising its aim of driving off a class of poorly justified beliefs . . . seems more self-consciously normative than the characterisation of the aims of the Treatise in the corresponding section of that work” (42). In the Enquiry, as Qu reads it, the epistemological recommendations delivered haphazardly and parenthetically in the Treatise have been elevated into a fundamental purpose of the work. Moving from overview to detail, Qu takes up the problem of Hume’s views on induction in Chapters 3 and 4. He follows Stroud in distinguishing a negative phase from a positive phase in Hume’s argument on induction, the first phase aiming to show that inductive inferences are not founded on reason, and the second aiming at the conclusion that they are instead determined by custom. That these two phases of the argument can be found in both the Treatise and the Enquiry is a...

Reviewed by: The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind by Timothy M. Costelloe Saul Traiger Timothy M. Costelloe. The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 312. Hardback. ISBN: 9781474436397. $107.00. If anything about Hume’s philosophy can be characterized as widely accepted, it is that the imagination is front and center in Hume’s account of the mind. The aim of Timothy Costelloe’s book is to fully develop the observation, that the imagination, as Hume understands it, is “the canvas of the mind.” Costelloe amply demonstrates that the imagination is a broad canvas, ranging from Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics, to his aesthetics, moral and political philosophy, history, philosophy of religion, and his general conception of philosophy itself. Seven substantial chapters cover these areas, and show how Hume takes the imagination to play a pivotal role in each. One of the many strengths of this book is that Costelloe responsibly mines the secondary literature, carefully explaining the interpretations he seconds and those he finds wanting. The attention to the relevant secondary literature is apparent from the start, where Costelloe laments the surprising dearth of book-length treatments of Hume on the imagination, but helpfully highlights both the lesser known Hume-centric monographs on the imagination by Furlong and Wilbanks, as well as more widely read interpretations. The introductory chapter makes important distinctions and introduces some main concepts. Hume differentiates the imagination’s “combinatory power” from its “creative power.” While the uninhibited ability to concatenate ideas might also be seen as a creative act, Costelloe sees the creative power where the imagination [End Page 173] “generates a class of ideas—‘fictions’ of a certain sort—independent of experience and according to its own inner logic” (21). This characterization makes sense when viewing the imagination’s function as directed towards a goal, such as achieving coherence or creating an aesthetically pleasing effect. Costelloe suggests that achieving an aesthetically pleasing effect is an element in any exercise of the imagination’s creative power. The imagination creates easy transitions among ideas where there were none, where doing so is pleasurable, or aided by the passions. Costelloe introduces his account of Hume’s fictions as errors of the imagination whereby ideas are formed in a manner different from the standard derivation from antecedent impressions. He insists, helpfully, that fictions are not illusions, but rather errors of a different kind. Though both involve error, fictions, unlike illusions, are not described in terms of jest or irony (30). Though he acknowledges that Hume does not describe any fictions as “artificial,” Costelloe finds it helpful to draw a distinction between natural and artificial fictions. Natural fictions are generated without reflection. Artificial fictions, such as those created by poets and philosophers, issue from “the voluntary act of imagination” (31). Costelloe holds that artificial fictions “are rarely taken to refer to objects with real existence and that any professed belief is really a matter of people being persuaded of something and taking the ideas in question as having real referents, thus only lending themselves to their existence for one reason or another” (31). This is a bit unclear. Certainly, poetic fictions are voluntary creations not intended to refer to real objects. But substance, and the double existence of ideas and external objects, as philosophical fictions, surely both involve belief and the corresponding existential commitments on the part of the philosophers who are committed to them. It is also difficult to see the purported contrast between belief and taking ideas to have real referents. Chapter 2, on metaphysics, is the longest chapter in the book, and it addresses the fictions of the imagination in Hume’s account of space and time, continued and distinct existence, liberty and necessity, and personal identity. Costelloe is sensitive to the worry that classifying Hume’s subject in Book 1 of the Treatise as metaphysics may appear to be slighting the central epistemological concerns and failing to appreciate Hume’s nascent cognitive psychology. Such worries fall away as Costelloe explores the roles that the imagination plays in the formation of our conception of duration without change, and the identity...