Abstract

The paramilitary forces known as the “Gendarmerie” emerged as a novel mechanism for societal control following the French Revolution. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser instituted the Central Security Forces (CSF) in 1969, drawing inspiration from the French Gendarmerie model, in response to mass protests. However, he developed it to suit the security needs in Egypt, where its operation expanded to include both urban and rural areas, not just rural areas as in France and Türkiye. After President Nasser’s unexpected death in 1970, his deputy, Anwar Sadat, assumed power. During his tenure, the CSF underwent two significant developments. After the assassination of former President Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak restructured the CSF and deployed it across Egypt to ensure the regime’s ability to confront any local threats that might endanger it. Nevertheless, the CSF failed to quell the protests of January 2011 and collapsed, which contributed to Mubarak stepping down from his position. This article investigates the role of the CSF in sustaining Egypt’s authoritarian regimes from 1969 until the 2011 uprising. It delves into the key internal and external factors behind the CSF’s formation and evolution while also analyzing the crucial circumstances that affected the forces’ performance during the 2011 revolution.

Abstract

From the 1980s onwards, the EU took a balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the last two decades, the EU has abandoned its role as a normative and neutral player. It appeared to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the context of security. On this basis, the paper aims to assess changing policies of the EU towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the early 1970s. By revisiting constructivist theories, the study attempts to find out the role of the identities in the EU’s policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It concludes that the shift in the identities of the major political actors from the Palestine Liberation Organization to Hamas led to the reformulation of its policy toward Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Türkiye’s public diplomacy has begun to be addressed within a systematic framework following the establishment of the Directorate of Communications in 2018. With this new phase, Türkiye, has entered a period which is marked by the strengthening and deepening of its public diplomacy policies across institutional, theoretical, and practical terms. Today, Türkiye’s public diplomacy ecosystem, composed of diverse actors, is shaped by the principle of ‘Strengthening the Türkiye Brand.’ Enhancing Türkiye’s reputation globally, cultivating positive perceptions, and establishing permanent relationships with foreign audiences sit at the heart of Türkiye’s public diplomacy practices and nation branding strategies. This article aims to put a spotlight on Türkiye’s public diplomacy ecosystem by examining its practices and highlight the transformative impact of institutionalization on this ecosystem through the concept of nation branding. It is stressed that as public diplomacy efforts led by the Directorate of Communications have become institutionalized, Türkiye has been actively promoting its nation brand, making use of different aspects of public diplomacy tools. The article shines light on public diplomacy actors’ efforts regarding the shared goal of ‘Strengthening the Türkiye Brand.’

This research shows that the U.S. recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights is a radical shift in U.S. policy regarding the ownership of lands seized by military force since the Second World War. It is also considered a new and implicit abandonment by Washington of its commitment as a guarantor of the post-war international order. Moreover, this recognition will set a precedent for other countries to militarily seize any lands they claim are vital to their strategic security. Crucially, this recognition does not have any legal effect. It is null and void, with no international value or legitimacy, and is a clear violation of the provisions of international law and international treaties, agreements, covenants, and norms. It also threatens international peace and security and incites other countries to seize illegally the lands of their neighbors. Furthermore, it is contrary to all resolutions that have been issued in a legitimate manner, including those issued by the United Nations obligating Israel to return these lands. The Golan is legally recognized internationally as occupied Syrian territory before and after this recognition. Since the right to self-determination is linked to peoples and not to states, Israel cannot confiscate this right under the pretext that “the Syrian state has engaged in an aggressive war against its people.”

Indonesian Islamic thought is important in the context of contemporary Indonesian politics. Contemporary politics has seen a shift from sectarian and ideological toward more inclusive and dynamic dialogues. In Indonesian Islamic thought, there is a contestation in the public sphere between conservative and progressive currents. The conservative trends are usually rather closed to new interpretations, while the progressive tend to be open to new trends based on social realities. The future of open Islamic thought in Indonesia as a characteristic of wasatiyah Islam will be maintained as its two largest Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), continue to fight for the ideals of Islam. In addition, inclusive Islam will gain strength if political parties are no longer sectarian but extend the post-Islamism movement.

This commentary examines the changes and transitions in the Arab regional order in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict since the foundation of the Israeli state. The discussion centers on four main transformations in the Arab regional order that occurred after major wars or confrontations with the Zionist regime. It also suggests that due to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the conflict may enter a fifth phase. In addition, the analysis addresses the failure of the strategic decision made by the Arab states to only back a political settlement with Israel. It also argues that the American strategy to integrate Israel into the region and pursue a policy of normalization with its Arab allies was the main causality of the October 7 attacks. Finally, the discussion explores Israel’s strategic losses that diminish its strategic value in the region.