How do minorities come to be seen as security threats? This paper examines the case of the large Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia in the context of neighbouring conflict activities driven by the minority’s alleged kinstate. The paper focuses on the trend of securitization experienced by the minority within the area of public life participation. This dynamic takes place through domestic laws linked to the decision-making sphere and self-governance opportunities. How this occurs is researched through primary fieldwork data from semi-structured interviews with Russian-speaking minority elites, whose perspectives are often overlooked in research addressing the particularities of the region. The fieldwork data complements the legal analysis and finds effects of securitization on public participation of minorities, regardless of whether they were successful in entering into governing coalitions or remained in the opposition within the State legislature. While some of those inefficiencies are caused by governing coalition agreements, other obstacles are created by divisions within the minority. Furthermore, the minority group experienced negative effects on their public participation opportunities through limited prospects facilitated by consultative bodies and self-governance arrangements. Finally, the perceived association with the alleged kinstate shapes the minority to the extent of essentially securitizing them.

Trump 2.0 has contested and sought to upturn the so-called liberal international order. Within Europe this entailed leveraging geoeconomic dependence to force NATO members to publicly commit to spending 5% of GDP on defence and the EU into an asymmetrical trade deal. Europe is thus undergoing a guns versus butter debate that threatens the social contract and the solvency of Europe. Taking stock of the scramble across Europe to keep NATO keeping on - and drawing upon research that explores the transnational and economic roots of the rise of the far right - this essay argues that to effectively respond to Trump 2.0 and stem tide of anti-democratic currents will require rethinking contemporary EU economic doxa – imperfectly captured by the term neoliberalism. Such a reckoning should involve a systematic reconsideration of how far and how deep markets and market logics should be institutionalised within European societies. In short, Europe should seek to proactively shape the emerging post-neoliberal trend to seek to ensure that what comes next retains the existing order’s stated commitments to democracy, tolerance, and human dignity. Conversely, failure to rethink Europe’s commitment to neoliberalism risks strengthening those that are convinced the status quo embodies little worth salvaging.

In the IR literature, devoting attention to small state exceptionalism remains the exception. This paper aims to rectify this situation by analyzing claims of exceptionality of the successive Orbán governments of Hungary. It aims to shed light on Hungary’s foreign policy by making two core claims. First, based on a diverse range of sources, it shows that successive Hungarian governments have increasingly come to conceptualize Hungary as an exceptional, trail-blazing, model country in foreign policy and beyond, especially after 2018. Secondly, the paper shows how claims of exceptionality can lead to resentment and isolation in foreign policy, if and when they go hand-in-hand with collective narcissism.

This report examines the involvement of the population of the occupied territories of Ukraine of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the invasion of the territory of Ukraine in 2022 by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. It focuses on the body of evidence for the forced mobilization of the student youth population in these two regions in the lead up to invasion and assesses the implications of this mobilization effort.

This article addresses the contradictory behaviour of the Russian Federation in reacting to the events of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. The Russian response saw significant aggression, but also seemingly involving inaction or even restraint in other areas. The question is what are some plausible explanations for this contradictory behaviour. In order to answer this question, relevant terminology is defined, then the subnational level is focused on and Most Similar System Design is utilised. Then cases involving significant aggression are considered, before moving on to those seemingly involving inaction or even restraint. Finally, these two elements are reconciled, producing a clear picture of the overall similarities, the inconsistencies and the crucial differences. The article finds the crucial differences to be the level of loyalty to the Kremlin and willingness to engage in collaboration or cooperation. The focus on loyalty to the Kremlin and the issue of willingness to collaborate is revealing.

Methodological uniformity and the relatively small number of studies concerning election turnout in Serbia strikingly detract from the social importance of the topic. The goal was to reduce this disparity by studying turnout in the 21st century under a statistically atypical approach that uses objective, publicly available data at the municipalities/cities level. Beginning in 2012, the trend of a worrying, almost linear decrease in turnout was found. Canonical correlation analysis showed that socio-demographic-economic variables are highly predictive of voter turnout. Six pairs of statistically significant canonical factors were isolated from the space of socio-demographic-economic characteristics and corresponding variables of electoral participation. It was indirectly established that the analytically extracted types of environments whose inhabitants exhibit specific electoral-participative behavior also show specific constellations of electoral preferences. The findings were then discussed in light of the regression to Vučić’s hybrid regime.