Eclipse attacks, which isolate victim nodes by monopolizing their peer connections, remain a critical threat to Ethereum’s consensus mechanism. To address this, we present a principled framework for detecting Eclipse attacks in Ethereum peer-to-peer networks, grounded in a formal adversarial model. Existing defenses are either ad-hoc or lack provable guarantees, leaving open questions about their reliability under adaptive adversaries. Our work aims to bridge this gap by formally defining eclipse attack detection as a security property. We specify soundness, completeness, and robustness theorems under bounded adversarial drift, and derive formal guarantees within false positive and false negative bounds, resilience to adversarial manipulation, and multi-node compositional reliability. We then instantiate a lightweight detection framework that maps packet-level traffic features to predictions using ensemble classifiers (Random Forest, XGBoost). The system was validated using a controlled Ethereum testbed and extended with CTGAN-generated synthetic traces to emulate networks of up to 100 nodes. Empirical evaluation shows that our framework achieves up to 96% F1-score with sub-second inference latency, well within Ethereum’s 12-second Proof-of-Stake validator time slots. These findings demonstrate that lightweight statistical features, when coupled with formal analysis, enable accurate, efficient, and scalable detection of network-level partitioning attacks. Our work establishes a deployable and theoretically grounded defense foundation for securing modern blockchain systems against eclipse adversaries.
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