ABSTRACT Based on empirical data from a survey that we conducted in 2020 of key informants in local governments (CIOs, CISOs, and IT Directors), this paper examines patterns of cyberattacks, types of attackers, the frequencies of incidents and breaches of local government IT systems, and purposes of attacks. The paper also examines whether and to what extend local governments offer cybersecurity awareness training to their officials and staff and whether a nexus exists between training and these persons support for cybersecurity in their governments. Throughout the paper, we compare data from the 2020 survey with data from a nationwide local government cybersecurity survey that a team that included the authors conducted in 2016. We conclude with recommendations to local governments to improve their practice and management of cybersecurity in their organisations.

ABSTRACT Are industrial policies having an impact on countries’ cybersecurity capacity across the globe? When analysing the securitisation of countries’ cyberspace, the empirical assessment of industrial policies is still rather unexplored. In parallel, scholars in the field of development have already raised their concerns regarding the risk for developing countries falling further behind vis-à-vis developed countries as a consequence of the disruptive dynamics brought forth by new technologies. Still, empirical studies that contrast the dynamics that new technologies are posing among developed and developing countries are rather scant. This paper looks to contribute to the empirical literature by assessing the role of industrial policy in cyber-related challenges through a cross-country OLS estimation model. Results show that industrial policies are having a significant impact across countries’ cyber capacities and that, moreover, there is an interactive relationship between countries’ cybersecurity capacities and R&D efforts once development values are controlled.

ABSTRACT Target 16.9 of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is the provision of legal identity for all, including birth registration by 2030. Approximately 1 billion people globally do not have basic ID credentials. To close this gap, governments in developing countries, including Nigeria, with the backing of international agencies like the World Bank, have launched digital identity schemes for residents. These schemes typically include smart cards which are required to access public and private services. The speed of implementation of these projects has come at the expense of a thorough consideration of cybersecurity and privacy. This is set against the backdrop of the rising threat of cybersecurity breaches in the world against targets such as national identity databases. This paper seeks to provide an overview of digital identity in Nigeria and use the Oxford Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre’s Cybersecurity Maturity Model Report 2019 for Nigeria to illustrate how, although progress has been made in key sectors, the implementation of the Nigeria’s digital identity programme has progressed faster than cybersecurity maturity in the country. This increases the risk of cyberattacks and opens both the national identity database and users of the digital identity to security vulnerabilities.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how the twin UN processes of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) are willing and able to address two ‘below-the-threshold’ problems in their deliberations. The call for the protection of the public core of the internet and the call for the protection against foreign election interference have been flagged by many state and non-state parties for consideration by both processes. This paper analyses the threats that the vulnerability of the public core of the internet and foreign election interference pose for stability in cyberspace, as well as the legal and normative proposals that have been suggested to promote responsible state behaviour. On the basis of the public documents that states have submitted to the more transparent OEWG process, the contours are sketched of what the inclusion of these issues in possible consensus reports for both processes may look like. The OEWG concluded its deliberations with a consensus report that addresses some aspects of these issues, shifting the task of further elaboration and guidance firstly onto the ongoing UN GGE process, as well as onto the new OEWG 2021–2025 and other UN processes that are emerging.

ABSTRACT This article traces a normalising and domesticating process in the use of digital misinformation and disinformation as part of political campaigning in Europe. Specifically, the analysis highlights innovations associated with the digital influence engineering techniques pioneered by far-right groups and agencies linked to the Kremlin, showing how there are areas of alignment and differentiation in the agendas and interests of these two groups. Their individual and collective activities in this area are important because of how they have promoted the use of similar disinforming tactics and techniques in the conduct of domestic politics.

ABSTRACT During Dmitrij Medvedev’s presidency from 2008 to 2012, the Russian government chose to promote the development of a new digital economy, with the idea that it would become a competitive sector and a tool for the external power of the country on the international market. However, in 2013, Edward Snowden’s revelations were used by the Russian government to promote the development of a strong and diversified digital industry on the domestic market, as it presumably became necessary to ensure the digital sovereignty of a country dependent on foreign actors especially American public authorities and digital companies. This new strategy brought the Russian authorities to examine new kinds of development and new standards for the domestic digital market, especially regarding its regulatory framework, in order to ensure the technological independence of the country as soon as possible (before 2020, according to the ‘State Program for an information society 2010–2020’; and then, before 2030, after the adoption of the ‘State Program for an information society 2017–2030’). In this regard, free and open-source software appeared as a practical solution, since open (i.e. publicly readable) code ensures low exploitation costs and the possibility of controlling its functions.