This article examines the methodological foundations of a critical approach to addressing the ethical challenges of artificial intelligence (AI). It argues that the object of ethical analysis should not be AI technologies in isolation, but rather hybrid systems encompas­sing humans, technologies, and social institutions whose operation involves AI systems. The subject of AI ethics then becomes the content and nature of the changes that AI sys­tems bring about in human perceptions, values, behavior, and decision-making. A system of principles, transformable into questions for critical analysis, is proposed as a metho­dological basis for this critical approach. These principles include system expansion, con­sideration of changes, skepticism, design limitations, AI system agency, augmentation of natural intelligence, inequality, pragmatic adoption, and demystification. The applica­bility of this critical approach to analyzing specific situations is demonstrated through the example of using neural networks for writing code. This analysis reveals ethical is­sues related to increased cognitive inequality and the potential disruption of training and development systems within the IT sector. The article concludes that ethical challenges arise not at the level of the technology itself, but at the level of social interaction among users. It emphasizes the need for critical analysis and forecasting of changes at the cogni­tive, personal, and social levels to find balanced solutions and mitigate risks.

The paper presents definite review of mutual communication between analytical philosophy and phenomenology in the study of conscious experience’s phenomenal character. It is clearly demonstrated, that analytical philosophy tends to share the so-called “narrow” inter­pretation of conscious experience phenomenal character both in its strong and moderate ver­sions. Strong version denies that cognitive states may have phenomenal properties and in­sists that the latter adhere only to sensorial domain. Those who share moderate position, admits, that perceptual experience preserves its phenomenal character although laden with definite conceptual content. According to this position, conscious thoughts may possess their specific phenomenal character, but only due to perceptual states, with which they are obvi­ously tied. In their turn, those, who adhere to phenomenological tradition, support the so-called wide interpretation of conscious experience phenomenal character. Their point is, that our thoughts also have their specific phenomenal character, which differs from the former and cannot be reduced to sensory phenomenology. Those who accept this position acknowl­edge (logical and metaphysical) possibility of specific cognitive mental states; differ from any sensorial mental states. Vivid debates on cognitive phenomenology, dated back to the last years 80th of XX century and embrace wide range of international philosophical community, still continue. They throw a fresh light on the most fundamental problems of contemporary epistemology: perceptual intentionality and its influence on the high-level cognitive processes, qualia of mental experience (if any), the relevance of introspection in the study of abstract thinking, phenomenological description cognitive status. This analy­sis outlines directions of their further elaboration and not only paves the way to the new de­cision of the so-called “hard problem” of mind, but also raises to the new level of complex­ity the problems of artificial intelligence.

By 2024, the use of self driving transport has not only become widespread, but also regu­lated. Its implementation is accelerating, and today we can already talk about the formation of the technological paradigm of unmanned transport. An important feature of it is the active participation of the consumer, and an important factor is the trolley problem. The article shows that the modern paradigm of unmanned transport is formed not by solving the prob­lem, but by avoiding its occurrence and maintaining the decisive role of humans in emer­gency situations.

The article discusses the prospects and conceptual means of a new perspective on the theo­retical explanation of human origins, especially in the aspects of cognition, language, mate­rial practices, and technology. Neo-Darwinism, or synthetic theory of evolution, which com­bined the simplified concept of Darwin with population genetics, where the main role is given to random mutations and natural, mainly individual, selection, is no longer completely dominant. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, which combines neo-Darwinism with neo-Lamarckism and includes models of gene-cultural evolution, epigenetics, multilevel selec­tion, the Baldwin effect, inclusive heredity, cultural drive, niche construction, and phenotype plasticity, seems more promising. The relationship of these ideas to the intellectual achieve­ments and rich traditions of domestic evolutionism is shown. After a brief explanation of the interrelated concepts that make up the extended synthesis, concepts and models bor­rowed from different branches of evolutionary theory, modern macro- and micro-social knowledge, and psychology are proposed. Instrumental activity, which has received the most attention because the remains of Paleolithic technologies are the most preserved and studied in detail by archaeologists, is presented as a part of niche construction: the practical transfor­mation by our distant ancestors of the habitat available to them. The exceptional role of probes is shown and a typology of behavioral and evolutionary probes is compiled. The metaphorical name “magic wand” is used to name especially flexible and polyfunc­tional structures that provide evolutionary success to different species (like the trunk in ele­phants and the echo sounder in bats). It is shown that for hominins and sapiens the main “magic wand” was the accumulation of cultural patterns transmitted in generations, because it was through them that the other “magic wands” characteristic of our species with almost limitless development potential began to develop: language, consciousness, writing, science, philosophy, art, and an expanding range of technologies.

The article examines the views of Alexander Leonidovich Nikiforov (04.28.1940–09.29.2023), whose name is inseparable from the formation and development of Russian epistemology. His persistent interest in the problem of the correspondent concept of truth and its protection from intrascientific and social criticism is noted, the rationale for the unified nature of science as knowledge and criticism of the interpretation of technoscience as the third, post-non-classical stage of the development of science are analyzed. In the light of the correspondent concept of truth, the question of the cognitive status of humanitarian, especially historical knowledge is considered, in particular the question of the epistemological legitimacy of using the concept “veracity [pravda]” instead of the concept “truth” in historical research. It is shown that A.L. Nikiforov proposed a concretized concept of truth that retains commonality with truth as correspondence, in this case, to the available historical data and methods accepted in this science. In such a refined form, veracity [pravda] can serve as a criterion for distinguishing scientific research from other forms of historical description, but does not provide all the conditions for the correspondence theory of truth, the use of which even in academic history is recognized as limited. The main thing that unites the analysis of the problem of truth in the context of the study of technoscience, on the one hand, and historical research, on the other hand, is the distinction and recognition of the cognitive and non-cognitive goals (practical, ideological) realized in them and the associated epistemological and axiological criteria and attitudes, cognitive and emotional components. It is substantiated that, asserting the significance of the concept of truth, A.L. Nikiforov stands for the defense of the autonomy of scientific research, its methodology and ethos as conditions for the responsible behavior of scientists, which ensures the high status of science in society and culture. Shown as A.L. Nikiforov defended the specificity of philosophical epistemology, distinguishing it from other special scientific methods of studying science. It is concluded that in addition to solving specific theoretical, epistemological and methodological problems, the contribution of A.L. Nikiforov is to implement a critical-skeptical approach, which allows, in particular, to minimize the negative impact of authoritative and recognized positions in the scientific community on the research process. Embodying the ideals of criticism in his work, A.L. Nikiforov was one of those who contributed to Russian philosophy finding a new breath.

The article addresses the classical epistemological debate on direct and indirect realism from educational perspectives relating to the studies of Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Real­ity (AR). Recently, D. Hoffman introduced the Interface Theory of Perception stating that senses and thoughts mediate and represent reality similar to interface of computer represent­ing hidden process in a computer. Hoffman goes further and compares the nature of cogni­tion with production of virtual reality. Studies of VR partly confirmed such statements. For instance, due to an interaction of our mind with computer-generated objects (signs), move­ment and acceleration in VR during a virtual free fall from a parachute experienced as real. By using the Interface Theory of Perception and semiotic theory, the paper examines how the signs and interactions in VR scenarios can replace/construct studied realities and be used for learning. It is argued that VR allows building for learners ‘developmental niches’ to ex­perience and acquire new skills or conceptual knowledge. Overlays or signs augmented on these VR environments give ‘semiotic scaffolding’ for learners who re-construct studied social realities or receive instructions for the acquisition of professional skills. These results were investigated in three types of VR environments with different degrees of semiotic scaf­folding and evaluated by experts in cultural education. It is shown that VR provides learning environments similar to the real world and provided semiotic scaffolding reduced the cogni­tive loads in these developmental niches. VR environments for professional learning as well as for general education can benefit from using semiotic scaffoldings in virtual apprentice­ship and professional instruction. Augmented Reality could also scaffold and speed-up sci­entific discoveries through the effective integration of researchers into the ‘collective me­mory’ (global databases) and technically scaffolded processes of recognition.

The problem of paradigm shift has been on the agenda of social and humanitarian cognition for half a century. Among the factors that led to the appeal to this topic, two played a deci­sive role. The first one the emergence of Soviet social science from ideological isolation, gave an impetus to comparisons of the achieved results. The second one, the transfer of the problem of human to the center of theoretical and methodological analysis, gave rise to the need for a radical reconstruction not only of the structure of social science, but also of its basic methodological principles. Originating in line with the theoretical and method­ological principles of research of the “science” type, the social sciences and humanities of the classical period relied on the strategy of reductionism, which assumed the priority of the general (concepts) over the special (real phenomena, events, and people), identity over difference and diversity. The effect of this attitude persists to this day, causing not only a growing gap between science and reality, but also a decrease in the theoretical and methodological potential of social and humanitarian knowledge. The problem of changing the paradigm of social and humanitarian cognition is considered in the book by V.E. Ke­merov “Social philosophy: paradigm shift”, in which he substantiates the need to develop a strategy of anti-reductionism and outlines the range of tasks facing modern social philoso­phy in this area.

The illusory truth effect is becoming a particularly relevant field for cognitive research today. Meanwhile, the conclusions that researchers draw from numerous experiments refer mainly to single discrete “truths” that can be viewed independently of one another. The present study takes into account the emergent nature of subjective knowledge, since it is such knowledge that can be evaluated in the categories of certainty and doubt. It seems that this will allow to expand and complement ideas about the principles of belief formation in separate constituent parts of “knowledge”. David Hume’s analysis of “A Treatise of Human Nature” and “An Enquiry into Human Understanding” presents the necessary theoretical tools for this. The analysis of Hume’s conception of “belief” through the dynamic (differing in degree) characteristics of “strength” and “vividness” leads to the conclusion that belief can be seen as an inner sensation, that is, as a subjective characteristic of knowledge. Among other things, it is pointed out that conviction through mechanisms of association will be communicated to abstract ideas as well. The greater the number of reinforcing beliefs, the stronger the belief in the abstract idea, which is reinforced by primary ideas derived from impressions. But in the end, the abstract idea itself begins to translate the “credibility” (that is, to generate belief) to the information to which it is applied. For the concept of the illusory truth effect, this may mean that in some cases our conviction of a particular non-truth will encourage us to further resist or refuse to accept the truth, even when we encounter it directly through the senses or through logical inference.

Today, the study of the issue of distinction has turned out to be extremely relevant – what proportion of the work in the produced artifact belongs to a person, and what proportion belongs to a computer. In this direction, it is important to develop computer analyzers of computer generators of texts, pictures, music, animations, and videos. The fundamental theoretical-algorithmic status of such generators is given by the Gödel–Lucas–Penrose test. In 1961, Oxford professor J. Lucas, on the basis of Gödel’s second theorem, concluded that the human mind is fundamentally superior to all kinds of computing systems. R. Penrose, supporting this position, stated that human consciousness is not algorithmic and goes beyond computability. This argument has generated extensive discussion regarding its philosophical underpinnings, mathematical validity, physical and neurophysiological explanations, psychological credibility, and technological implementation. The dispute about the importance and alternative ways of interpreting the argument does not stop, constituting one of the basic provisions of the philosophy and methodology of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. In October 2021, the SCMAI RAS held the All-Russian Symposium “Artificial Intelligence: Paradoxes and Contradictions”, during which the logical-philosophical, formal-computational and cultural-anthropological aspects of the Gödel-Lucas argument were studied, and possible ways of its transformation and development were shown, such as the Gödel-Lucas-Watt test.

The development of high technologies is currently one of the key factors determining the country’s success in the international arena. The development of all spheres of society today depends on the latest research and technological developments: not only economic and so­cial, in which high technologies are widely used, but also political and cultural, in which they are actively involved, allowing to optimize traditional approaches to organizing activi­ties in these areas. The question of the use of artificial intelligence in Russia and in the world is extremely relevant due to the importance that the latest developments have acquired in such areas as military affairs, medicine, and the judicial system. At the same time, the problem of determining the prospects for artificial intelligence in the Russian Federation, as well as in other countries, continues to be open. In this article, the authors turn to the analy­sis of the concept of “artificial intelligence”, distinguishing it from “artificial conscious­ness”, consider the causes and results of the introduction of artificial intelligence in various spheres of society in Russia and abroad, predicting its future.