Abstract Up to the present day, the theories of legal reasoning have been concerned with reasoning in the stages of interpretation and adjudication of laws. However, if a fundamental feature of legal reasoning is that it is actually bound by laws, then the theory of legal argumentation should also consider to what extent legislative argumentation is an assumption of rational legal reasoning: if legal reasoning is, as Alexy states, a special case of the general practical discourse, and the speciality of legal reasoning is a consequence of the requirement of being bound by legal laws, then legislative rationality can be considered a premise of the rationality of law interpretation and adjudication.

Jeremy Waldron claims to have identified the core of the case against judicial review. He argues that as citizens have but reasonable and good faith disagreements about justice (ie, we live in the of politics) it is morally obnoxious for unelected judges to strike down primary legislation. Waldron, though, does accept the permissibility of judicial review of administrative and executive decision-making. This paper offers an account of what makes a disagreement about justice fundamental and, in light of this, argues that the intrinsic fairness considerations that imply that the judicial review of primary legislation is impermissible apply equally to the judicial review of administrative and executive decision-making. So, either both are permissible or neither is. The paper concludes by showing that the circumstances of politics have considerably fewer implications for the issue of the proper role of judicial review than Waldron's arguments imply.

(2008). “Legislating Politics”: An Introduction. Legisprudence: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 155-161.

The EU increasingly uses diversified (new) governance mechanisms in order to improve its performance and legitimacy. In tax matters, various kinds of soft law are used, in indirect as well as in direct taxation. One such instrument, the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, is deployed to tackle harmful tax competition with respect to direct taxation. Though legally non-binding but relying on peer pressure for its effectiveness, the Code of Conduct is generally regarded to be quite an effective political instrument. There is a subtle interplay between the Code of Conduct and existing hard law in the EU, the State aid provisions providing an important stick, and also between the Code and OECD's soft law instruments. Though the Code's effectiveness is limited, producing negative integration only, it still is significant in facilitating an ongoing dialogue on harmful tax competition between the Member States. However, the Code of Conduct does not score well in terms of stakeholders involvement. The Member States are involved, not civil society. More inclusive and transparent public participation and consultation may enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of EU tax coordination.

The article argues that the structure of practical reason has political implications regarding the authority of legislation. After arguing against one thesis about the relation between practical reason and legislative authority, namely, Waldron's “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude”, it goes on to argue that the role of commonly held beliefs in practical reason helps to justify the authority of legislation. The connection between practical reason's structure and legislative authority explains why certain institutional designs embody a particular kind of recognition of other members of the political community. That recognition is connected to a particular division of reasoning labour between political institutions which, in turn, allows for a conception of political representation in which representatives are neither simply the bearers of their constituents opinions nor an elite that need not take in consideration those opinions. The last section discusses how agreement can be politically relevant in plural societies.