ABSTRACT This article analyses the medical response to rape victims in India as one that prioritizes the collection of evidence over providing care, treatment, and support. It argues that such a prioritization stems from patriarchal and imperialist assumptions that have been embedded into the foundations of the medico-legal jurisprudence on rape. These assumptions posit the rape victim as one whose story must always be disbelieved, unless there is objective, scientific evidence that supports it. It is on that basis that this article poses a fundamental critique of the current medical response to rape victims in India based on principles of feminist medical theory and jurisprudence. It also proposes an alternative structure based on the tenets of a feminist conception of medical jurisprudence which places the victim’s needs at the forefront.

ABSTRACT The past decade has seen a massive rise in the role of social media influencers in society. Disparagement, originally a common law remedy meant to protect trademark holders from unfair disparagement of their products or mark, is now being used as a tool to suppress free speech on the internet. By looking at several cases in the light of the culture theory of trademark and the right to freedom of speech and expression, this article argues that courts need to exercise caution while deciding upon cases pertaining to disparagement. Trademark law ought to be used while keeping its consumer protection rationale in mind, balancing disparagement with consumer welfare and the right to freedom of speech and expression.

ABSTRACT Should a secular state accommodate personal laws in a religiously diverse society? Must legislation reforming personal and cultural practices rest on the consent of affected groups? These questions animated the Constituent Assembly’s deliberations on the Uniform Civil Code (“UCC”). Initially conceived as a mechanism to harmonize personal laws, the UCC soon became a site of constitutional contestation over secularism, gender justice, and cultural autonomy. Proponents advanced it as essential to civic equality and national integration, while critics warned of majoritarian homogenization and emphasized the need for preserving plural legal traditions and community assent. The Constituent Assembly ultimately located the UCC within the non-justiciable Directive Principles, signalling a compromise between legal uniformity and pluralist accommodation. Revisiting these debates, this article argues that the democratic legitimacy of personal law reform rests not on equality or uniformity alone, but on inclusive deliberation, negotiated consent, and institutional patience within a plural constitutional order.

ABSTRACT Federalism is the centrepiece reform of Nepal’s 2015 post-conflict Constitution. However, the seven new provinces face considerable challenges as they seek to facilitate the redressal of socio-economic inequality and improve sensitivity to regional difference – historic drivers of conflict. Building on the concept of hourglass federalism to engage the discourse on decentralization in conflict-affected contexts, we highlight how Nepal’s constitutionally enshrined, autonomous third tier of local government may be better situated to work towards these ends. We argue that while the hourglass schematic has already delivered on some of the key aims of the new Constitution (like inclusion), several important challenges remain, including the decentralization of the political party system and economies of scale. Unless the initial inclusion dividend and increased responsiveness of government are consolidated, there is a risk that the state will be gradually recentralized (in practice), undermining the gains of the post-conflict constitution-making process.

ABSTRACT The freedom of speech and the right to information are crucial fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Various governments have committed to protecting these rights. However, most governments have acted in breach of this commitment by using vague laws for political reasons. Through this article, we look at one such law often used for political reasons to enforce broadcasting bans, namely the Cable Television Network (Regulations) Act, 1995. We argue that the legislative framework for broadcasting under the said Act is constitutionally suspect. The problems that make this framework constitutionally suspect are: procedural and substantive unreasonableness, lack of uniform enforcement and absence of an effective statutory remedy. After identifying the defects in this law, we develop a normative constitutionally compliant framework for the regulation of broadcasters. Among other things, we recommend: clearly defining the contours of grounds for imposing broadcasting bans and separating the “investigating” and “adjudicatory” functions.

ABSTRACT The Indian Constitution obligates the Governors to act with the aid and advise of their Council of Ministers except in those matters where discretionary powers have been explicitly conferred upon them. Despite the absence of an explicit power to order a state government to face a floor test before the House, Governors have been using their discretion to make such directions. While defining the ambit of this discretion, several Inter-State Council reports and judicial pronouncements have assented to this practice. This paper argues against this trend and asserts that the process of summoning the assembly for a “floor test” must be driven by the choice of elected legislators rather than the Governors’ subjective satisfaction. Towards this end, this paper proposes a four-level formula, with certain rights for the opposition parties, which must be followed by the Governors when the confidence of the House in the incumbent government is questioned.

ABSTRACT For religious disputes, Indian courts apply the essential practices doctrine, granting constitutional protection only to practices that are “essential to the religion.” This test soon acquired a normative character, sometimes excluding “superstitious” practices. However, some scholars believe that courts can evaluate essentiality without making normative judgements. We suggest that this distinction between descriptive and normative essentiality tests is deceptive. Instead, we argue that evaluations of essentiality are cryptonormative (i.e. even evaluations that are not facially normative possess a normative character). Recent Supreme Court judgements indicate that it might depart from the essential practices doctrine. If it does, courts should instead evaluate the sincerity of the claimant and the plausibility of the claim and then balance religious freedom against the state interest. However, adjudicative norms, including limitations posed by public interest litigation, impede a non-normative inquiry. We suggest the beginnings of an alternate approach that might help overcome those challenges.

ABSTRACT As a self-imposed norm of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court has held that a judgement may be overruled only by a bench larger than the bench which delivered the judgement. Being a facet of the doctrine of stare decisis, the “Larger Bench Rule” achieves certainty, equality, and efficiency in adjudication, and secures public legitimacy for the Court. The Rule also accords equal weight to the wisdom of every judge. But the Court has breached the Rule in some key cases. We trace seven instances where smaller or coordinate benches explicitly or impliedly overruled binding judgements. The Court did this, we show, by ignoring precedent, shoddily “distinguishing” precedent, expressly disagreeing with precedent on merits, or unfairly declaring the precedent invalid for itself contravening the Larger Bench Rule. Finally, we suggest – preliminarily – some measures to ensure adherence to the Rule in future.

ABSTRACT Nergesh Meerza is one of the earliest and most grave failures of the Supreme Court of India in the field of discrimination law. In a single stroke, not only did the Court drive a wedge between sex and gender to protect only the former from discrimination, it also debarred indirect and intersectional discrimination from the purview of the Constitution. This article presents a feminist judgment in this case which dissents from the original decision of the Court. It develops a version of constitutional protection from sex discrimination which embodies gender, indirect and intersectional discrimination. Importantly, it ventures into the hitherto neglected field of non-discrimination under Articles 15(1) and 16(2), and develops a substantive test for violations. Nergesh Meerza makes clear that without such a test, judges inevitably fail to give any meaning to the non-discrimination guarantees as part of the equality code of the Constitution.

ABSTRACT Simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies have been proposed by the NITI Aayog and other government institutions to minimize the disruptions caused by frequent elections which include enormous expenditure, administrative burden, communal violence, policy manipulation, etc. These institutions endeavour to introduce and sustain simultaneous elections with the aid of mechanisms like constructive vote of no-confidence, fixed-term legislatures, and executive rule in case of premature dissolutions. Such proposals are based on the misplaced assumption of the dependence of simultaneity on these mechanisms. We find that simultaneity can be introduced without incurring accountability costs. In a bid to achieve stability in governance, they make the system rigid, attack the principles of democracy and federalism, and erode executive accountability towards the legislature, implicating an important tenet of parliamentary democracy. We suggest alternative models which introduce simultaneity without the aid of these mechanisms through flexible legislative terms and phased elections.