As an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy on the Yijing and Western metaphysics, this article examines the variety of uses to which the Yijing has been put in the past and offers suggestions as to why the vast majority of Western philosophers, and even many recent Chinese philosophers, have tended to ignore it. Drawing on insights conveyed by the papers included in the special issue, as well as on various other recent research related to this topic, I argue that the Yijing has a largely untapped potential to be used by philosophers who seek to construct metaphysical arguments and systems. Everyone interested in gaining wisdom through philosophical reflection—whether their main focus is on Chinese thinkers, on Western thinkers, or on thinkers from other, more marginalized traditions—can benefit by accepting the challenge posed by this classical Chinese book of wisdom.

The ancient Daoist document Hengxian 《恒先》 contains a fascinating and unique concept, Zuo 作 that expresses a unique view of the world and human affairs. There are three stages of Huo-Zuo 或作, Qi-Zuo 氣作, and Ren-Zuo 人作 to understand the meanings associated with Zuo. On a metaphysical level, Zuo implies the world's actuation. Huo-Zuo explains how Hengxian 恒先 gave rise to material existence from Xuwu 虛無. During the process whereby Qi 氣 gave rise to all things, Qi was the inner motivating force driving the evolution of the universe. Qi-Zuo is a specific manifestation of Huo-Zuo in the generation process. In the sphere of human affairs, divergence appears in the meanings of the concept of Zuo. By giving the standard of not interfering in the spontaneous Zuo of others, Hengxian 《恒先》 sets a criterion for Zuo in human affairs.

Gadamer's linguistic turn has been criticized for eclipsing ontological grounds for truth by conflating the meaning of existence with history. Chung-ying Cheng's recognizes the nihilistic implications of a ceaseless quest for meaning that cannot but perpetually slip away and in response, discloses the cosmo-ontological grounds that Gadamer's interpretive acts presuppose. In so doing, Cheng initiates a theoretical appropriation and integration between Western philosophy and the Yijing tradition. However, Cheng also interprets Gadamer from a Heideggerian perspective without due regard to Plato. When Gadamer's turn to language is understood in terms of his claim that Socrates removes the contradiction between the Pythagorean One and the many by studying the forms in language, then there is room in the said turn for temporalizing the meaning of Being in the dialogue form. It is through the dialectical interplay between the auditory and visual dispositions underlying orality and literacy, the two mediums in which human understanding is entangled for Gadamer, that the "creative" emerges in his thought from within and out of a prior historically effected consciousness that in the final analysis attests to the universality of Cheng's onto-generative hermeneutics.

“Huo” 或 in “Heng Xian” 恆先 of the Chu bamboo slips in the Shanghai Museum is a significant concept in cosmology and cosmogony. “Huo,” as a cosmogonic period, is after “heng” 恆 (the permanent), but prior to qi 氣 (material force), hence it is relatively important. This term in the manuscript is used as an indefinite pronoun, meaning “something”, rather than “exist” (as a verb), “indefinitely/maybe” (as an adverb) or “a state between being and nothingness”. However, in the cosmogonic sequence, it is indeed intermediate between nothingness (“heng xian”, the permanent beginning) and being (qi, or you 有, being/to be). That “huo,” as an indefinite pronoun, can be used as a philosophical concept is testified by “Bai Xin” 白心 (Purifying the Heart-mind) in the Book of Guanzi 管子 and “Ze yang” 則陽 in the Book of Zhuangzi, in which the term “huo” also means “something.” “Heng Xian” uses an indefinite pronoun “huo” to refer to a stage in the genesis of the cosmos. This shows, on the one hand, that its author has contemplated cosmology more profoundly; on the other hand, it shows that the author's knowledge about the structure of cosmogony has not yet been fully developed. Moreover, the concepts “huo” and “heng xian” both develop the notion implicit in the concept of “heng.”

As an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy on the Yijing and Western metaphysics, this article examines the variety of uses to which the Yijing has been put in the past and offers suggestions as to why the vast majority of Western philosophers, and even many recent Chinese philosophers, have tended to ignore it. Drawing on insights conveyed by the papers included in the special issue, as well as on various other recent research related to this topic, I argue that the Yijing has a largely untapped potential to be used by philosophers who seek to construct metaphysical arguments and systems. Everyone interested in gaining wisdom through philosophical reflection—whether their main focus is on Chinese thinkers, on Western thinkers, or on thinkers from other, more marginalized traditions—can benefit by accepting the challenge posed by this classical Chinese book of wisdom.

By placing the history of American interactions with China in the foreground, this essay aims to bring what is hidden into critical awareness. In this endeavor, I use three elements of historical interpretation—visibility, love, and discipline—and provide examples of how the moral imperative is equalized by the incongruous sides of global consciousness and ethnic identity. I then discuss eight immigration cases from the Chinese Exclusion Period (1882–1943) to describe how anti-immigration efforts attempted to halt Chinese footprints around American walls. Finally, I conclude with a rationale as to why uniting spirit with action deepens co-existence in the present day.

Journal of Chinese PhilosophyVolume 45, Issue 3-4 p. 136-139 Special Theme: Onto-Generative Studies: Hengxian Pian 《恒先篇》 (I) 《恒先》專題導論 (Introduction to the Special Theme on Hengxian《恒先》) Cao Feng, Corresponding Author Cao Feng caofeng2014@ruc.edu.cn Renmin University of China, Beijing, P.R. ChinaCAO FENG, Professor, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China. Specialties: Pre-Qin and Qin-Han philosophy, Daoism, philosophical studies on unearthed texts. E-mail: caofeng2014@ruc.edu.cnSearch for more papers by this author Cao Feng, Corresponding Author Cao Feng caofeng2014@ruc.edu.cn Renmin University of China, Beijing, P.R. ChinaCAO FENG, Professor, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China. Specialties: Pre-Qin and Qin-Han philosophy, Daoism, philosophical studies on unearthed texts. E-mail: caofeng2014@ruc.edu.cnSearch for more papers by this author First published: 20 June 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6253.12378Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume45, Issue3-4September-December 2018Pages 136-139 RelatedInformation

The biblical narrative of the Akedah and the Chinese tale "Guo Ju Buries His Son" (to piously support his mother), both of which are extensively circulated in their respective cultures, share many similarities and remain controversial. Ancient biblical scholars and Confucian literati have exerted interpretational efforts to reduce the tensions of the narratives and respond to the many critiques raised related to the conduct of Abraham and Guo Ju. This cross-textual reading of the two tales provides clarity and enriches the understanding of both texts by exploring their historical settings.

Hegel’s account of China, based mainly on the reports of European travelers and missionaries, is hardly trustworthy. Attention to it, however, can illuminate Hegel’s own critical practices. Displacing his claims about China onto the imaginary nation of “Baffinland,” I argue that Hegel’s critical standards derive from the basic nature of his thought, which requires that a good society be one that not merely tolerates but encourages the full development of human diversity. As an example of how this might work, I turn to the Rwandan practice of imihigo, in which an individual publicly spells out the contributions that only he or she can make to the community.