It is argued that, contrary to a rather prevalent view within economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. The note begins by defining these terms and justifying the choice of these definitions, proceeds to survey the main justification for this prevalent view, and concludes by highlighting its weaknesses.

An author who is lucky enough to find a close reading and deep engagement from four reviewers can only be extremely thankful, and I am. I can also say that (mostly) I don't feel misunderstood, that...

The present essay addresses the epistemic difficulties involved in achieving consensus with respect to the Hayek–Keynes debate. It is argued that the empirical implications of the relevant theories are such that, regardless of what is observed, both theories can be interpreted as true, or at least, as not falsified. The essay explicates the respects in which the empirical evidence underdetermines the choice between the relevant theories. In particular, it is argued both that there are convenient responses that protect each theory from what appears to be threatening evidence and that, for particular kinds of evidence, the two theories are empirically equivalent. Larry Laudan's suggestion that ampliative methodological criteria can resolve an underdetermined choice between multiple scientific theories is considered and rejected as a possible means to rational consensus.

A recent (though controversial) trend in economics has been to appeal to evolutionary theory when addressing various open questions in the subject. I here further investigate one particular such appeal to evolutionary biology: the argument that, since markets select (in a standard biological sense) firms as coherent units, firms should be seen to be genuine economic agents. To assess this argument, I present a model of firm/office selection in a competitive market, and show that there are cases where markets can select for firms/offices as collective units – and thus, as agents of their own – but also that there are cases where they do not. In this way, I try to make the evolutionary argument for the agency-based view of the firm more precise.

Mark Blaug was a man for all seasons. His scholarship in the history of economics, economic methodology, the economics of education, and the economics of arts and culture brought new insights to th...

This article focuses on the conventions that sustain social interaction and argues that they are central to Simon's decision-making theory. Simon clearly identifies two kinds of coordination by convention: behavioral mores that shape human actions, and shared mental models that govern human perceptions. This article argues that Poincaré–Carnap's conventionalism provides powerful support for Simon's theory; it contends that this theory offers a more convincing account of decision and coordination than Lewis' concept of convention. Simon's approach to applying conventionalist logic to social interaction emphasizes the normative role played by mental models in solving coordination problems and considers rationality in terms of both cognitive and moral considerations. By connecting conventional phenomena to social identifications, Simon stresses the resulting complexity of coordination problems

In an attempt to combat the positivist view that the only legitimate way to conduct social science is in the manner of a natural science, Knight distinguished between positivist and non-positivist categories or levels of interpretation of human-social subject matter. Since each of the categories contained ‘a large element of truth’, Knight argued that any serious analysis would need to embrace a pluralist approach. In this paper I draw on four separate accounts he gave (in 1934, 1940, 1941, and 1942) of these categories in order to arrive at a more complete statement. This fuller description will hopefully promote a deeper appreciation of Knight's emphasis on the need for adopting a pluralist approach to the subject matter of economics. I then apply the perspective of the categories to shed light on Knight's definition of economics and his criticism of Robbins' definition.

That the maximization of quality-adjusted life years violates concerns for fairness is well known. One approach to face this issue is to elicit fairness preferences of the public empirically and to incorporate the corresponding equity weights into cost-utility analysis (CUA). It is thereby sought to encounter the objections by means of an axiological modification while leaving the value-maximizing framework of CUA intact. Based on the work of Lübbe (2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, forthcoming), this paper questions this strategy and scrutinizes the concomitant assumptions concerning the nature of prioritization decisions. Empirical studies indicate that these premises are in fact unwarranted. People chose a certain resource allocation because they perceive it as a fair way to treat the persons concerned, not because it maximizes something valuable, and it is questionable if prioritization decision can be represented as value-maximizing choices at all. This reflection on the fundamental distinction between deontological and consequentialist reasoning bears general implications for the scope of ‘economic imperialism.’