Purpose This systematic scoping review aims to map the peer-reviewed evidence on cryptocurrency-enabled money laundering to highlight significant gaps in knowledge, particularly regarding its role in the rapid expansion of Southeast Asia’s scam economy. It focuses on scam compounds, money mule networks and anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing strategies to inform policy responses. Design/methodology/approach Following systematic scoping review guidelines, 7,669 records from five databases (2009–2025) were screened, yielding 25 peer-reviewed studies. Dual-reviewer screening, standardized extraction and thematic synthesis were used, with quality appraisal emphasizing methodological rigor and theoretical depth. Findings Four themes emerged: (1) industrial scam ecosystems in Southeast Asia are linked to crypto-enabled wealth transfer and laundering, though peer-reviewed evidence on these specific regional operations remains limited; (2) offender rationales favor low-risk, high-reward techniques like mixing, privacy coins and high-volume, low-amount transfers; (3) blockchain forensics enable tracing and evidence gathering, but are challenged by evolving privacy tools; and (4) regulatory attempts often lag behind criminal innovation, necessitating financial reforms. However, the review reveals a critical gap: only a minority of studies directly address Southeast Asia’s scam compounds, underscoring the need for targeted research amid the region’s burgeoning scam economy. These themes illustrate that cryptocurrency has become essential financial infrastructure for organized crime, yet empirical insights specific to Southeast Asia remain limited. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first systematic scoping review highlighting the shortage of peer-reviewed research and studies of Southeast Asia’s scam economy in cryptocurrency laundering research, synthesizing broader literature to advocate for criminologically informed interventions.

Purpose This paper aims to illuminate actions to be executed by the bank’s financial crime compliance department on suspected money mules. Design/methodology/approach This paper outlines the actions by collecting facts from existing literature review, reports and news on money mule. Findings Money mule phenomenon is a threat to the financial system. The irresponsible actions by money mules allow illicit funds to pass through the banks, resulting in money trail dissemblance and prevent detection. The banks must not extend their services to money mules, and actions of suspicious transaction report filing, exit relationship, watchlisting, police report and interbank intelligence exchange should be initiated. Originality/value This paper presents mandatory actions to be taken by financial crime compliance department after completion of money mule investigation by anti-money laundering analyst. This study will be beneficial for future money mule researchers, enforcement agencies and practitioners in the banking industry.

Purpose This study aims to examine a range of factors − encompassing both micro- and macro-level perspectives, as well as institution- and industry-specific characteristics − that may account for the persistent exposure of banks to money laundering risk. This vulnerability persists despite ongoing efforts to curtail the exploitation of the banking sector as a conduit for illicit financial activities. Drawing on routine activity theory, this study analyzes how the convergence of motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardianship within the banking sector facilitates the continued occurrence of money laundering. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a qualitative research methodology, with a primary focus on the review and analysis of secondary data obtained from reports, official documents and relevant academic literature. Findings Numerous instances of money laundering demonstrate that, despite the implementation of robust safeguards, banks continue to knowingly or unknowingly internalize money laundering risk within their institutions. Although various risk management strategies have been adopted by banks, alongside regulatory interventions by authorities to shield the banking sector from such risk, complete immunity remains elusive. Accordingly, proactive and adaptive measures are essential to strengthen anti-money laundering efforts and more effectively combat the occurrence of money laundering activities. Practical implications The findings of this study suggest that banks remain vulnerable to money laundering risk. Consequently, they must continuously strengthen their efforts to assess pervasive threats and refine strategic approaches to effectively mitigate this risk. Originality/value This study offers a valuable contribution to the literature on money laundering by providing a contemporary analysis of the pervasive threats that banks continue to face.

Purpose Virtual assets are considered to be particularly susceptible to money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has established an international regime to address the money laundering risk associated with virtual assets. This study aims to compare the anti-money laundering regimes in South Africa with those of Mauritius, Namibia and the United Kingdom to identify any gaps and areas for improvement in South Africa’s regime for virtual assets service providers. Design/methodology/approach A comparative analysis of the anti-money laundering laws for virtual asset service providers in South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia and the United Kingdom was done. A black letter approach was followed by examining the anti-money laundering legislation of said countries with a focus on supervision, licencing, customer due diligence, recordkeeping and suspicious transaction reporting for virtual asset service providers. Findings It is recommended that South Africa introduce a distinct law that specifically addresses virtual assets and virtual asset service providers. Also, its range of customer due diligence measures should be broadened to reduce the anonymity of virtual asset holders. Originality/value It is essential to regulate virtual asset service providers to mitigate the risk of money laundering associated with these assets. Prior studies have not thoroughly examined the effectiveness of South African legislation in addressing virtual assets and virtual asset service providers.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the laws that regulated the management of seized and forfeited assets before the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act of 2022 (POCA), identifying their flaws. Also, it explores the provisions of POCA on the management of seized and forfeited assets, highlighting how POCA addresses the flaws in the legal and institutional frameworks for the management of these assets. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a doctrinal research methodology. It also makes use of primary sources, national laws, as well as secondary sources, such as journal articles. Findings It establishes that Nigeria now has comprehensive legal framework for the management of forfeited assets. However, POCA does not contain detailed provisions on the management of seized assets. Also, it establishes that, unlike what was obtainable before the coming into force of POCA when there was no clear institutional framework for the management of seized and forfeited assets, POCA establishes a Directorate of Proceeds of Crimes in all law enforcement and some regulatory agencies. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first article that examines the legal and institutional framework for the management of seized and forfeited assets in Nigeria.

PurposeThis paper aims to address the existing gap in the anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and explore the possibility and effectiveness of disentangling the nexus between the two concepts.Design/methodology/approachThe approach undertaken is doctrinal legal research by employing rigorous analysis of the legal terms of terrorism financing and money laundering.FindingsUpon analysis, the study confirms that the two concepts are distinct; there is a slight overlap in the methods of acquisition of funds for both terrorists and money laundering; however, the purpose and intention of the two are totally separate and therefore creates a need for singular approach in tackling the two concepts. Enhanced collaboration between states and increased financial technologies will aid in better tackling of the two menaces.Research limitations/implicationsThe research is limited to a desk review approach.Practical implicationsThe study confirms the argument that the AML/CFT approach is ineffective in tackling money laundering and terrorism financing.Originality/valueThis paper delves into a deeper analysis of money laundering and terrorism financing and provides a nuanced understanding of the differences between the two terms.

PurposeThis study aims to analyze the complex dynamics of money laundering (ML) in the export sector of developing countries, with a special focus on Bangladesh. It aims to uncover the strategies and tactics money launderers use to exploit export transactions and understand the vulnerabilities that exist in economies where enforcement agencies neglect the export industry.Design/methodology/approachThis study examines Bangladesh’s export sector ML using qualitative methods. Customs officers, central bank officers, port authorities and selected exporters were interviewed semi-structured. Document analysis of Bangladesh Bank orders, media and Customs Intelligence and Investigation Directorate reports was also done. Qualitative data patterns were identified using theme analysis.FindingsThe study identifies the most vulnerable export commodities – readymade garments, agricultural items and processed foods – as prime targets for ML. Key methods of laundering include under-invoicing, over-invoicing, misdeclaration and fake documentation. The research highlights the significant risk posed by the improper use of government financial incentives and introduces the “sample shipment” method as a novel laundering tactic. The findings underscore the need for stronger oversight and controls to mitigate these risks.Research limitations/implicationsThis research is limited by single-point data because ML is a continual activity. The reliance on case studies from newspaper reports and online platforms introduces a degree of selection bias and the chosen instances may not comprehensively represent the broader landscape of trade-based ML.Practical implicationsThe study provides several practical recommendations for policymakers and law enforcement agencies to fortify the export sector against exploitation by money launderers, ensuring greater transparency and accountability in international trade operations.Social implicationsBy closing loopholes in the export sector, the research supports the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly Goal 16.4, which aims to reduce illicit financial flows, thereby contributing to poverty eradication and economic stability in developing countries.Originality/valueOriginal research results supported by technical analysis are presented in this work. It contributes to the body of knowledge by detailing the adaptive strategies of money launderers and proposing targeted recommendations for enhancing the integrity of the export sector.

At its 1989 meeting, the G7 Heads of Government established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), intended to dampen the growing threat posed by money laundering. As a task force, it was intended to be a temporary measure, but like so many initiatives, it acquired a life of its own. Its permanence was guaranteed when, in the aftermath of the horrific attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, the G8 choose to add terrorist financing to its mandate. Today, the FATF remains the only international body dedicated to this bifurcated role. The FATF expanded over the years, to include additional nations and to create nine regional bodies, composed of associate FATF members, which have become the lifeblood of the task force. In total, over 200 nations are affiliated to the FATF. In April 1990, the FATF issued Forty Recommendations, intended to serve as minimum international standards [1]. These became synonymous with the FATF, later increased by Special Recommendations dealing with the financing of terror. Collectively, they serve as the normative international standards expected of countries when dealing with the scourge of money laundering and terrorist financing [2]. Adherence to the FATF's Recommendations is voluntary, not directory. Nevertheless, to encourage compliance, the FATF adopted a peer review mechanism, akin to that used by the OECD for its Anti-Bribery Convention [3]. Most peer reviews are now conducted under the auspices of a regional body. There are two aspects to a review, technical compliance with the requirements of the Recommendations and an effectiveness assessment. Technical compliance requires that the necessary laws be in place. Effectiveness speaks to these laws having their intended effect, through education, compliance and enforcement. In its early years, the FATF resorted to a "name and shame" policy to force nations into compliance. Originally, this took the form of a list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs). At one time or another, this list included Egypt, Israel, Nigeria, Philippines and Russia, among others. Over time, countries fell into line and were removed from the list. It evolved into one composed almost entirely of small island nations. The FATF received withering criticism for what was perceived to be a ganging up against less fortunate nations, thereby placing them at an economic disadvantage to their more advantaged colleagues. In October 2006, all nations were delisted. In place of the NCCT, the FATF now has both a black list of high-risk countries and a grey list of countries that require increased monitoring. Being named and shamed by inclusion on either the grey or black list, is a worst-case scenario for a country, however criticism by the FATF short of shaming can also have considerable impact. Nations, like people, hate being singled out of the pack for criticism. Easier to go with the flow, do what must be done, than suffer the ignominy of criticism which may impact a country in many ways, not the least, economically. The FATF developed a coding system to signify the degree to which a nation adheres to the Recommendations: compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant and not compliant. In early peer reviews, good marks were accorded to countries which created the necessary legal and enforcement frameworks to deal with money laundering and terrorist financing. Today, peer reviews look past the bald statute to ascertain whether the laws are being enforced, is improvement being made and is a country truly committed to dealing with these crimes. The schedule of peer reviews can be maddeningly slow, extending for years between

PurposeThis study aims to explore the relationships between GDP growth, education spending, central bank transparency (CBT) and accountability on the corruption perception index within the G20 countries, emphasizing their combined effects and interdependencies.Design/methodology/approachUsing the central bank transparency index (CBTI) introduced by Dinçer et al. (2019), an analysis spanning from 2002 to 2019 was conducted on selected G20 countries, further refining the results by excluding EU members. Data sources included World Bank statistics and CBTI data. The research deployed the heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated panel-corrected standard error model to detail the effects of the aforementioned factors on the corruption index.FindingsThe study revealed no statistical evidence that economic growth had an effect on reducing corruption. Education spending emerged as a potent tool in curbing corruption, especially in EU nations. A strong correlation was identified between CBT and reduced corruption, consistent across G20 countries, regardless of EU affiliation. The insights emphasize the importance of enhancing education spending and CBT in combating corruption. For effective anti-corruption measures, countries are encouraged to invest more in education, amplify internal checks and adopt transparent central bank policies. Further research could delve into cultural, historical and political variables to understand corruption dynamics comprehensively.Originality/valueThis study aspires to address the existing gaps in the literature and provide a substantial contribution to the ongoing discourse and efforts to understand and mitigate corruption within the G20 countries and globally.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the turnover of Italian shell companies (SCs)/missing traders used for tax crimes, a predicate offence of money laundering. This research could be useful for Italian obliged entities to the Anti-Money Laundering Law to detect and report SCs, as soon as possible, to the Financial Intelligence Unit for Italy. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 32 SCs that are present in the Third Penal Section of the Italian Supreme Court in the period 2018–2020, involved in tax crimes and that have presented their balance sheets for two or more years. For SCs, the author computes the averages for: the turnover growth rate from first and the maximum turnover; the years between these two values; and the years in which SCs are active. Moreover, the author verifies if SCs are similar in terms of turnover by studying the relationship between the turnover growth rate and the first turnover and the reduction of turnover standard deviations. Findings SCs growth is very high and they reach, on average, their peak in less than three years; SCs are active, on average, for about four years; eventually, SCs exhibit a convergence process in turnover levels. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no studies that analyse the SC turnover.