Abstract Regional hegemony is a realist concept explaining how great powers deal with each other and with their immediate surroundings. Realism's competing strands disagree on whether regional hegemony is a feasible objective, and on whether states should actively pursue this goal. For offensive realists, the international system's anarchic structure and the impossibility of gauging others' intentions compel states to maximize relative power and try to become the only great power in their region. They predict that a great power war is more likely because China will try to establish hegemony in Asia and the United States will try to prevent it from doing so. By contrast, defensive realists maintain that bids for hegemony are usually thwarted by powerful balancing coalitions. Defensive realists have the stronger case: In modern times, the United States is the only great power whose bid for hegemony was not thwarted by a powerful balancing coalition. The United States succeeded because conditions in North America were unusually favorable; China does not enjoy similar advantages. A Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia is likely to fail and Beijing would be unwise to attempt it. U.S. leaders can therefore adopt a measured approach to this danger, facilitating balancing behavior by the United States' Asian partners while working with China to create a more stable regional order.

Abstract How will the U.S. military's growing use of space to support its operations and the growing counterspace capabilities available to its rivals shape the balance of power? This article develops a framework to assess the U.S.-China military balance in space and applies that framework to a Taiwan scenario. It evaluates trends in both the U.S. military's dependence on space to defend Taiwan and the resilience of U.S. satellite constellations against a Chinese counterspace campaign. The findings highlight some of the challenges that China's military modernization and expansion have created for the U.S. military, but they caution against overstating the magnitude of the threat. The findings also support qualified optimism about the future: Encouraging trends in resilience will enable space to remain a major asset rather than a major liability for the U.S. military. But the Chinese military will also benefit from these positive trends in resilience, which will create new challenges for the United States in countering China's use of space to support its own military operations.

Abstract The world's two great powers, China and the United States, are competing over international order—that is, the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate relations among states and societies. China's ruling party is discontented with several features of the liberal international order that the United States and its allies constructed after World War II. Sino-American struggles over the content of institutions suggest that great powers compete to control international institutions. Such competition is especially intense when great powers have different domestic regimes, such as democracy and autocracy. Power and security are at stake because different types of international orders can grant material and social advantages to different types of states. My ecological theory of competition over international institutions makes three claims: (1) international institutions select for one regime type over alternatives; (2) the typical government believes that it is in its core interest to preserve its regime type; and (3) great powers can shape international institutions to select for their own regime type. I demonstrate these dynamics in great power relations in the interwar period (1919–1939).

Abstract The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is consistent with the logic of preventive war. States often initiate wars because they fear the consequences of a shifting balance of military power and thus strike to forestall it. They fear that, once the balance changes, the rising power may either attempt to coerce them, or initiate war later under much more favorable circumstances. The tendency to consider preventive war is exacerbated if the declining state also sees itself as having a special, and fleeting, window of opportunity to prevent the shift. This essay reviews a range of evidence to argue that Vladimir Putin likely viewed Russia's strategic situation through a preventive war frame. NATO membership for Ukraine would shift the balance of power against Russia, and U.S. and NATO military cooperation with Ukraine intensified during the Joe Biden administration. These developments likely convinced Putin that he did not have much time to forestall Ukraine's NATO membership.

Abstract China's rise, Russia's military resurgence, and India's economic growth have prompted debates about the end of unipolarity and the future balance of power. Such debates are a staple of international politics; indeed, in the late twentieth century, many observers warned that Japan and the Soviet Union would overtake the United States. Yet scholars and policymakers evince little agreement on how to define power or measure the distribution of power. This article introduces an inductive method for comparing national power. I empirically validate common metrics of national capabilities—economic and military—by assessing their ability to both predict known balances of power across historical systems (1820–1990) and distinguish between great powers and other countries. This method yields three important findings. First, large gaps in national capabilities between great powers and even superpowers have been common throughout history. Great powers need not achieve parity with the leading state to engage in a dangerous security competition. Second, this method shows that China on most dimensions is not only a great power but a superpower. Third, neither Russia nor India is a great power. The system is bipolar. These findings inform debates about the stability of international politics and the future of international order and suggest the likelihood of shifts in U.S. grand strategy and alliances.

From April 1, 2023, to March 31, 2024, International Security received 352 new article manuscripts. International Security relies heavily on the evaluations and advice of external reviewers in making its editorial decisions. The editors thank the reviewers listed below for their invaluable assistance. As in previous years, we are recognizing outstanding reviewers for the exceptional quality, quantity, and timeliness of their reviews. Outstanding reviewers are denoted with an asterisk (*).Aisha AhmadMarsin AlshamaryMary Beth AltierVictor AsalBoaz AtziliPaul AveyAlice BaKathrin BachleitnerKristin Bakke*Thierry BalzacqKyle BeardsleyMichael BeckleyChristopher BlairRuth BlakeleyBrian Blankenship*Mariel BorowitzMålfrid Braut-HegghammerHillary BriffaRisa BrooksStephen BrooksRyan BrutgerH. Zeynep BulutgilCole BunzelDaniel Byman*Austin CarsonVictor ChaSteve ChanSamuel CharapStephen ChaudoinThomas ChristensenJohn CiorciariJoe ClareBridget CogginsLindsay CohnSusan ColbournZack CooperJack CorbettRogier CreemersMartha CrenshawChristopher DayAnjali DayalLauren DickeyJanina Dill*Jennifer DixonJohn DownerAlexander Downes*David EdelsteinLynn EdenNaomi EgelAndrew EricksonJennifer EricksonTyler FelgenhauerUlrike FrankeM. Taylor Fravel*Matthew FuhrmannJenna GibsonFrancesca GiovanniniCharles GlaserStacie Goddard*James GoldgeierJoshua R. GoodmanBrendan Rittenhouse Green*Kelly GreenhillKelly Grieco*Michael GrossNils HagerdalTodd HallAndrew HaltermanRon Hassner*Marina HenkeAllen HertzkeStephen Herzog*Henrik Stålhane HiimMarkus HochmüllerEmily HollandMichael C. Horowitz*Lise Morjé HowardVictoria HuiYasuhiro IzumikawaBruce JentlesonLauren JohnstonTyler JostPaul KapurSabrina KarimScott KastnerHiro KatsumataStuart Kaufman*Edward KeeneAnita KelloggJoshua David Kertzer*Charles KingSarah KrepsMinseon KuDominika KunertovaKendrick KuoRaymond Cheng KuoMarika Landau-WellsAdria Lawrence*Christopher LayneNicola LeveringhausKeir LieberJennifer Lind*Jon LindsayDavid C. LoganAustin LongAnthony LopezXiaoyu LuRichard MaassSimon MabonKimberly MartenLennart MaschmeyerDaniel MattinglyRose McDermott*John Mearsheimer*Avishai MelamedBarak MendelsohnAnja MenzelJonathan Mercer*Marion MessmerJeffrey MichaelsSimon MilesAsfandyar MirAssaf MoghadamDavid Morgan-OwenJohn MuellerMichelle MurrayAmy J. NelsonHollie Nyseth NzitatiraCyril ObiMiyeon OhJohn M. OwenSumita PahwaRobert PapeRoland ParisChristiana ParreiraEdward ParsonFrank PasqualeReid B. C. PaulyZi En Kimberly Peh*Susan PetersonJeffrey PickeringAbigail PostKathleen Powers*Xiaoyu PuMakram RabahRobert ReardonDan Reiter*William RenoChristine Sixta Rinehart*Meg Rithmire*James RogersAsh RossiterMahsa Rouhi*Joshua RovnerBelgin San-AkcaKarthika Sasikumar*Elizabeth SaundersJonah Schulhofer-WohlRachel SchwartzAndrew ScobellNina SiloveNaunihal Singh*Rebecca SlaytonJack SnyderDaniel SobelmanJoseph SoetersKathryn StonerRebecca StratingScott StrausCaitlin TalmadgeJordan TamaShiping TangNina TannenwaldDaniel TavanaJessica TeetsAnnie Tracy SamuelChristopher TwomeyBenjamin A. Valentino*Sara Van GoozenSanne Cornelia J. VerschurenJames WalshAlex Weisiger*Spencer WillardsonPaul WilliamsWilliam WohlforthMichael WoldemariamDanielle YoungJinghan ZengKetian Zhang*

Abstract How strong are the constraints against nuclear use? Experimental studies find that a majority or near majority of citizens in multiple major powers approve of their own governments’ nuclear strikes if they create military advantages or protect co-national soldiers. But what if the nuclear taboo only begins at the water's edge when individuals evaluate the use of nuclear weapons by a foreign government? Many policymakers believe that the international reaction to nuclear use would be severe, especially among allies. Yet prior studies have not tested this assumption. An identity-based theory of support for nuclear weapons use proposes that this argument is incorrect. The public will display favoritism toward allied and partner countries because it views them as members of the in-group. Four survey experiments in the United States and India provide evidence for this theory. In contrast to many policymakers’ expectations, public approval of nuclear use is not significantly lower for allies or strategic partners than for one's own government. As expected, however, approval is lower for out-groups, such as non-allied and non-partner countries. Absolute support for nuclear attacks is also high, even when it is foreign countries pushing the button. On balance, these findings are inconsistent with the existence of a nuclear taboo or strong non-use norm.

Abstract Conventional wisdom holds that conflict is highly likely during a power transition between declining and rising powers. The spread of global supply chains has provided new economic weapons for great powers waging these conflicts, but the businesses that constitute global supply chains can make it harder or easier for them to do so. A structural theory of business-state relations shows how power transitions affect a state's ability to exercise economic statecraft. As a dominant power and a rising power approach parity, they face structural incentives to use economic statecraft to decouple their economies. The resulting threat to businesses’ profits changes business-state relations: high-value businesses within the dominant power tend to oppose their state's use of economic statecraft, whereas low-value businesses within the rising power tend to cooperate with their state's use of economic statecraft. The Anglo-German power transition from 1890 to 1914 and the U.S.-China power transition since 1990 illustrate the theory. The findings shift scholarly debates on the use of economic statecraft in modern great power competition and have policy implications for weaponizing supply chains against rising powers like China.