Rinderpest was one of the most devastating epizootic diseases in history, causing large scale losses of livestock in the Ottoman lands and many other parts of the world. In response to epizootic outbreaks, states developed various intervention tools such as inoculation, quarantine, and culling. These methods were widely used from the early modern period onwards. In nineteenth-century Europe, animal compensation became an important instrument for preserving the stability of rural economies. By contrast, compensation was not an instrument adopted by the Ottoman administration early in its intervention regime. This study examines how the Ottoman administration organised its struggle against rinderpest from the early nineteenth century to the early Republican period. Which intervention tools it employed, and why compensation remained a contested instrument throughout this process. According to official Ottoman correspondence (drawing on official reports, regulatory texts and local petitions) the analysis shows that epidemic intervention was shaped not only by veterinary knowledge but also by fiscal constraints, local administrations, administrative regulations and the interests of livestock owners. The study argues that the Ottoman epizootic intervention regime was formed within a negotiated framework that sought to balance the protection of treasury revenues with the maintenance of local production chains.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman intellectuals endeavored to construct alternative national narratives in order to safeguard the empire against the potentially disintegrative consequences of nationalism. Namık Kemal played a pivotal role in this endeavor, and his play Vatan Yahut Silistre became a foundational text in shaping Ottoman patriotic consciousness. Kemal’s sacralized conception of the homeland influenced Muslim communities, including the Kurds. Evdirehîm Rehmî Hekkarî, author of Memê Alan , regarded as the first modern Kurdish drama, similarly framed the defense of the homeland as a religious duty and employed literature as a means of collective mobilization. This study presents a comparative analysis of Vatan Yahut Silistre and Memê Alan , arguing that in both works the defense of the homeland is articulated as a religious obligation. This shared conceptualization demonstrates how religion and patriotism became deeply intertwined in the intellectual and literary discourse of the late Ottoman period.

This article explores the consolidation of Israel’s right wing in the 1960s–1970s as a case for understanding long-term cross-class alliances. Moving beyond standard accounts that emphasize party mergers and ideological shifts, the authors argue that the Israeli right’s emergence as a dominant force was grounded in class mediation and social negotiation. Drawing on Gramsci’s ideas of the ‘historical bloc’ and ‘passive revolution’, the article analyzes the formation of Gahal (Herut – Liberal Bloc) in 1965 as a class-convergent project rather than just a political alliance. The 1966 economic recession – occurring when Gahal was still new – served as a critical juncture, exposing internal contradictions and pushing the party to transform. Initially aligned with bourgeois interests, Gahal began to act as a ‘mediating party’, accommodating the needs of its increasingly diverse support base, including working-class Mizrahi voters. This dialectical shift forced the party leadership to respond to new demands, broadening its appeal and deepening class heterogeneity. The article introduces the concept of the ‘mediating party’ to highlight how political organizations can actively negotiate class tensions. This category helps bridge the gap between abstract theory and institutional practice. The Israeli case thus offers insights into party-building and class compromise relevant to broader comparative political analysis.

In 1908, the constitutional revolution led by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) brought an end to Sultan Abdülhamid II’s autocratic rule. The restoration of constitutional life created a political vacuum into which multiple elite groups attempted to reassert themselves. Among them was the Kıbrıslızade family – descendants of Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Pasha – who represented the Istanbul-based ancien régime. This article analyzes the conflict between the Kıbrıslızades, as an example of the traditional elite, and the CUP, which emerged as a new political class composed primarily of organized and ideologically driven military and civil officers of Rumelian origin. Grounded in Gaetano Mosca’s theory of the ‘political class’ and Vilfredo Pareto’s concept of ‘elite circulation’, the study explores how the CUP refused to share state power and employed various instruments, including legal manipulation and political violence, to suppress opposition. The rivalry culminated in the Raid on the Sublime Porte on 23 January 1913, during which Tevfik Bey of the Kıbrıslızade family was killed. Drawing on archival documents, contemporary press, and memoirs, this article examines how elite transformation in the late Ottoman Empire was marked not by a peaceful transition but by a deeply contested and violent power struggle.

This article examines the 7-month-long trip of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, the fifth ruler of the Qajar State, to Europe in 1900 for medical treatment on the grounds of health problems. The factors that shaped the itinerary through Russia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire and the parties’ expectations during the visits are analysed. In addition to the apparent reasons for the journey, the objectives behind it are discussed. What the Shah wanted to achieve as a result of this trip, the results he encountered and the impact of this trip on Iranian modernisation along with diplomatic relations are emphasised. The study claims that the trip affected the modernisation movements in the Qajar State, but the international diplomatic system left the Qajar State in a dilemma of weakness and balance.

Virtually. nothing is known about the response of Ottoman Jews to the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms because of the lack of relevant sources. The present study, the first of its kind, examines a community conflict in Izmir in 1846–1847 through the lens of two extant Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) sources, whose authors directly articulate their attitude to the reforms, revealing their interpretation of the Tanzimat Decree. This article argues that it was this understanding that prompted the poor members of Izmir’s Jewish community to split and temporarily form a community of their own. The first Ladino periodical and a separate Ladino account of the events show that the wealthy put a disproportionate financial burden on the poor by making them pay the meat gabela (an indirect tax on kosher meat), which made meat unaffordable for them, while community elites were exempted. When for the first time, the poor realized that they were Ottoman subjects whose rights were presumably violated by the rich, they rebelled.

Family foundations were integral to the Ottoman legal and economic systems, adhering to Islamic foundation law. They provided essential services such as education, healthcare, public works, and economic support, relieving the state of these burdens. Over time, these foundations grew in number and scope, becoming crucial to society. However, in the nineteenth century, debates arose about their legitimacy, particularly regarding family foundations. The Ottoman bureaucracy and intellectuals began questioning these institutions due to centralization policies and pressure from European states. Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals argued that family foundations were inconsistent with Islamic inheritance laws, served to circumvent confiscation, and placed an economic burden on society. In the twentieth century, family foundations were abolished in some countries, and their numbers dwindled in the Ottoman Empire, nearly vanishing in the Republican era. Despite numerous debates on the legitimacy of family foundations, discussions within the Ottoman heartland, particularly in Istanbul, have been largely overlooked. This article aims to fill this gap by exploring the debates among scholars and intellectuals in Istanbul regarding family waqfs and the effects of Ottoman centralization policies on these institutions.

Using recently declassified sources, this article sheds light on the relatively unexamined years of 1968 to 1970 in the Israeli–Lebanese relationship and claims that the period was a turning point in Israeli attitudes and policy toward its northern neighbor. The evolution of the Palestinian cause after the Six-Day War led to three major developments. First, the formerly quiet border with Lebanon became a site of significant conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, who were now using Lebanon as a base of operations. Second, Lebanese Christians and Israelis found common cause against the Palestinians in Lebanon, but with the repeated failure of efforts to cooperate, Israel began to shape its policies on the assumption of the Lebanese government’s incompetence. Finally, Israel’s military establishment began to play a dominant role in Israel’s foreign policy. These trends intensified over the subsequent years and reached their dramatic peak in the war of 1982.