For decades since the late 20th century, support for the “Axis of Resistance” has been the main instrument and key track of Iran’s Middle East policy. The Axis has been principally designed to confront Israel and the United States and their influence in the region. However, the escalation of the Israeli–Palestinian and Iran–Israel conflicts in 2023–2025 has seriously damaged this alliance and called its survival into question. The article attempts to identify the impact of the transformations taking place in the Middle East on the Axis of Resistance. The author examines the historical background for the formation of the Axis as a key instrument of Iran’s “forward defense” strategy and describes its essential features. The main focus is on the consequences of the escalation of the conflict with Israel, in particular, the 12-day Iran–Israel war in June 2025. The dynamics of Iran’s foreign policy priorities are examined in the context of both the Iran–Israel conflict and Tehran’s long-term regional strategy. It is concluded that the importance of the Axis as a factor in regional politics and a foreign policy resource for Tehran is waning not only as a result of the damage it suffered from Israel’s military campaigns, but also due to its declining strategic value from Tehran’s own viewpoint. Specifically, in the conditions that have evolved by the mid-2020s, Iran is forced to prioritize strengthening its own defense capabilities. It is noted that the dynamics of international relations in the region may also contribute to the decline of the Axis's influence in the long term. Despite this, the Axis is unlikely to collapse completely: Iran will continue to use its elements selectively, but as an auxiliary tool rather than a central foreign policy mechanism.

The issue of protecting submarine infrastructure emerged shortly after the appearance of such infrastructure in the 19th century, yet for a long time, legal and practical mechanisms for safeguarding it remained underdeveloped. Following a series of incidents in the 2020s involving cable damage in the Baltic Sea, the issue has gained urgency and has been used in Europe as an excuse to search for a new regulatory logic. However, the proposed measures often aim not so much at protecting infrastructure as at addressing objectives unrelated to cable security: establishing intelligence monitoring systems, expanding redundant telecommunications networks (driven by the Nordic countries aspiring to lead in digitalization), commercializing repair services, and extending the regulatory powers of the European Commission. Current initiatives also reflect economic interests. It is concluded that the militarization of undersea civilian infrastructure, including equipping submarine cables with technologies for carrying out reconnaissance activity in the Baltic Sea, allows them to be considered part of the military infrastructure. Attacks against Russian maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, obstruction of shipping and other measures directed against it serve as sufficient grounds for Russian retaliatory actions against the infrastructure of unfriendly countries in the region. The NATO and European Union policies to “protect” underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea can also be seen as part of a broader process of militarization of the World Ocean. In this way, a precedent base is created, and mechanisms and arguments are developed that allow similar activities to be carried out in other regions of the world.

The article examines the conflict between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America in the context of the global confrontation between the United States and China that has intensified since the coming to power of D.Trump in January 2025. The main factor in the escalation of the situation was the growth of tension between the two countries around the Panama Canal, which is of strategic importance to the United States. Trump’s campaign of harsh pressure on Panama, in addition to seeking to strengthen the U.S. strategic position in the Panama Canal zone, increase its control over global trade flows and generate additional revenue, reflects long-standing concerns about China’s growing influence in Central America and the Caribbean. Deterring China is part of Trump’s broader strategy to increase political, economic and military presence in the region, which is seen as an area of special interests of the United States. The article presents an analysis of the Trump administration’s policy towards the Panama Canal and of its economic importance for the United States. It also examines China’s role in the development of the canal and assesses the real presence of Chinese (Hong Kong) companies in its management. The reaction of Panama’s authorities to the demands to reduce dependence on China as well as the consequences of the measures taken for China are shown. The problems and prospects of the development of the transport artery connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are analyzed. The unprecedented pressure on Panama, which included threats of military intervention, resulted in a renegotiation of the terms of cooperation with the Chinese companies, the sale of shares in the port infrastructure of the Panama Canal to a consortium of investors led by an American fund, the cooling of Sino–Panamanian relations and Panama’s withdrawal from the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative”. It is concluded that in the near future, such pressure tactics will determine Washington’s political, trade, and economic relations with countries geographically located in the immediate environment of the United States, where its influence and economic leverage are significant.

Rev. of: Wolfe S., Kane M., and Ansah T. (eds.). In the Shadow of Genocide: Justice and Memory within Rwanda. London: Routledge, 2023

By the mid-2020s Germany has faced the full-scale reduction of its military presence and decline in its political–diplomatic activity in key areas of instability in the Middle East and in Africa north to the equator. Even as Berlin has been focusing on the deterrence of Russia in Europe, these policy trends have had important repercussions for Germany. They have impeded creation of global strategic presence and the capacity to counter various security threats in their areas of origin. The article explores the specifics and problems of Germany’s use of political–diplomatic tools and the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, as well as in Libya and Mali. It notes the low results of the Bundeswehr`s antiterrorist activity. It also explores the pitfalls of German diplomacy in its attempts to achieve reconciliation in several conflict areas. As the Palestinian–Israeli conflict got “unfrozen” since October 7, 2023, Germany has hardened its position on Iran, while demonstrating solidarity with official Tel Aviv and at the same time fearing to worsen its relations with the Arab states. It is concluded that Germany’s policy of linking together conflict resolution and containment of its non-Western opponents has been counterproductive.

Review of: Autesserre S. The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World (Oxford University Press, 2021)

At the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the theoretical understanding of the concept of "soft power" has changed, as well as the application of its tools in practice. Along the liberal democratic countries that have traditionally used “soft power” resources to effectively achieve their foreign policy objectives by spreading their agenda and model of public administration, many non-western states have started to actively employ their educational services, cultural products, and sports diplomacy tools to advance their own geostrategic goals and to limit the monopoly of the West on shaping political agenda and its so-called normative power. With the escalation of the Ukrainian and Palestinian–Israeli conflicts, Western states turned to the use of the so-called sharp power tools, in order to delegitimize the “soft power” of competing countries through the tools of “cancel culture” and, specifically, to limit Russia’s ability to use its humanitarian resources in foreign policy. Reliance on “sharp power” has discredited not just J.Nye’s concept, but also the basic principles of the functioning of the humanitarian sphere at large. Against this background, “soft power” loses its initially positive message that promotes the ideas of growing interdependence as a condition for maintaining long-term partnership relations and mutual benefit. This message is replaced by tools for manipulating public consciousness, as states seek to ensure the conditions for the dominance of their narratives in the shortest possible time. Nevertheless, despite the dominance of “sharp power” at the times of conflict, demand for “soft power” instruments does not disappear completely. This is reflected by the 2022 concept of the humanitarian policy of the Russian Federation abroad which recognizes the important role of “soft power” tools as a means to neutralize anti-Russian sentiments.

A comparison of Daesh (“Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”) and Azov Battalion – and violent Salafist–jihadist and white suprematist/ultranationalist extremism in general – may seem non-trivial, as they are not typically paired in the mainstream research or expert analysis. However, it provides an interesting angle for exploring not only potential parallels and similarities, but also divergences between them. The two terrorist organisations – Daesh and “Azov” – have been selected as some of the most notorious in their respective ideological–motivational categories and as the phenomena standing out in many other respects in their respective regions – the broader Middle East and (Eastern) Europe. Both Daesh and “Azov” also turned into the leading regional hubs for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) attracting the largest influxes of FTFs in the 2010s. Roughly simultaneously, both became extremely politicised internationally. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of two organizations and compare them by identifying aspects and areas of convergence and divergence by examining the historical background, both domestic and regional, that gave rise to these organizations, as well as their ideologies and the use of foreign fighters. It is concluded that it is the scope of their goals, agenda and activity where the two groups differ most: while Daesh was guided by and promoted a supranational, religiously-based imperative and ideology, “Azov” focuses on the national and regional levels through the lens of ultranationalism. While in Daesh’s envisioned “caliphate”, the population was to be comprised of equal “brothers and sisters in Islam” regardless of race, nationality, age, etc., “Azov”, in contrast, advances a clear societal and racial hierarchy at the core of which lies the belief that men are naturally unequal. However, the two groups display interesting similarities in several respects, including some ideological parallels. In both cases, a group of “the chosen ones” is “to lead by example”, “enlighten” and mobilise the masses, and the concept of perpetual battle without an option of possible defeat lies at the core of both ideological systems. While the two groups’ ultimate political-ideological goals diverge completely, they have also both actively engaged foreign terrorist fighters and employed many similar terrorist tactics, e. g. abductions, killings, torture, and the use of civilians as a human shield. * Daesh (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State (IS)) is an organization recognized as terrorist and banned on the territory of the Russian Federation by decision of the Supreme Court dated 29.12.2014, no. АКПИ 14-1424С, which entered into force on 13.02.2015. ** The Azov Battalion is an organization recognized as terrorist and banned on the territory of the Russian Federation by decision of the Supreme Court dated 02.08.2022, no. АКПИ22-411С, which entered into force on 10.09.2022.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has always pursued an anti-Israel policy. Religious and ideological enmity with Israel is still a vital element in the doctrine of the Islamic Republic whose revolutionary ideology explicitly rejects the existence of Israel and calls for Israel “to be wiped off the map”. However, a focus on this ideological doctrine is not enough to understand Iran’s policy towards Israel, the Palestinian issue, and the Gaza problem. Has the IRI’s policy been solely determined by its revolutionary ideals, Iran would have joined the Gaza war or pushed Hezbollah to an all-out confrontation with Israel. The fact that Iran has not taken such measures is more than an expression of moderation – it is an evidence of its rational and pragmatic approach. Although the ideological revolutionary vision of Israel’s destruction has not been abandoned, Iran’s policy is increasingly focused on a range of security needs and strategic goals set by its leadership in pursuance of evolving national strategic interests. Since the beginning of the new acute crisis around and in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, Iran’s current and potential role in the Palestinian–Israeli context has been widely discussed. In Israel and the West, it is commonly assumed that since Iran supports Hamas and congratulated Hamas on its 7 October 2023 attack, it may not want or be able to leave Hamas alone in the face of a large-scale war in Gaza and, if not by itself then at least through its regional allies, will do everything to support Hamas. However, Iran’s own focus has been two-fold: on the one hand, to avoid getting involved in a regional war and, on the other, to stop the Israeli aggression against Gaza. As a result, Tehran has been trying to score propaganda points from the Gaza crisis without starting a wider war. Directly engaging in a head-to-head war with Israel could potentially trigger U.S. intervention, resulting in massive losses to Iran. While Iran does not want an all-out war, it intends to maintain its reputation as the leading force confronting Israel in the Muslim world, especially given the devastating situation in Gaza. For that aim, Iran has used Hamas and the Gaza war to activate its regional network of allies and protégés against Israel. However, when the conflict in Gaza ends, Iran will encourage its proxies to de-escalate tensions to support peace and stability in the region.

The article explores the religious expansion of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Arab countries of the Middle East. Socio–political precipitants and motives of Iran’s religious policy in the region are addressed through the prism of the Syria crisis. Special attention is paid to a shifting paradigm of armed conflicts in the region as a factor influencing the rise of paramilitary forces (militia) and the choice of instruments of Iran’s humanitarian policy in Syria and Iraq. The history of various Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, their ideological basis and results of their activities are examined. On the basis of comparative analysis, an author’s typology of such groups is proposed. Active spread of the Shia doctrine, the formation of Shia–majority governments, support for non-state groups, and the creation of pro-Iranian militias are explored as strategic guidelines for Iran’s religious expansion in the Middle East. On the one hand, it is concluded that the integration of Shia militias in regular Arab armies along with the spread of the Shia doctrine rooted Iran in Arab social fabric and strengthened its political and military positions in the Middle East. On the other hand, it is shown that Iran’s sectarian policy affected Tehran's relations with key regional, international players in the region in more ways than one. Despite Tehran’s political statements and preferences, Shia militias’ attacks on the U.S. and Israeli targets in the region de facto have made Iran a part in Gaza war and have also affected its rapprochement with the Arab states and its cooperation with international partners in the process of reconciliation in Syria. In view of the significance of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict for Russia’s Middle East policy, the article contributes to the study of the Iranian policy in the region and sheds the light on Iran’s behavioral model in crisis conditions in the Middle East.