Abstract This article explores ways in which AI tools can help negotiation scholars do their research, drawing on presentations delivered by Ray Friedman, Emily Hu, Gale Lucas, and Zhivar Sourati at the AI Negotiation Summit at MIT. AI can be used to automate transcript coding, applying negotiation-specific (e.g., “substantiation”) or general language (e.g,. “politeness” or “turn taking”) codes. AI can be trained to act as confederates in negotiation studies, providing human-like behavior in language patterns with high levels of consistency for experimental control, and there is potential for AI to act as subjects in negotiation studies. In these ways AI can help scholars conduct research more efficiently and effectively. However, there are still great challenges, such as the inability of AI to produce the variance of human behavior.

Abstract Drawing on the growing genre of literature on “environmental peacebuilding,” this article develops a qualitative model of how land and natural resources (including minerals, water, forests, and agricultural products) contribute to the framing of conflicts and how they might contribute to their resolution. We considered twelve cases of peace processes in which land and resources played a role and developed a causal link typology of the nexus between natural resources and conflict. Based on extensive archival research and interviews, we then developed a series of causal variables and pathways that were synthesized into our qualitative model—the Peace and Natural Resource Nexus (PNRN) Model. Our analysis suggests that there are opportunities for making peace through a nexus with natural resources and for making peace agreements more robust with greater attention to natural resource linkages even if they might not be the dominant cause of conflict. Attention to the role of natural resources in conflicts and the inclusion of environmental and natural resource factors in the negotiation of peace agreements are thus likely to be advantageous across a wide spectrum of conflicts.

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Steve was a close friend and colleague to us both.He contributed to the dispute resolution field in several significant ways.From our perspective, the most important was his development of the theory of systems design.Collaborating with coauthors

Abstract Despite decades of calls by the international community for the need to pivot the primary approach to cross-cultural conflict resolution education away from privileging Western, prescriptive models and methods of outside educators toward those based on the knowledge and expertise of local stakeholders, the dominant top-down paradigm persists. This article presents a new framework for cross-cultural conflict resolution education that builds on John Paul Lederach’s original distinction between prescriptive (top-down) versus elicitive (bottom-up) approaches, and extends it through grounded-theory research with expert practitioners working across cultures in conflict zones. The result is a contingency approach to working adaptively across different types of cross-cultural situations—based on five key factors—as well as insights into enacting hybrid combinations of both approaches. The implications and next steps for research and practice are discussed.

Abstract While successful peacebuilding efforts require official, top-level negotiations (Track 1), scholars and practitioners agree that facilitating contact and dialogue at the grassroots level is instrumental in reducing prejudice, building trust, and increasing community members’ commitment to peaceful coexistence. However, grassroots-level peace interventions, such as intercommunal training activities and peace education workshops, frequently suffer from the “usual suspects” problem, becoming dominated by people who already are persuaded of the benefits of reconciliation. The problem is widespread in Cyprus, with researchers asserting that the island’s peacebuilding practitioners need to adopt strategies—or “theories of change”—that can engage a broader spectrum of the population. This article explores the usual suspects problem by focusing on a group of practitioners and their engagement strategies. It argues that interventions that conceal their connection to peacebuilding and provide opportunities relating to people’s everyday activities, interests, and livelihoods are more likely to engage individuals who are indifferent to the idea of building peaceful relations.

Abstract How can sophisticated negotiation bring about a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East? While a “grand bargain” to accomplish this lofty goal may seem implausible, the potential value of such an agreement would be vast for most Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players—as well as for many global states. Yet the failure to successfully negotiate it would entail correspondingly huge potential costs for these parties. When the benefits of a deal are high and the costs of no deal are extreme, the underlying basis for a successful negotiation exists—that is, we can envision a collectively beneficial “zone of possible agreement” (ZOPA). The first task of this article is relatively easy: to describe the elements of such a grand bargain—an “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiative (AIPPI),” which should be announced by Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The AIPPI would contain a vision of a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of a non-militarized Palestinian state with Israel enjoying normalized relations with moderate Sunni Arab regimes. As a point of departure for negotiating, it would detail the benefits to and obligations of Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab states required to realize this vision, encourage the creation of performance-based milestones toward this end, to be followed by an international conference. The analysis of this article then shows that a ZOPA likely exists among critical stakeholders despite formidable would-be blockers. Yet bringing about the AIPPI requires answering two much harder questions: What are the barriers to realizing it and what is a plausible path to overcome these barriers? Sketching credible answers to these two knotty questions is the main intended contribution of this article.

Colombia offers a unique case study for the localization debate. Unlike in other conflict‐affected countries, international nongovernmental organizations are not the main channel through which international aid flows. Instead, Colombia has strong state capacity and a historically well‐established civil society, including national‐ and regional‐level social organizations, think tanks, universities, and community‐based organizations throughout the country, all of which have extensive experience working for peace, security, and human rights. Particularly, the national‐level organizations, such as think tanks, human rights organizations, and peace organizations, are not “community‐based” because they do not represent a single community or population, but work at the national level, with deep connections to different communities and regions. Arguably, these “middle” organizations are considered local in the localization literature but with national‐level operational capacity. However, this type of organization does not seem to fit within the localization narrative, and the role of these organizations is largely hidden from the debate. More so, the very processes and mechanisms through which international aid is disbursed in Colombia detract from these national‐level organizations' ability to grow and meet their missions. This article aims to pull out how “middle” or national‐level organizations in Colombia face five key constraints to tailoring aid so that it is accessible to local communities and local organizations. It then presents a deep dive into how one national‐level organization engaged with an American philanthropy to create a transformed way of working in partnership and develop a new model for systemic collaboration and networks in Colombia. It ends with recommendations for how to continue to adapt the localization debate into meaningful action through partnerships throughout the Colombian and global ecosystems.

Most negotiation courses have been taught in person. However, online education has become more prevalent over the past decade due to its flexibility, cost and time efficiency, and new digital technologies designed to compensate for the lack of personal contact. The global pandemic has accelerated this trend, raising the question of whether negotiation courses taught online are as effective as those taught in person. The few studies that have examined the effect of teaching modality on student performance were limited to undergraduate and graduate student samples and the results have been mixed. To contribute to this discussion, we conducted two studies with practitioners to examine whether online or in‐person instruction is more effective for teaching negotiation skills to experienced negotiators.

Although negotiators need to build and sustain high‐quality relationships, relatively little attention has been given to how they might accomplish this. Negotiation researchers have focused largely on the role of trust and trust violations in dealmaking, neglecting the insights that relationship science can offer. In this article, I integrate research from the close relationships and marriage therapy literatures with negotiation research. Based on this integration, I identify three common themes—relationship history, shared meaning, and relationship work—and draw out nine lessons for repair following actions that disrupt a relationship between negotiators. Drawing on these three themes and their associated lessons, I conclude by identifying four guiding principles for developing strong positive relationships. The first principle highlights the importance of acting within a critical window. Using the opening moments of a negotiation to establish positive emotional tone and cognitive interdependence builds a constructive foundation. Reappraising temporary impasses as transformational opportunities and resetting positive affect immediately after a temporary impasse stabilizes relationships and returns them to a positive trajectory. The second principle highlights the role of pauses. Stepping back from the moment of a temporary impasse enables negotiators to neutralize negative emotions, creating the psychological space to positively reappraise the impasse as a transformational opportunity. The third principle draws attention to the benefits of creating a positive skew within relationships, that is, increasing the salience of positive moments in a relationship's history. Finally, the fourth principle draws upon the concept of positivity resonance to highlight the benefits of synchronicity: the alignment of cognitions and emotions in a way that establishes a shared perspective and a shared response to temporary impasses.