ABSTRACT This study examines why legislators change their positions on Free Trade Agreement (FTA) ratification votes in the South Korean National Assembly, analyzing 17 FTA ratifications from the 16th to 20th Assembly. Using logistic regression with change‐based variables, I find that transitions in ruling party status, changes in party loyalty, and shifts in constituency economic composition significantly influence position changes. Directional analysis reveals asymmetric patterns: legislators who gain ruling party status are more likely to switch from opposition to support, while switches from support to opposition are primarily driven by increases in district manufacturing employment. Increases in agricultural employment are associated with switches toward support rather than opposition, possibly reflecting government compensation mechanisms. Interaction analysis shows that declining electoral security amplifies responsiveness to constituency economic changes, and that former ruling party members with high party loyalty are particularly prone to switching toward support. These findings demonstrate that legislative position changes in trade policy are shaped more by transitions in political context than by static characteristics, and that different types of position switches operate through fundamentally different mechanisms.

ABSTRACT In South Korea, ruling parties have historically been strongly subordinated to the presidency. What were the origins of this president‐ruling party relationship? This paper aims to answer this question by examining the political dynamics that led to the marginalization of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) and the establishment of Park Chung‐hee's personalist dictatorship, from the beginning of the military regime in 1961 to the early Yushin era in 1973. Few previous studies, grounded in theoretical frameworks, have provided in‐depth case studies on how an authoritarian leader establishes a personalist dictatorship by overcoming other regime elites seeking to build and maintain a collective leadership system, such as a hegemonic party regime, particularly in the South Korean context. In contrast, this paper argues that factionalized regime elites, combined with a ruler's enhanced ability to punish other elite factions and control financial resources, increase the likelihood that an (electoral) authoritarian regime will shift toward a personalist dictatorship. The Park era clearly illustrates these political dynamics. During this period, the ruling DRP was internally factionalized, while Park's power was increasingly enhanced due to the strong presidency, executive dominance over parliament under the “developmental state,” and his growing popularity fueled by rapid economic growth. Accordingly, he could minimize the size of the winning coalition by effectively employing a “divide and rule” strategy, thereby concentrating all power in his hands. The complete subordination of the ruling party to the president was a key byproduct of the consolidation of Park's personalist dictatorship. This paper uses a within‐case analysis based on qualitative methods.

This paper analyzes the differing policy responses of Southeast Asian countries – such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines – to the US–China competition over critical mineral resources. It also examines how these countries prioritize various national interests, including economic development, resource security, and policy autonomy. The study finds that Malaysia primarily adopts a light hedging approach, balancing economic cooperation with both the United States and China to maintain the stability and development of the rare earth supply chain. Simultaneously, it leverages external resources to drive industrial modernization, demonstrating high flexibility and policy independence. In contrast, the Philippines, as an upstream supplier of nickel resources, employs a heavier hedging strategy. While deeply embedded in China's supply chain, it gradually attracts investments from the United States and its allies to reduce dependence on a single market. The differences in these strategies reflect how resource‐based Southeast Asian countries adjust their policies to balance economic development and security needs amid geopolitical rivalries based on their resource endowments and supply chain positions. Malaysia's approach emphasizes balance and economic benefits, while the Philippines' strategy highlights dual objectives of resource security and industrial upgrading. Indonesia has also maintained a light hedging strategy in response to US–China strategic competition, prioritizing the development of a critical mineral industry centered on nickel. This approach aims to promote foreign trade and industrial growth in a rational and strategic manner, thereby maximizing economic gains. Vietnam, by contrast, occupies an intermediate position among the three countries, adopting a moderate hedging strategy that leverages its advantage in rare earth and other mineral resources to strengthen cooperation with major powers. However, due to ongoing tensions between China and Vietnam, their cooperation on critical minerals remains uncertain and warrants further observation. With Trump's re‐election and the increasingly intense trade war between China and the United States, critical mineral resources are bound to become a core and crucial point of competition between the two countries in the coming period. Whether it is Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, or the Philippines, adopting relatively independent mineral policies not only helps safeguard their own economic security but also offers valuable lessons and inspiration for other resource‐rich small states in Southeast Asia.

The Global South is a relational and collective identity of a group of states suffering colonialism and sharing particular material and normative traits. Drawing on an exploration of the historical path of Korea's Southern identity, or the lack thereof, this article explores the origins of Korea's diplomatic narrative of solidarity as a Southern donor. In the past, the Global South did not recognize Korea as one of “us” due to its security dependency on the USA, and internally, Korea's national obsession of developmentalism held a negative view of the South. Today, Korea has succeeded in un‐Southing itself as it has become a member in the Northern donors' club. The article argues that the linear understanding of the Global South shapes Korea's Southern solidarity, something nostalgic that is reflected in its verbal and visual vocabulary of its development assistance. The article aims to start a discussion of the state identity of Korea as a donor and expand the contours of the dialogue on what makes the Global South with the twisted case of Korea.

Despite the escalating perception of China as a “threat” in some Western countries, existing cross‐national investigations lack a psychological framework that incorporates identity factors such as ontological security (OS) and diverse security value orientations to predict the threat. This study introduces a framework of self‐reported individual‐difference measures, tapping into ontological security and security value orientation, to analyze their influence on China threat perception in Australia, South Korea, and the USA. Based on our examination of four dimensions of ontological security (biographical, dread, self‐integrity, and trust), the findings challenge current theories that assume a coherent, integrated model of the four OS dimensions. We thus dispute OS as an initiated and unified form of security, revealing a tension between theoretical and empirical perspectives on individual‐level ontological security. In this tension, dread has a generalizing effect on China threat perception, while self‐continuity lacks substantial impact. Regarding security orientation values, individuals favoring an absolutist notion of security, alongside violent and collective means, are more prone than others to perceive China as a threat. This study contributes to the constructivist school in OS‐threat association within international relations and enhances ontological security research on China perception in the Asia‐Pacific context.

Science and technology policy of Kim Jong‐un's regime in North Korea is more strategic and aggressive than ever before. Under the tight economic sanctions led by the United States and its partners, the young leader makes a desperate effort to boost science and technology (S&T) for maintaining North Korea's political stability and achieving economic development. Despite growing concerns over nuclear and security issues, studies addressing the alternative futures of North Korea are mainly focused on the economy, nuclear weapons, and stability of the regime. This study explores various alternative futures for North Korea's S&T policy, which are different from the viewpoints of most existing studies. To envision and propose alternative futures for North Korea's S&T policy in 2050, we try to link uncertainty levels and types of futures based on Voros' future types and utilize Dator's alternative future model. Based on alternative futures, this study suggests a new perspective to better understand the plausible futures of S&T policies and strategies for a preferable future of the country.

Pacific Focus is a peer-reviewed journal