Abstract In this article, I mine President Donald Trump’s considerable writing and speaking record to synthesize the key elements of his deal-making approach to help make better sense of his rhetoric and actions on the world’s diplomatic stage. My argument is that Trump’s coercive negotiation style is best understood through the prism of his four public roles: observer, performer, controller, and disrupter. In this article, I analyze how these roles translate into his negotiating behavior. Spotting and exploiting vulnerability is his trade; leverage and bravado are his tools. After assessing the opposing side, Trump uses leverage to threaten his counterparts’ weaknesses, while using bravado to play up the advantages of reaching an agreement on his terms. This way, he presents a drastic structured choice to his opponents, leaving them the least maneuvering space. In the final section of the paper, I illustrate how the four-role framework helps explain Trump’s decisions in the nuclear negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. I also consider opportunities for further research.

Abstract In this study, we explore the long-term effectiveness of the mediation of hierarchical workplace conflicts by comparing and analyzing participants’ perceptions of short-term and long-term mediation effectiveness. Specifically, we surveyed supervisors and subordinates to determine the extent to which they perceive mediation to be effective one year after the conclusion of the process. In this study, we distinguish between mediations that result in a continuing employment relationship versus exit mediations, which occur when employees end their employment. We collected data from real workplace mediation cases in the Netherlands. Our results show a general positive relationship between short-term and long-term mediation outcomes. Supervisors and subordinates, however, perceive the long-term outcomes somewhat differently, with supervisors perceiving greater compliance with the agreement than did subordinates after one year. We found no significant difference in perceptions of long-term effectiveness between exit and nonexit mediations. In the article, we discuss the implications of our findings for mediation theory and practice.

Abstract In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer ex post costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.

Abstract Negotiation practitioners today struggle to manage complex political, economic, and cultural disputes that often involve an array of intertwined issues, parties, process choices, and consequences – both intended and unintended. To prepare next-generation negotiators for these multifaceted challenges, negotiation instructors must keep pace with the rapidly evolving complexity of today’s world. In this article, we introduce systemic multiconstituency exercises (SMCEs), a new educational tool for capturing this emerging reality and helping to close the experiential learning gap between the simulated and the non-simulated environment. We discuss our pedagogical rationale for developing The Transition, a seventy-two-party SMCE inspired by the complex conflicts in Afghanistan and Central Asia and then describe our experiences conducting multiple iterations of this simulation at Harvard University. We argue that SMCEs, in which stakeholders are embedded in clusters of overlapping networks, differ from conventional multiparty exercises because of their immersive character, emergent properties, and dynamic architecture. This design allows for the creation of crucial negotiation complexity challenges within a simulated exercise context, most importantly what we call “cognitive maelstroms,” nested negotiation networks, and cascading decision effects. Because of these features, SMCEs are uniquely suited for training participants in the art of network thinking in complex negotiations. Properly designed and executed, systemic multiconstituency exercises are next-generation teaching, training, and research platforms that carefully integrate negotiation, leadership, and decision-making challenges.

Negotiation JournalVolume 33, Issue 4 p. 283-307 Original Article Howard Raiffa: The Art, Science, and Humanity of a Legendary Negotiation Analyst James K. Sebenius, James K. Sebenius James K. Sebenius: is the Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School in Boston, the director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and a founder and principal of Lax Sebenius LLC, a negotiation advisory firm. His e-mail address is jsebenius@hbs.edu.Search for more papers by this author James K. Sebenius, James K. Sebenius James K. Sebenius: is the Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School in Boston, the director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and a founder and principal of Lax Sebenius LLC, a negotiation advisory firm. His e-mail address is jsebenius@hbs.edu.Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 October 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12188 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume33, Issue4October 2017Pages 283-307 RelatedInformation