In this article, I expand our understanding of the normative profile of stereotype threat and point where to take that inquiry next. My focus is the realization of the threat of stereotype threat, a phenomenon I call succumbing to stereotype threat. I show that in cases of stereotype threat that present us with the threat of what Sally Haslanger identifies as epistemic self-objectification, succumbing to stereotype threat is characterized by a corrupt relation of the individual to herself. That baneful relation, I argue, is what stereotype threat is a threat of. We also learn that that relation is facilitated by the individual’s social environment, in which the individual is an active participant. The individual, then, contributes to the forces that set her against herself. That social dimension is the area that stands in need of further investigation. To carry on that task, I suggest we harness the notion of alienation as understood by Marx. This notion neatly captures the corrupt relationship at the heart of succumbing to stereotype threat while acknowledging the individual’s role in the social forces that contribute to that plight; and it is a notion that is nested in a tradition that is well attuned to the ontological and normative nuances of social environment. The notion of alienation, then, lends a name to the wrong of succumbing to stereotype threat and thus to the threat of stereotype threat, and it has the credentials to lead further research into those phenomena.

This paper refines and defends the grassroots demand of reallocating powers and responsibilities from police to other institutions: what I call the unbundling proposal. I begin by presenting the proposal and specifying what sorts of roles and responsibilities proponents argue should be allocated from police to other institutions. I then advance a series of arguments for why we should unbundle policing. The first two draw on straightforward principles of institutional design, claiming that we should reallocate responsibilities from police to other institutions because (1) institutions with violent capacities should have narrow mandates, and (2) unbundling induces a better distribution of epistemic labor between institutions and fosters higher quality expertise. I then argue that policing institutions should be unbundled because they disproportionately burden marginalized people and perpetuate racial structural injustice. There, I advance some general principles about what is required when institutions undermine social justice, suggesting that in this case and others, we ought to turn to extra-institutional, reallocative measures. I close by addressing a series of objections to unbundling, including the concerns that (i1crime would increase, (2) nonpolice institutions would replicate the problems with existing policing regimes, and (3) unbundling is unfeasible in places with high rates of gun violence (like the United States).

Most would agree that friends are permitted (and often expected) to offer advice when mere acquaintances may not, to support or encourage us in ways that might be unwelcome coming from strangers or to tell us hard truths that even a romantic partner may be reluctant to share. Though it seems obvious that friendship impacts the normativity of interpersonal influence, extant treatments of the nature and role of the relevant relationship-based considerations in the ethics of influence literature remain undertheorized and largely suggestive. Drawing on social science research and philosophical treatments of special relationships, I identify a triad of features that are partly constitutive of friendship and can serve as a preliminary framework for illuminating the normative considerations at stake in influencing friends.

To date, much of the speciesism debate has centered on an ethical question: Can speciesism be justified, or is it immoral, as the analogy with racism suggests? Another question has received less attention: How prevalent is speciesism? Animal ethicists have largely assumed that speciesism is pervasive in our societies. After all, almost everyone routinely treats animals in ways they would never treat fellow humans. This widespread assumption is now being challenged. Some philosophers are beginning to question whether speciesism is an accurate diagnosis for our conduct. This paper defends the orthodox view against such critiques. It refutes three challenges to the existence of speciesism—one posed by Travis Timmerman, another by Shelly Kagan, and a third inspired by Stijn Bruers. Some of these arguments rely on a flawed understanding of speciesism; all generate implausible empirical predictions.

In a recent case, a Facebook user in Iran posted “death to Khamenei”, which the platform removed as a violation of its policy against threats and incitement. Facebook ultimately overturned the decision on the grounds that the speech, while contravening its rules, was newsworthy. Yet the company’s Oversight Board offered a distinct rationale for allowing the post: “death to Khamenei” wasn’t a threat or an incitement at all, but rather a rhetorical expression of criticism, disdain, or disgust. Who was right? Drawing on longstanding distinctions in the philosophy of language, we argue that the answer depends on whether platform rules should primarily target an utterance’s illocutionary force or instead its perlocutionary effects. Using this case study to trace broader lessons for the proper governance of online speech, we argue that platforms’ rules should primarily target illocutionary force, only considering perlocutionary effects in cases where illocutionary force is ambiguous.

While there are urgent health-related demands surrounding dementia, there are sociopolitical dimensions to this issue that ought not to be neglected, concerning the ways in which institutions and individuals treat people living with dementia. Key among these concerns, for dementia self-advocate Christine Bryden, is the dominant narrative of dementia as a process that irreversibly sets those that live with it on a path to the destruction of their personal identities and personhood. In this paper, I bolster Bryden’s arguments against the loss narrative and develop a novel conception of personhood as a first step towards challenging it.

A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications must be acknowledged. If, however, they should not be considered responsible, then we may have to reassess the meaning of animal morality. I discuss ways to eschew responsibility or to tailor it to animals and argue that each requires a revised conception of animal morality.