report, topic is very broad and forms in itself alone a great part of private international law.1 Although the Netherlands's government memorandum that was distributed with the note calling the Conference in August 1893 addressed, in the procedural area, only the possibility of an international agreement with respect to foreign judgments based upon uniform rules of territorial jurisdiction of the courts, the commission decided that it did not have enough time to reach agreement on judicial jurisdiction. Thus, it limited itself, for the moment, to preparing a draft agreement on service of judicial documents and on the execution of letters of request. Despite the fact that the original program for the Conference's first session was heavily weighted with family law and general principles of the conflict of laws, articles on service of process and taking of evidence abroad were the first to be drafted. These articles, with the addition of chapters on deposits for costs, legal aid, and physical detention of foreign debtors, formed the nucleus of the first Hague Convention to be fully drafted and to enter into force. The package as a whole, referred to as the Convention on Civil Procedure with additional Protocol, was adopted in the final act of the Conference's second session in 1894. It was signed November 14, 1896, and the Convention entered into force on May 23, 1899, coinciding with the first Hague Peace Conference. This first successful Hague Convention, ratified by fourteen European countries ranging from Portugal to Russia and from Norway to Romania, laid the groundwork for the conclusion of five family law Conventions at the Conference's third and fourth sessions in 1900 and 1904. Also, a revised version of the Convention on Civil Procedure was signed on July 17, 1905. The 1905 version of this Convention remains in force today, controlling relations between countries that have not both ratified the Civil Procedure Convention of March 1, 1954. This 1954 Convention2 remains in force among thirty countries. Its chapters on service of documents abroad and on the taking of evidence abroad were replaced, however, by the 1965 and 1970 Conventions, respectively, and

McNollgast's article on legislative intent can be viewed as an exercise in textual interpretation.1 As such, it represents an alternative to the currently fashionable interpretive school of legal studies. Rather than play positive political theory off against its contemporary rival, however, this comment will instead play it off against an earlier research tradition: the studies of persuasive communications undertaken by sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists of the behavioral tradition. Doing so helps to highlight the significance of McNollgast's basic strategy as well as possible weaknesses in its application. I refer back to this earlier tradition because its goal is similar to that of McNollgast. While the former studied mass media messages and the latter study statutes, the basic problem they both address is the attempt to understand the content and impact of persuasive messages. The lessons learned from experience with the one can therefore be applied to the other.

Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 56, No. 1, Equitable Doctrines and Remedies in Contemporary Regulatory Settings (Winter, 1993), pp. 7-44

Counsel's Office was at center of brief uproar that arose when press discovered that presidential aides had manipulated FBI to put White House patronage maneuvers (replacing career officials in White House travel office with friends or relatives of President Clinton) in a better light.l The apparent suicide of Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster, amidst mysterious circumstances, focused new attention on Counsel's Office, all more so as Counsel's Office was accused of mismanaging and manipulating investigation of Foster's death in peculiar ways.2 Counsel Bernard Nussbaum ultimately achieved distinction of being first White House Counsel whose activities were visible enough-and controversial enough-for respectable editorialists to condemn his personal performance and demand his removal from office.3 If Counsel's Office achieved more notoriety in Clinton Administration, its operations did not become easier to follow. But role of Counsel has never been easy to define or to assess. The White House Counsel is often described as the President's lawyer. By constitutional tradition and statutory provision, however, president already has an official lawyer: Attorney General of United States. The Attorney General has had a place in president's Cabinet-and an official role in providing legal advice to executive officials-from time of President Washington. The Counsel is an innovation of recent decades. The Attorney General (along with other top officers in Justice Department) must be confirmed by Senate and remain available for frequent congressional appearances, while Counsel and his aides are

In her ambitious critique of securities disclosure law, Professor Kim Scheppele seeks to attack a utilitarian account of, and prescription for, that law.l She seeks, as well-and this is what makes her contribution ambitious-to offer an alternative way to create, and a different standard to criticize, legal rules than the method offered by the utilitarian paradigm. Her account of, and prescription for, securities disclosure law derives from a contractualist approach to rule formulation and criticism. Her approach is inspired by, but somewhat different from, that employed by John Rawls in his famous work, A Theory of Justice.2 On a practical level, Professor Scheppele offers criticism of the current Supreme Court law on insider trading reflected in Chiarella v. United States3 and Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission.4 Her policy recommendation is that federal disclosure law should recognize a duty to disclose nonpublic information or abstain from trading in securities whenever a market participant has access to information that is not accessible to all other participants in the market. She sees her proposal as differing from current law in that under her rule it would not matter whether one with nonpublic information received it as part of a relationship that implied confidence or knew that his or her receipt of the nonpublic information was made possible by a breach of trust. I begin by recognizing that this article is a pleasure to read. It is lucid, knowledgeable, textured, and innovative. The paper represents an imaginative effort to combine the method of Rawls (and others) with some available empirical data on risk preferences, and to apply that learning to problems of disclosure law. It thus enjoys an uncommon scope and breadth. Ultimately, however, for the reason discussed below, I find Professor Scheppele's critique of the existing Supreme Court law governing securities disclosure unconvincing. Perhaps more basically, I remain skeptical that the method employed by the article offers what its author hopes it can: a technique to generate specific legal

The Hague Convention of 20 October 1988 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons (Succession Convention)1 clarifies succession law for those who have important connections with more than one country. It provides choice-of-law rules for intestacy, and, for those who write wills, it specifies the testator's permissible choice of law. This article does not evaluate the overall desirability of the Convention, a matter currently being debated elsewhere. Rather, it concerns one aspect of the Convention that affects cases in which a testator has specified a choice of law consistent with the Convention. It discusses mandatory survivorship rules, including quasi-community laws, and considers the possible effects of the testator's choice of law on them. It then evaluates an authorized reservation to

ly existed.65 Second, the court's reliance in du Pont on a general maxim (equity will suffer no right to be without a remedy) to establish equity jurisdiction is important, because it tempers the bounds of the historical constitutional approach. The Delaware Court of Chancery's general equity jurisdiction is not frozen by what the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain did; it can look at what that court would have done if it had been faced with these circumstances. In short, the creative and innovative function of equity can operate through historically recognized general equitable maxims. Third, the post-du Pont result regarding the curtailment of constitutional general equity jurisdiction by statute should be highlighted in capsule form. The substituted statutory must be adequate and exclusive. In Glanding, it was conceded to be adequate but found not to be exclusive. In du Pont, it was conceded to be exclusive but found not to be adequate. The two cases combine to restrict the sufficient remedy limitation of the first clause of section twentyfive of the Gordon Statute. To state it positively, the two cases support the retention of jurisdiction in the court of chancery. This is especially true since the

In INS v. Chadha,' the Supreme Court invoked a strained theory of separation of powers to strike down Congress's use of a a device used for a half century to control the executive branch. Through the use of the legislative veto, Congress delegated power to the executive branch on the condition that Congress could control executive decisions without having to pass another law. These legislative controls, short of a public law, included one-house vetoes, two-house vetoes, and even committee vetoes. Congressional actions by a legislative veto were not presented to the President for his signature or veto. It may appear that this procedure thrust Congress unfairly (or even unconstitutionally) into administrative decisions that should have been left to executive officials; the initiative for the legislative veto came from President Hoover, however, and executive officials tolerated the arrangement for decades because it was in their interest. By attaching the safeguard of a legislative veto, Congress was willing to delegate greater discretion and authority to the executive branch. If Congress failed to invoke the legislative veto, the executive branch could, in effect, make without further congressional involvement. The experiment with the legislative veto lasted for five decades before it was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983. In response to Chadha, Congress eliminated the legislative veto from a number of statutes. The legislative veto continues to thrive, however, as a practical accommodation between executive agencies and congressional committees. More than two hundred new legislative vetoes have been enacted since Chadha. In addition, legislative vetoes of an informal and nonstatutory nature continue to define executive-legislative relations. The meaning of constitutional law in this area is evidently determined more by pragmatic agreements hammered out between the elected branches than by doctrines announced by the Supreme Court. The next part of this article explicates the Court's decision in Chadha. Part III discusses the origins of the legislative veto and its traditional place in the