ABSTRACTEvents such as the leaking of hacked emails from the US Democratic National Committee before the 2016 presidential election sit between two paradigms of cybersecurity. The first paradigm focuses on intrusion (unauthorised access to networks), while the second concentrates on influence (the use of digital technologies to shift public debate). Analyses generally tackle one of these two aspects: cybersecurity specialists focus on intrusion, setting aside the complexities of the digital public sphere, while media scholars do the opposite, closely analysing flows of leaked information without considering how it was obtained. This article instead argues for conceptualising hack-and-leak operations (HLOs) as a distinct category, through a close analysis of a crucial HLO that has been overlooked by the cybersecurity literature: the release of documents from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the ‘Yemen Cyber Army’. It proposes a tripartite framework for understanding the impact of HLOs as mechanisms of delegitimization, based on their technical characteristics, social and political context and target audiences. The article suggests that the Yemen Cyber Army incident could have been an experiment for the same Russian actors who carried out the DNC operation, allowing them to hone their tactics prior to the US elections.

ABSTRACTThe most recent overview of white and grey markets in the zero-day trade was published in 2015 and much new evidence has since emerged. By examining data from bug bounty platforms, newly published pricelists and Russian language reporting, I aim to produce an updated picture of prices, market dynamics and policy implications. Analysis of the white market indicates that generally higher supply and demand is increasing prices, as more zero-days are found and organisations become more aware of the costs of breaches. Nevertheless, factors other than supply and demand shape the market, crucially the impetus among researchers to work for non-monetary rewards. Prices in the grey market also seem to be increasing, with comparisons of public price lists showing that zero-days affecting mobile operating systems, particularly iOS, were most valuable. Furthermore, recent evidence implies the existence of a grey market in Russia which is analysed below. Finally, this paper proposes three policy recommendations to mitigate the risk from zero-days, particularly as the Internet of Things comes to fruition. Secure software development, improving vulnerability disclosure legislation and establishing mechanisms for governments to decide what to do with the zero-days they find are all vital to reducing the current threat.

ABSTRACTFar from just a domain in which to counter one’s enemies and a weapon to wield against them, Russian political elites view cyberspace as the source of significant threats to Russia’s own national security. Since 2011, when networked protests broke out in multiple Russian cities following controversial parliamentary elections and against the backdrop of the so-called Arab Spring, Russian political elites have articulated their anxieties by constructing three major cyberthreats: that to regime security, that to public safety, and that to societal norms and cohesion. These cybersecurity narratives, the construction of which is explored in this article, are found to have dovetailed with broader national security narratives deployed by Russian political elites, reinforcing their messaging on national security issues. The article concludes with the observation that cybersecurity debates in Russia and in North American and Western European countries increasingly resemble each other, to a potentially problematic extent.

ABSTRACTViewing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, in May 2018, authorities in Taiwan passed the Information and Communication Management Act (ICM Act) in response to the increasing awareness of potential malicious cyberattacks targeting the public and private sectors. Under the ICM Act, both government and non-government bodies are complied with the coded regulations and new management scheme. This article provides a thorough review of the proposed national information security policies in Taiwan between 2001 and 2017, as well as to deliver a case for the comparative study of industrial policies employed to bolster domestic cybersecurity markets. Using interview data and government documents, we argue that the industrial policy for cybersecurity in Taiwan is a top-down centralised approach. The new basic law for cybersecurity requests all government agencies and the critical infrastructure providers to comply with the new regulation. On top of the legislative base, the state policy adopts traditional policy instruments as economic stimulus, for instance announcing series of national development programme, imposing new security standards, and providing financial subsidy and R&D credits for SMEs. This paper also describes the major rationale and drivers behind the government’s plan of action to shape the cybersecurity industry policy in Taiwan.

ABSTRACTThe 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security was the first major document to focus directly on national cyberthreats as a key risk to France’s sovereignty. It defined new priorities – such as cyberattack prevention and response – and established, in July 2009, the National Agency for the Security of Information System (ANSSI) as an inter-ministerial agency with national authority for the defence of information systems. In 2013, a new version of the White Paper reiterated that the capacity to detect and protect against cyberattacks was ‘an essential component of [France’s] national sovereignty and economic well-being’. The same year, the French government launched an ambitious programme and invested considerable efforts and expenditure into cybersecurity industrial policy. This article summarises the structural characteristics of public-private partnerships and outlines the different conflicts behind the industrial movements in the 2009–2015 period: representation of digital sovereignty versus corporate interest in the global market, national defence champions versus the start-up ecosystem.

ABSTRACTIn an effort to develop strong cyber resilience, international organisations, academic institutions, corporations and countries have been actively working to develop cybersecurity frameworks (CSFs). Such efforts emphasize various perspectives depending on the organisation’s intention, while their contents involve the same concept. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the many varied perspectives on CSFs and gather them into a concise view by contrasting different intentions and distilling shared concepts. To do so, this study uses the document analysis method alongside two cycles of coding (descriptive coding and pattern coding) to excerpt 12 extant CSFs. The various intentions can be cascaded with respect to four areas: 1) the promoted action, 2) the driver, 3) the framework milieu and 4) the audience. The frameworks can also be examined according to three common concepts: 1) shared actions, 2) cyber pillars and 3) the framework life cycle. A total of seven shared actions are distilled from the frameworks, while the human, organisational, infrastructure, technology and law and regulation pillar are the most frequently discussed excerpts from the CSFs. Moreover, there are three processes for securing cyberspace: profiling, delivering and assuring. The shared concepts presented in this paper may also be useful for developing a general model of a CSF.

The supporting infrastructure of a healthy public sphere is under strain. There are fundamental challenges facing journalism as it seeks a sustainable financial model. Evidence is growing of the so...

ABSTRACTData localisation should be seen as a sign of the current political climate; as the internet grows, so does its ability to empower users, hold governments accountable, and call into question much of the status quo. At the same time, governments are becoming increasingly savvy in their use of the internet to monitor the actions of users, both within their own countries and in others. Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations regarding the U.S. government's secret surveillance programme made other governments realise the potential of utilising the internet as a means to collect, analyse, and store data. It is under this purview that we will discuss data localisation. The main question of which we should keep reminding ourselves is why, in the face of clear evidence regarding the detrimental impact of data localisation in a country, a government would still opt for such a measure. The answer is to be found in power.