ABSTRACT This research examines how evaluability is influenced by the interplay of attribute framing, magnitude information, and reference points. In two experiments, participants evaluated scenarios varying in framing valence (positive vs. negative), magnitude polarity, and the availability of a base‐rate reference point. The results indicated that framing valence systematically biased evaluations regardless of reference‐point availability and magnitude polarity. However, the availability of a reference point improved calibration, revealing higher sensitivity of evaluations to magnitude information. Experiment 2 extended these findings by manipulating reference‐point value. The results demonstrated that evaluations are highly sensitive to the relative value of magnitudes compared with the reference point, yet absolute magnitude made an additional contribution. These findings are consistent with fuzzy‐trace theory, insofar as they align with its dual‐route framework, and may be interpreted as compatible with the idea that evaluability is associated with dual cognitive routes: gist‐based processes may contribute to susceptibility to framing bias, whereas verbatim‐based processes may support magnitude sensitivity and improve calibration. Importantly, the present research did not directly test fuzzy‐trace theory against alternative accounts; therefore, it cannot determine whether fuzzy‐trace theory uniquely explains the observed findings or whether other accounts could explain them. The research highlights the intricate nature of evaluability by demonstrating that providing reference‐point information can enhance magnitude sensitivity without mitigating framing bias. Practical implications for information presentation are discussed, and future directions are outlined for promoting theoretical understanding of evaluability mechanisms.

ABSTRACT Consequentialist theories of judgment and choice hold that individuals and actions should be evaluated in terms of the outcomes they produce, but not on how they bring about (otherwise equivalent) outcomes. This paper demonstrates a striking violation of consequentialism in judgment when fatal martyrdom—sacrificing one's life for a cause—is introduced. Across six experiments ( N total = 4861), including one preregistered replication, US participants judged scenarios in which a protagonist takes actions to save members of his group from an attack. They evaluated the protagonist and his actions more positively when he (voluntarily) sacrificed his life in the process, compared with when he achieved the same goal without dying. This is despite the fact that the former scenario—which adds self‐sacrifice to an otherwise identical chain of events—is clearly worse for the protagonist (and his fellow group members). Moreover, fatal martyrdom (self‐sacrifice) boosted evaluations even when the protagonist belonged to a despised group and his actions produced harmful outcomes that served an aversive cause. These results show that people praise fatal martyrdom (self‐sacrifice), regardless of its consequences, and regardless of whether they generally support or oppose the martyr and the martyr's cause. The experiments also examined several potential mechanisms and boundary conditions of this fatal martyrdom effect, and they show that the effect can occur even in the absence of human intergroup conflict.

ABSTRACTBiases are prevalent in human judgment and decision‐making (JDM). Previous research has suggested that some biases might share common underlying causes and can be accounted for under dual‐process theories in which fast and error‐prone System 1 drives erroneous behavior. Here, we use an online paradigm to investigate similarities and differences in behavior across three commonly studied cognitive bias phenomena: cognitive reflection test (CRT), gambler's fallacy (GF), and conjunction fallacy (CF). These are all thought to emerge during biased System 1 processing. Critically, we examine both summative performance metrics and process tracing measures derived from mouse cursor movements and growth curve analysis (GCA). Summative performance in these tasks was broadly in line with previous studies, and we replicated correlations in accuracy between tasks (CRT vs. CF and CRT vs. GF). However, we found key differences in our GCA of mouse trajectories. Specifically, in the CRT and the CF tasks, participants tended to choose the incorrect option more quickly relative to the correct option, as might be expected. However, the opposite tendency was observed for GF—people tended to take longer to choose the wrong answer. We also found evidence from the mouse movement analyses for between‐task differences in the extent to which participants were tempted by the option they did not choose. These findings challenge prominent dual‐process accounts of JDM and highlight the potential of process tracing (and in particular mouse movement analyses) for revealing insights into cognitive processes.

ABSTRACTA cursory read of the popular press and the JDM research field suggest that they have very different beliefs regarding the consequences of confidence. And these beliefs have important consequences themselves. For individuals, how one views the consequences of confidence (and whether they are positive or negative) likely influences the extent to which one pursues the development of confidence and how one interprets confidence in others. For JDM researchers, their beliefs about the consequences of confidence inform research programs. For example, a belief that overconfidence leads to inappropriate medical treatments, legal advice, or investments suggests an emphasis on reducing overconfidence rather than on developing confidence. This paper aims to improve understanding of both the general public's and JDM researchers' beliefs about the consequences of confidence in knowledge. We present a general theoretical framework for thinking about the consequences of confidence, followed by two exploratory studies designed to access these beliefs, first with the general public and then with JDM researchers. We used structured, open‐ended questioning to generate a large dataset (over 10,000 responses) of potential consequences of low confidence, high confidence, overconfidence, and underconfidence. Qualitative coding identified a broad set of respondent‐generated beliefs regarding psychological and behavioral consequences, organized into antonym pairs (e.g., arrogant/high self‐image vs. low self‐image). Respondents made few distinctions between low confidence and underconfidence, viewing both negatively. However, the general public drew a sharp distinction between high confidence (described positively) and overconfidence (described negatively), a trend less prevalent among JDM researchers.

ABSTRACTRecent theories of decision‐making, such as Decision by Sampling, suggest that people lack stable preferences. Instead, preferences are malleable and constructed in the moment by comparisons of target attributes to small samples of attribute values active in working memory. Manipulating the distribution of attribute values observed before a choice has therefore been suggested to affect subsequent choices. In a series of four experiments, we investigate if prior exposure to different distributions of attribute values affect subsequent pairwise, two‐alternative forced choices and listwise choices between multiple options. We also investigate if these suggested effects are attenuated by domain expertise. We typically find that listwise choices are affected by prior experience of attributes in the predicted manner but that the pairwise choices are not. This occurs even when we hold range constant, and the effect is reduced but not eliminated by substantial domain expertise. We propose that this format dependence of the malleability of choices is an important challenge for any theory of their cognitive origin.

In table 3 on page 9 of 15 there is an error in the row corresponding to variable 6.IGT AA (Iowa Gambling Task advantageous cards selected).1.The mean and range values for IGT AA are incorrectly reported as follows:a. Range should be 6-60 (not 0-54).b.M should be 33.34(not 26.66).

No abstract is available for this article.

ABSTRACTSubjective experiences of resource scarcity can make individuals short‐term oriented, capture attention, and trigger feelings of unfairness. However, the impact of scarcity on information processing and ethical decision‐making remains poorly understood. This eye‐tracking study explored how acute financial scarcity affects selective information search and ethical decision‐making in an economic task with competing incentives (N = 60, 12,000 observations). Results revealed that participants experiencing financial scarcity displayed a strong attentional bias towards financially tempting information, although they ultimately did not behave more unethically. These findings might reveal a “moral boundary” dictating when attentional biases translate into decision‐making. Our results contribute to understanding how individuals in scarcity contexts process and prioritize information in ethical decision‐making, helping organizations and policymakers combat stereotypes surrounding resource‐deprived individuals, and design evidence‐based policy interventions promoting ethical behavior in financially scarce situations.

ABSTRACTIntertemporal choices (i.e., the choice between a sooner available but smaller reward and a later available but larger reward) were initially thought to reflect stable preferences for immediate or delayed rewards. However, recently, it has been shown that intertemporal choices are influenced by factors such as context variables and attentional processes. Here, we investigate if another factor, the choice repetition bias, affects decision making and attentional processes in intertemporal choice. The choice repetition bias is characterized by the tendency to repeat previous choices and to be slower when switching to an alternative choice. In a series of two experiments (including a preregistered, eye‐tracking study), we find that the choice repetition bias exists in intertemporal choice. We also find tentative support for an early attentional bias towards the favored attribute dimension of the previous choice; however, this effect disappears when taking the whole decision process into account. This finding raises interesting questions about the cognitive processes underlying the choice repetition bias. In addition, we successfully replicate other attentional effects from the intertemporal choice literature (e.g., more fixations on monetary dimension, gaze cascade effect).