I propose redefining Gascón’s (2021) notion of argumentative bullshit by adding three words to its original formulation. Consequently, argumentative bullshit would be defined as the production of an ar­gument without concern for the strength of the supporting relation between the reasons and the claim. I then examine Mukerji and Mannino’s (2022) general account of argumentative bullshit. Using Grice’s conversational maxims, I show how it can be further extended into a taxonomy of bullshit illocu­tionary acts—an extension Gascón himself hints at.

It is widely recognized in legal scholarship that international law functions as an argumentation practice, but its purpose remains debated. Some argue it legitimizes legal facts, while others believe it persuades actors to adopt specific positions. I align with Harald Wohlrapp's argumentation theory, which focuses on acquiring new orientations. I will outline why Wohlrapp's theory suits international law by examining three elements: prioritizing validity over mere assent, introducing "midrange universality" that balances community perspectives with a universal outlook, and introducing "framing" to responsibly integrate diverse cultural and legal perspectives, including those from the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).

Sometimes we argue about cats or about whether there is a largest prime number. Other times we argue about arguments. When we do this, we engage in meta-argument. Most accounts of meta-argument in the literature view it retrospectively: we meta-argue about arguments that have already been made. In so doing, we may find meta-reasons for rejecting an otherwise good argument, among other things. This paper considers meta-argument in the other direction, that is, prospectively. To illustrate this concept, we explore cases where one has meta-reasons for intentionally making bad arguments or where one argues not by offering an argument, but by communicating in a non-argumentative fashion that supports other arguments. We call these later cases para-argument.

Abstract: This paper critically examines the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of visual arguments and proposes a resolution to this issue. Using a type-theory framework, the legitimacy of visual arguments is addressed through two key sub-problems. First, the paper argues that visual arguments exist, with their existence grounded in dynamic existentialism. Second, it contends that visual argumentation theory can expand argumentation theory in both descriptive and normative aspects. The paper advocates for a moderate defense of visual arguments, offering a stronger foundation for future research in the field. Résumé: Cet article examine de manière critique le débat actuel sur la légitimité des arguments visuels et propose une solution à ce problème. En s'appuyant sur la théorie des types, la légitimité des arguments visuels est abordée à travers deux sous-problèmes clés. Premièrement, l'article soutient l'existence des arguments visuels, fondée sur l'existentialisme dynamique. Deuxièmement, il soutient que la théorie de l'argumentation visuelle peut élargir la théorie de l'argumentation, tant sur le plan descriptif que normatif. L'article prône une défense modérée des arguments visuels, offrant ainsi une base plus solide aux recherches futures dans ce domaine.

Abstract: This paper aims to develop the criteria for assessing semantic arguments. However, while this notion constituted the core of ancient dialectics and is addressed in several approaches to argument analysis, the criteria for evaluating such arguments are insufficient. This paper intends to address this problem by combining the insights of classical and contemporary logic and testing them against some controversies involving controversial definitions or classifications. Through detailed case studies of the argumentative uses involving the (re)definitions of racism, war, peace, and feminism, we formulated and tested eight evaluation criteria that may be expressed as critical questions. Résumé: Cet article vise à développer les critères d’évaluation des arguments sémantiques. Cependant, bien que cette notion constitue le coeur de la dialectique ancienne et soit abordée dans plusieurs approches de l’analyse des arguments, les critères d’évaluation de ces arguments sont insuffisants. Cet article vise à résoudre ce problème en combinant les idées de la logique classique et contemporaine et en les testant par rapport à certaines controverses impliquant des définitions ou des classifications controversées. À travers des études de cas détaillées sur les usages argumentatifs impliquant les (re)définitions du racisme, de la guerre, de la paix et du féminisme, nous avons formulé et mis à l’épreuve huit critères d'évaluation qui peuvent être exprimés sous forme de questions critiques.

The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.

In this paper, a reaction is presented to Siegel’s claim that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation ignores or neglects epistemological viewpoints that he finds vital to any normative theory of argumentation. The focus is on the most important problems in Siegel’s argument: 1) the ambiguity of the term ‘argument’ and the alleged negligence of this ambiguity in pragma-dialectics; 2) the critical rational perspective of the pragma-dialectical account; and 3) the alleged negligence of the “abstract propositional sense” of argument in pragma-dialectics.

BOOKS RECEIVED Informal Logic no longer invites descriptive book reviews. However, at the end of each issue of the journal, Informal Logic will print, and re-print, notices of monographs, collected papers, proceedings of conferences, anthologies and any similar scholarly books (not textbooks) published during the previous four years on topics related to informal logic, critical thinking, argument (logic, dialectic, rhetoric