ABSTRACT This paper introduces sentientist political liberalism . Elaborating on the fundamental ideas in John Rawls's political liberalism, we propose that the scheme of fair social cooperation among persons should be understood as embedded within a broader system of social coexistence between persons and other sentient beings. This prompts a revision of the original position: We add a second phase in which participants, acting as trustees for animals, deliberate on principles of fair coexistence. We also extend the idea of public justification to include a duty of diligent trusteeship and the permissibility to appeal to comprehensive doctrines to reform anthropocentric political cultures.

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ABSTRACTKant's view that there is a propensity to evil in human nature has been thought to be both internally inconsistent and in tension with his other philosophical commitments. This essay provides an interpretation of the propensity to evil to defend Kant from these objections. I argue that the propensity to evil is the choice of the evil fundamental maxim. I then assess Kant's claims that the propensity to evil is universal and inextirpable given this interpretation. I conclude by proposing a new interpretation of why Kant deliberately employs religious language in developing his account of the propensity to evil.

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Abstract Research on personal identity often relies on imaginary cases and tends to theorize about our nature from the first‐person perspective. In this paper, I argue that a problem arises when we combine the two methods and assess imaginary cases from the first‐person perspective. The problem is that the link between de se imagination and modality is broken. De se imagination regularly gives rise to de se modal illusions. De se modal illusions come in two varieties: there are de se illusions of possibility and de se illusions of impossibility. I present a systematic account of the two types of illusion. I further make the case that the proposed account is compatible with maintaining a general link between imaginability and possibility. I apply the account to two concrete cases and use it to undercut the motivation behind a central theory of personal ontology, Dualism, and a central account of personal persistence, Lockeanism.

Abstract What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life maintain that the consequences of that life confer meaning upon it. This article advances one such theory: welfarism about meaning in life. According to this view, a life is conferred meaning if, and only if, and then only insofar as, it promotes or protects the well‐being of other welfare subjects. The purpose of this article is to show why welfarism about meaning in life is the most plausible theory about meaning in life.

Abstract Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. There are two prominent variants of such objections. First, we have a duty to help others. Adopting a child from a poor country satisfies that duty. But procreation does not. Second, adding another person to a wealthy nation through procreation contributes to climate change. But adopting does not. I show that such objections are unsound.

Abstract Yes. I defend this claim against the charge of race reductionism and the charge that ‘white interests’ cannot figure meaningfully into structural explanations of racial inequality. We then distinguish two explanatory roles for white supremacy. The racial role approach attempts to trace the causal effects of white supremacy's normative white/non‐white hierarchy on life chances. The racial materialism approach treats racial inequality as an emergent feature of social orders which depend on conventional racial divisions in labor performance. Each approach emphasizes a different level of explanation for the same basic fact: white interests both drive and are served by racial inequality.

Abstract Which individuals belong to a racial group, and what determines membership? I argue that questions about membership are importantly different from questions regarding the ontology of racial categories and invite a distinctive line of inquiry. But there's a formidable challenge to providing determinate and consistent answers to membership questions: Many phenomena documented in sociology and psychology generate reasonable and systematic disagreement about membership that cannot be adjudicated by an influential variety of social constructionism. While the puzzle of racial identity remains, we emerge with a new appreciation for how racial membership is a distinctive part of it.

Abstract In this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the anti‐realist challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the skeptical challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results do not in fact support any anti‐realist or skeptical conclusions.