We argue for two claims in this paper. First, we argue that existing taxonomies of ideal and non-ideal theory must be expanded. While non-ideal theory is often thought to be transitional in nature - that is, theorizing how agents in structurally unjust circumstances should act so as to bring about a more just state of affairs - we show that some non-ideal theory is in fact static. Static non-ideal theory attempts to guide the actions of individuals while taking background structural injustice as a kind of fixed point, or as a "backdrop" against which individuals can try to ethically interact. Second, we argue that notwithstanding the intentions of theorists, static non-ideal theory often serves ideological purposes by functioning to reinforce the (unjust) status quo. Throughout, we use theoretical debates about exploitation as illustrative of the phenomenon under discussion.

This essay identifies a normative function of the concept of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that the concept of intentional action functions to focus our evaluative concern on some doings rather than others. It acts as a proxy for evaluative priority. Two arguments are offered for this thesis. First, we need a concept that functions to focus evaluative concern, and the concept of intentional action exhibits features we'd expect from a concept with this prioritizing function. Second, the thesis is explanatorily powerful: it explains in a unified manner a number of puzzling features of intentional action, including the Knobe effect, the threshold of sufficient control governing intentional action, disagreement over whether knowledge is required for intentional action, cultural variation in ascription of intentionality, and the radical pluralism of ways that intentional action manifests. This second argument also shows what can be gained by attending to the functions of our concepts of agency.

Haecceitism is the thesis that some truths are not necessitated by the qualitative truths. In this paper I explore a general argument that purports to establish that haecceitism leads to objectionably 'cheap' violations of determinism. In response to this argument, I develop a novel position that combines considerations from metaphysics and the philosophy of language to secure the compatibility of haecceitism and determinism. This position has important parallels to the way haecceitism has been developed within counterpart theory, but, crucially, it makes no use of counterpart theory itself.

At the time of publication, "Pets, Power, and Legitimacy" by Richard Healey (Philosophers' Imprint, 2025, Vol. 25, DOI 10.3998/phimp.6219) was published under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. At the authors' request, the license has been changed to CC BY 4.0 instead. In addition, a statement regarding the change in CC licensing has been added to the article on page 14.

Many philosophers have argued that a hypothesis is better confirmed by some data if the hypothesis was not specifically designed to fit the data. ‘Prediction’, they argue, is superior to ‘accommodation’. Others deny that there is any epistemic advantage to prediction, and conclude that prediction and accommodation are epistemically on a par. This paper argues that there is a respect in which accommodation is superior to prediction. Specifically, the information that the data was accommodated rather than predicted suggests that the data is less likely to have been manipulated or fabricated, which in turn increases the likelihood that the hypothesis is correct in light of the data. In some cases, this epistemic advantage of accommodation may even outweigh whatever epistemic advantage there might be to prediction, making accommodation epistemically superior to prediction all things considered.

In this paper, I examine Hume’s account of an important class of causal belief, which he calls “general rules”. I argue that he understands general rules, like all causal beliefs, as lively ideas that are habitually associated with our impressions or memories. However, I argue that he believes they are unlike any reflectively produced causal beliefs in that they are produced quickly and automatically, such that they occur independently of any other processes of reasoning. Given this, I argue that Hume appears to understand general rules as relatively simple beliefs, expressible only via generic sentences, like “fires cause heat”.

This paper considers how cognitive architecture impacts and constrains the rational requirement to respond to reasons. Informational encapsulation and its close relative belief fragmentation can render an agent’s own reasons inaccessible to her, thus preventing her from responding to them. For example, someone experiencing imposter phenomenon might be well aware of their own accomplishments in certain contexts but unable to respond to those reasons when forming beliefs about their own self-worth. In such cases, are our beliefs irrational for failing to respond to our own reasons? Or are they excused on grounds of the reasons’ inaccessibility? I argue that in such cases, the rational status of the belief that fails to respond to reasons is modulated by the degree of encapsulation of the system that produces it. Yet because our cognitive systems are rarely perfectly encapsulated, our failures to respond to reasons are almost always irrational to some degree.

Frequently, those who commit a crime forcibly are subject to greater punishment than those who commit the same crime without using force. But uncertainty surrounds the conditions that must be met for an act to be considered to have been performed with force. It is particularly puzzling that acts that are committed through threat, which are in no way harmful, are nonetheless classified under the law as being committed forcibly. This paper explains why by offering an account of a particular kind of harmless force. On the account offered, an act is performed with this type of force just in case it manifests a disposition to escalate in the face of obstacles permissibly imposed by the victim. The paper argues that conduct that manifests such a disposition causes the victim’s agency to be implicated in the wrong done to them by causing them to refrain from realizing obstacles to the wrong. Forcible conduct, therefore, invades another’s autonomy in a way that non-forcible conduct does not and is, for that reason, more wrongful.

It is a commonplace that imagination is heterogeneous: we need to draw a series of cross-cutting distinctions even to begin any serious general discussion of the range of activities we take to be typical instances. The nature of the heterogeneity being exhibited is usually left unclear, however, and thus so are its consequences both for our understanding of imagination and for assessing certain challenges such as reductionism. Here it is argued that we can accept heterogeneity while recognizing important forms of unity among the various kinds of imaginative activity. Four distinct but compatible strategies of different strengths are considered, three of which have historical precedents in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s work. All of them have consequences for modern reductionist approaches to imagination, but also, more surprisingly, for standard assumptions about the epistemic asymmetry between imagination and other forms of representation such as perception and belief. Understanding heterogeneity in these ways allows us to understand the connections between the various forms of activity that philosophers and others have grouped together despite thinking they do not constitute a single natural kind, as well as to examine the extent to which current approaches are continuous or discontinuous with those of past thinkers.

We spend a good deal of time thinking about how and when to advise others, and how to respond to others advising us. But philosophical discussions of the nature and norms of advising have been scattered and somewhat disconnected. The most focused discussion has come from philosophers of language interested in whether advising is an assertive or directive kind of speech act. This paper argues that the ordinary category of advising is much more heterogenous than has been appreciated: it is possible to advise by asserting relevant facts, by issuing directives, by asking questions, and by other kinds of adviceless advising. The heterogeneity of advising makes speech act-theoretic accounts of advising look like accounts of special cases, which motivates us to look elsewhere for an account of what advising is. I suggest that we think about advising as a distinctive species of joint practical thinking, which I shall call collaborative deliberation, and show how our need for a concept to pick out this kind of joint activity emerges from our practical needs as deliberators. This view helps to illuminate a number of puzzling features of advising, and offers some guidance to be better at advising and at being advised.