In the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the European Union (EU) is critical of the State of Israel, of Israel’s settlement policy, and recently of the manner in which Israel was conducting the war in Gaza (2023-), yet it has refrained until now from adopting trade sanctions against Israel. This article argues that despite the lack of such formal, affirmative sanctions, which is due to its political inability to reach a common position among the Member States, the EU does in fact sanction Israel without sanctions: it has neglected to revise and upgrade the 1995 EU-Israel Association Agreement. This omission is based on the linkage created by the EU between the (non)-advancement by Israel towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the (non)-upgrading of EU-Israel trade relations. This linkage, and the resulting freezing of the potential upgrade of the Association Agreement, exact an economic price on Israel’s economy, which loses trade benefits that it could have enjoyed under a revised and upgraded trade agreement. The non-evolution of the EU’s normative trade framework with Israel due to non-economic consideration is tantamount, in light of real-world economic developments, to sanctioning Israel’s political policies relating to Palestine and Palestinians. This conclusion may be applicable to other EU trading partners who breach fundamental EU norms. It remains to be seen whether severe criticism of Israel’s military actions in its war with Hamas would cause the EU to adopt a more proactive stance, resulting in affirmative trade sanctions.

The recognition and enforcement stage may be the clearest example of interaction between international arbitration and economic sanctions. From a legal perspective, economic sanctions may lead to a domestic court’s refusal to recognize an award, most notably on the grounds of international public policy or, even, lack of jurisdiction. The refusal to recognize the award leads ipso jure to the refusal to enforce the award. However, economic sanctions can also lead to the refusal to enforce an international arbitration award irrespective of the recognition of the award by the relevant state. Economic sanctions targeting the award debtor or the award creditor in the country where enforcement is sought will in all likelihood bar enforcement, either because the provision of resources to the sanctioned award creditor is prohibited or because the assets of the sanctioned award debtor are frozen. Without aiming for comprehensiveness, this article considers various scenarios in which economic sanctions interact with the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.

Digital Economic Agreements (DEAs) represent a novel and increasingly influential instrument in the governance of digital trade. Departing from the broader and more traditional scope of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), DEAs focus exclusively on digital trade, establishing dedicated regulatory frameworks for the data-driven economy. This article offers a detailed analysis of the architecture, substantive scope and underlying dynamics of DEAs. It maps the convergences and divergences among existing agreements, with particular attention paid to provisions on data governance and source code, situating DEAs within the broader landscape of PTAs’ digital trade rulemaking. We further contrast the DEA model with the ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations towards an agreement on electronic commerce and examine the legal compatibility of DEAs with WTO law. We argue that DEAs represent a flexible and forward-oriented model for digital trade regulation. Nonetheless, their impact on the ground and whether they reduce or rather exacerbate the existing regulatory fragmentation in digital trade governance are questions that warrant further attention.

p class="MsoNormal"span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family: "AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif;mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I"By endowing the European Union (EU) with enhanced central /spanspan style="font-size: 10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb;mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"fi/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%; font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif;mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I"scal capacity, Next Generation EU (NGEU) marks an important shift in supranational economic policy. The EU has evolved from intergovernmental coordination and /spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"fi/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt; line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif;mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOTecfccdcf_I"scal surveillance of Member States, to disposing of a more robust, autonomous, and e/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%; font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb;mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"ff/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I"ective instrument for intervention in the EU economy. These improvements derive from some notable innovations NGEU brings about. However, this instrument also holds several shortcomings usually associated with the EU budget, namely regarding the nature of funding, the type of expenditure, and the overly intergovernmental legislative process. Accordingly, NGEU is described as a bridge between past and future. The paper analyses each of these issues by looking at the United States of America (US) experience and /spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%; font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb;mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"fi/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I"nds that the parallelism that is possible to draw in the di/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%; font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb;mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"ff/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I"erent matters is substantial and could serve as a useful inspiration for the EU going forward. Lastly, the /spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"fi/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt; line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif;mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOTecfccdcf_I"nancial component of the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness is also addressed, as it suggests that this recent experience may be a useful blueprint for the future of EU /spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb; mso-bidi-font-family:AdvOTecfccdcf_I+fb"fi/spanspan style="font-size:10.0pt; line-height:107%;font-family:"AdvOTecfccdcf_I",sans-serif;mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOTecfccdcf_I"nances./span o:p/o:p

The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed a transformative shift in the European food service industry, with local restaurants increasingly turning to online food delivery platforms (OFDPs) to sustain their operations during lockdowns. However, this symbiotic relationship has raised concerns regarding the prevalence of Most Favoured Nation clauses (MFNs) within contractual agreements between local restaurants and OFDPs These clauses, designed to ensure price parity across different sales channels, have sparked debates over their impact on competition and consumer welfare. This is due to their potential effect of hindering local restaurants’ ability to compete effectively, thus, consumers may face reduced price options and higher food costs. The Bundeskartellamt’s landmark decisions regarding MFNs in the online accommodation sector concerning Booking.com have provided initial guidance, but the application of this approach to OFDP markets remains complex. Against this backdrop, and following the reasoning laid down in a more recent approach from the Bundeskartellamt, we propose a systematic methodology for evaluating the effects of MFNs, taking as a starting point of analysis OFDP market conditions and business models. Ultimately, we aim to address the balance between positive and negative effects of usingMFNs byOFDPs to incentivize platform investment and protect the efficiencies passed on to consumers and local restaurants.

View Book Review: ‘Screening Foreign Direct Investment in the EU: Political Rationale, Legal Limitations, Legislative Options’, by Jens Velten (Springer, 2021) by - Legal Issues of Economic Integration

This article examines the status quo of the negotiations of the European Union (EU)–Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Association Agreement (AA)’s Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter, and explores alternatives to strengthen its climate change provisions in line with precedents of higher standards included in other recent free trade agreements (FTAs), in particular those signed by the EU. After thirty-eight rounds of negotiations, progress has been made in theDraft EU–MERCOSUR FTA. However, core aspects such as environmental and climate change commitments remain challenging and less progressive than those contained in more recent FTAs. This article draws from MERCOSUR countries’ climate commitments expressed in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and explores pathways for strengthening climate change related provisions. These include changes that could be proposed during the legal scrubbing phase of the agreement, considering precedents where this was done, and further changes that could be included as an interpretative declaration, memorandum of understanding, or side letter attached to the agreement – one however that is agreed by both sides and that effectively addresses climate and environmental concerns.

This article investigates the use of recent EU instruments related to the Green Deal within the framework of bilateral trade relations, typically governed by Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Specifically, it explores the implications of new measures introduced by the European Union (EU) in response to climate change concerns, including the proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the Critical Raw Materials Regulation, and the Deforestation Regulation. The article analyses the potential for enhanced cooperation within the framework of cooperation provisions in existing EUAmerica FTAs. It concludes by proposing to use the cooperation and corporate social responsibility commitments in EU trade agreements to foster closer cooperation with trading partners rather than simply informing partners of the context of these provisions.

Relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) have enriched the multifaceted concept of interregionalism from legal and international relations perspectives. The article argues that the transformative ASEAN-EU frameworks have shaped the Third Interregionalism. Brussels’ building-block approach envisions pathfinder agreements with individual ASEAN states as the basis for the ASEAN-EU FTA, which will help realize the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the ASEAN-EU Strategic Partnership. The designs of the EU’s trade and investment agreements with Singapore and Vietnam are therefore critical. The article assesses core areas such as tariff liberalization and ASEAN cumulative rules of origin, as well as commitments of trade in services and non-tariff barriers in key industries. Contributors to the special issue further analyse cutting-edge issues involving electronic commerce and sustainable development. These on-the-ground insights contribute to a new understanding of ASEAN-EU legal frameworks and evolving interregionalism in the post-pandemic era. ASEAN-EU FTA – CPTPP – Indo-Pacific strategy – Investment Protection – Singapore – RCEP – Sustainable Development – Third Interregionalism – Vietnam