This article is devoted to a phenomenological analysis and interpretation of the basic concepts involved in phenomenology. The first concept that deserves our attention is that of “apodicticity” along with the related concept of “apodictic evidence”. The next concept is that of “correlation,” which manifests its apodictic character in bringing together all transcendental facts. With the transition from traditional discourses to modern discourse, the concept of apodicticity continues to deepen; at the same time, it is accepted that some metaphysical presuppositions continue to lurk at the foundation of this concept. Apodicticity, as the principle of knowledge, is an idea that lies in the infinity of universal experience, which includes both agreed and mismatched moments. This mismatch, in turn, refers to correlative connections between the transcendental Ego, the world and intersubjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity has a correlative nature, which is due to its self-transcending character, resulting in gaps and distinctions being found within subjectivity.

The question of whether Heidegger’s phenomenological contribution to the philosophy of being originates from his pre-philosophical attitude to theology or rather, it is the methodological question of phenomenology which influenced his thinking, is one of the most essential questions in Heidegger-research. Though, this has already been elaborated on in a broader sense, the publication of the Black Notes has opened new dimensions for discussion. It is not the aim of this paper to represent Heidegger’s concept of the history of being in the light of the new debates, but rather to confirm the thesis, that, in spite of the ‘turn’; in Heidegger’s thinking, his phenomenological hermeneutics was inspired, above all, by his reflection on Christianity. Moreover, the paper will question whether the linearity of Heidegger’s thinking about the historical being remains on the horizon of the religious phenomenon, as it is thematized in his early papers and lectures. While Heidegger’s early phenomenological approaches to religion and theology have been sufficiently elaborated on by several authors, and the phenomenological–hermeneutical relevance has been proven in his thinking, the linkage between the early philosophical approaches to the problem of religiosity and of historical being arising newly in Heidegger’s thinking from the 1930s is missing. The present paper will not just refer to the thesis that Heidegger’s theological background contributed to his questioning of being, and that it was influenced in different ways, but makes an attempt to reveal the internal dynamics of Heidegger’s early thinking prior to the publication of Being and Time and the time of composing the Contributions to Philosophy of those of Heidegger’s lectures which remain in the parallel analysis of religiosity and historicity.

Body image (BI) and body schema (BS) refer to two different yet closely related systems. Whereas BI can be defined as a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body, BS is a system of sensory-motor capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring. Studies have demonstrated that applying the concepts of BI and BS enables us to conceptualize complex pathological phenomena such as anorexia, schizophrenia, and depersonalization. Likewise, it has further been argued that these concepts play a crucial role in our ability to grasp our bodily experiences in the socio-cultural world according to various factors, such as gender, social class, and ethnicity. Referring to the insights of Frantz Fanon, the author of Black Skin, White Masks, this paper suggests that under certain conditions the BI can take over and reshape the BS (or the BI is assimilated into the BS). Based on an examination of Fanon’s writings, the paper suggests that not only the BI can truly remold the BS but that the gaze of the other can directly influence the BI.

George Psathas was one of the most important “central figures” or “intellectual promoters” in a “phenomenological sociology” movement not only in the United States bur also in the world. This essay, using the term “phenomenological sociology” in a broader sense, i.e., as a sociological perspective, aims to demonstrate this by tracing his research and publication activities, educational activities, and activities for making up intellectual networks and scientific organizations in reference to various materials including a detailed curriculum vitae compiled by him in 2008 and an interview with him in 2009.

The present paper advocates for the use of phenomenology in the study of the self, presenting the findings from a phenomenological study on the participants’ engagement with challenges to the self brought about by their experience studying postmodern thought. Accordingly, the present study utilised Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to investigate the influence of postmodernism on the self, beliefs, and values. Seven participants took part in semi-structured interviews, in which four themes and 14 subthemes were identified in response to postmodernism: ‘ambivalence’; ‘uncertainty’; ‘responses to uncertainty’; and ‘self as an exception’. These findings were both consistent and inconsistent with criticisms of postmodernism, as participants expressed a sense of postmodernism as destabilising, however, the need for action and stability frequently led participants to respond with the strengthening of their beliefs, or an unwillingness to refute them. The experiences and responses of participants to postmodernism challenge the view that postmodern thinking has a negative influence upon individuals and their beliefs and demonstrate the efficacy of phenomenological approaches in understanding experiences of the self, particularly where they encounter challenges and complexity.

Recently, a revival of phenomenological approaches has been gaining ground in the literature of cognition and human understanding. Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World plays a decisive role here. Instead of viewing the mind as an independent entity separated from the “outer” world, these approaches assert an immediate understanding of a meaningful environment. Such an immediate understanding is seen in the light of embodied practices, when humans are engaged in skillful absorbed coping. An analysis of Heidegger’s concept of truth provides a more sophisticated view. Being-in-the-World does not always grant direct access to an immediate understanding of a meaningful environment. Often, other objects in the world conceal themselves from human view. In a first approach, this understanding of truth will be elaborated on the basis of an exegesis of Heidegger’s text concerning his question of truth. What this actually means for a phenomenological understanding will be explained by a closer look at two central topics in Being and Time: disturbance and anxiety. The idea is to show that Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World—properly interpreted—can offer a “third way” beyond the limits of a mindless coping and an understanding of the mind as a self-standing entity detached from other entities in the world.

The text deals with Harold Garfinkels theorizing of what Karl Mannheim called ‘documentary meaning’, and established as a foundation of all historical disciplines, and what Garfinkel calls the ‘documentary method’ of lay and professional sociological reasoning. The commentary tries to establish the systematical position of the chapter in Garfinkel’s ‘Studies in Ethnomethodology’, and, indeed, in Garfinkel’s social theory at the time of publication. This position involves, and redefines, Weber’s definition of sociology, Schutz’s sociology of knowledge and especially, the very idea of a common stock of. typifications, and the discovery of ‘historical time’, or ‘Geschichtlichkeit’ in each micro-sequential interaction. Some consequences are drawn, or sketched, for ethnomethodology as a steady thorn in the side of sociology, and vice versa: for lay and professional sociology as an equally steady thorn in the midst of ethnomethodology.

This paper argues that Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussion of violence from his Notebooks for an ethics constitutes an attempt to go beyond an instrumental view of violence. An “instrumental view of violence” essentially assumes that violent behavior is a form of pragmatic behavior whose distinguishing feature consists in the kind of means one employs for reaching one’s goals (violent behavior resorting to means that are harmful for others, whereas non-violent behavior does not). For his part, Sartre attempts to provide a stronger demarcation between violent and pragmatic behaviors. First, violent behavior is, for Sartre, not necessarily characterized by the use of particular means, but by a particular manner of using means, one that involves a certain “forcing” or “straining” of the means. Second, I argue that, according to Sartre, in contrast with pragmatic behavior, violent behavior involves a modification of one’s attitude towards one’s goals. Three such modified attitudes with respect to one’s goals are detailed here, namely the non-productive attitude (the assumption that the goal is not to be produced or that it is not to be produced by means that are under our control), the counter-productive attitude (the exacerbation of one’s proximate goal at the expense of more distant goals) and the anti-productive attitude (the active refusal of one’s previously set goal). Moreover, I show that Sartre’s view that violence involves the “straining” of one’s means is undergirded by his idea that violent behavior presupposes the modification of one’s attitude with respect to one’s goals.