Abstract This article will analyze the way in which BR Ambedkar's lived experience and jurisprudential commitments framed the discursive structure of the Indian Constitution and reformulated prevailing conceptions of liberal constitutionalism to reflect the specific and historically contingent context in which it was formed. Whereas prevailing notions of political rights in Western liberalism were conceived as abstract protections of individuals against the state, Ambedkar attempted to reframe the idea of rights as including correlative duties and accounting for material conditions of inequality and systemic discrimination. Heblurred the distinction between the higher-order law and everyday politics, and conceptualized rights as horizontal in addition to vertical in character. Finally, he included a temporal reorientation of the liberal constitutional paradigm by incorporating permissive constitutional structures. This article analyzes his approach to constitutional jurisprudence within the framework of Mari Matsuda’s notion of multiple consciousness.

Abstract This article examines the supremacy accorded to free speech by the First Amendment of the American Constitution and in contrast, the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] that highlights data protection. It compares speech as a fundamental human right in US law with the GDPR that champions individual and social rights in personal data as constraints upon speech action. It evaluates US and EU law in light of the history of the law of privacy and the protection of personal information, as is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]. The article concludes by proposing a uniform and consistent regime for limiting freedom of expression in an era of mass exposure of personal data to harmful online dissemination on the global Internet of Things [IoT].

Abstract The article provides a systematic outline and refinement of societal constitutionalism (SC), one of the frameworks emerged in contemporary legal theory to analyse constitutional phenomena. After an introduction in Section 1, Section 2 summarises SC’s theoretical background, namely the debates on the Economic Constitution (2.1), legal pluralism (2.2), systems theory (2.3), and the work of David Sciulli (2.4). Section 3 explains SC’s analytical limb, which on the one hand criticises some tenets of state-centred constitutionalism (3.1); and on the other hand identifies functions, arenas, processes, and structures of a constitutionalised social system (3.2). Section 4 turns to SC’s normative limb, pointing to some constitutional strategies that increase social systems’ capacities of self-limitation (4.1); and develop a law of inter-constitutional collisions (4.2). Section 5 addresses the main competing approaches and criticisms, which are based on state-centred constitutionalism (5.1); on international/global constitutionalism (5.2); and on contestatory/material constitutionalism (5.3).

Abstract This article assesses the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty against the background that, at the time of UK’s withdrawal from the EU, UK parliament proclaimed it to be preserved despite the continuing domestic legal effect accorded, under 2018 and 2020 Acts, to pertinent EU law provisions in the UK legal system. The relevant evidence is analysed to show whether that position is one to which English law subscribes.

Abstract The multiple COVID-19 vaccines developed over the past months are typically thought of as the only means to meet the challenges posed by the current pandemic. Still, public opinion on vaccines is heavily divided. And, of course, discussions about compulsory vaccination, oftentimes based on fundamental rights arguments, tend to become heated. This note This note builds on the arguments developed in the author’s master thesis Anja Krasser, ‘Die grundrechtliche Zulässigkeit einer Impfpflicht in Österreich’ (Universität Graz 2019) which have previously been summarized in Anja Krasser, ‘Zur grundrechtlichen Zulässigkeit einer Impfpflicht’ (2020) 2020/206 RdM 136. analyses the issues at hand based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

Abstract New Caledonia is a colonial territory of France. Since the adoption of the Nouméa Accord in 1998, a period of transition towards the exercise of self-determination has been going on. New Caledonia is currently a strong autonomy, well entrenched in the legal order of France from 1999 on. The legislative powers have been distributed between the Congress of New Caledonia and the Parliament of France on the basis of a double enumeration of legislative powers, an arrangement that has given New Caledonia control over many material fields of self-determination. At the same time as this autonomy has been well embedded in the constitutional fabric of France. The Nouméa Accord was constitutionalized in the provisions of the Constitution of France and also in an Institutional Act. This normative framework created a multi-layered electorate that has presented several challenges to the autonomy arrangement and the procedure of self-determination, but the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have resolved the issues regarding the right to vote in manners that take into account the local circumstances and the fact that the aim of the legislation is to facilitate the self-determination of the colonized people, the indigenous Kanak people. The self-determination process consists potentially of a series of referendums, the first of which was held in 2018 and the second one in 2020. In both referendums, those entitled to vote returned a No-vote to the question of ‘Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?’ A third referendum is to be expected before October 2022, and if that one also results in a no to independence, a further process of negotiations starts, with the potential of a fourth referendum that will decide the mode of self-determination New Caledonia will opt for, independence or autonomy.

Abstract In this article, I seek to defend three main claims: Firstly, that the kinds of practices that are the object of study of constitutional theorists are undergirded by certain fundamental shared understandings. Secondly, that these shared understandings together form a rich fabric of meaning that is, broadly speaking, held in common across modern western societies, which I call the ‘constitutional imaginary’. Thirdly, that political institutions play a symbolic role as ‘repositories’ of shared understandings, which is crucial for the development, maintenance, propagation and evolution of the constitutional imaginary. On the basis of these claims, I propose a distinctive role for constitutional theory: the interpretation of the social meaning of political institutions and the actions and events that take place in and around them.