The Platonic work, extended to a lot of dialogues, could be used among others as an analytical instruction of the nature of participation given through various types of predication relations. This article focuses on the identification of the implicit and explicit predications (seen as participations) dispersed in the Platonic work. Nine distinct categories have been found and each of then is comprised of certain structures, carrying distinguishable meanings. Ordinary predication, Pauline predication, identity, difference, otherness and definition are included, while the various senses of self-predication and self-participation are presented. Lastly, concept maps of mutual relations between selected ideas are exhibited in a software ontology environment.

The second conjunct of the Republic’s account of justice—that justice is “not meddling in the work of another”—has been neglected in Plato literature. This paper argues that the conjunct does more work than merely reiterating the content of the first conjunct—that justice is “doing one’s own work.” I argue that Socrates develops the concept at work in this conjunct from its introduction with the Principle of Specialization in Book II to its final deployment in the finished conception of justice in Book IV. Crucial to that concept’s development is the way in which the notion of “another” comes to refer to members of distinct classes or parts, i.e. takes on an inter-part connotation beyond a mere intra-part connotation. The first conjunct—that justice is “doing one’s own work”—does not connote the same divisions, and so the conjuncts should not be understood as equivalent or mutually entailed.

Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.

This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of writing proposed by Plato in Phaedrus and especially the conception of philosophical writing as a maieutic game. The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy.
 On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between Plato and "the facts".
 1) If we compare the Apology of Socrates with other sources, we discover a series of important “games” that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes.
 2) The famous passage of Phaedo 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics.
 3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of their contri-bution is overall negative.
 4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the Sophist, there is a "sophist of noble stock", an educator who can only be Socrates.
 5) Plato in the Sophist shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals, before the Philebus and the Timaeus, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his philosophy
 In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex reality.

It may seem odd to publish a thesis submitted almost fifty years ago, but the editor Harold Tarrant explains why: "When conversing about Plato, Samuel Scolnicov (1941-2014) not infrequently mentioned doctoral thesis, and I suspect that I asked him more than once what the topic was. From his eartier essays on he had referred to it (a list of Samuel Scolnicov's publications is to be found from p. 238 to 249 of this book), and he published articles devoted to the hypothetical method in Kant-Studien (1975) and Methexis (1992). He still remained committed to its principal claims in his treatment of Republic V-VII (1988); and his book on the Parmenides (2003), which was a natural dialogue to tackle as a sequel to the present work, reiterates many of its findings (2003). However, he nowhere returned to the issues with the same thoroughness and scholarly acumen that is demonstrated in the present pages. When I finally read the thesis in Cambridge University Library I felt that here was the key of much else that he had published on Plato, a work that showed his fondamental commitment to Plato -to a Plato who was importantly different from Aristotle, not just Aristotle's more problematic precursor". (p. 10). Harold Tarrant is right. Even if after the submission of this thesis

Plato and Xenophon had different perspectives on the better governance. In this paper, I study the notion of tyranny in Plato's Republic and Xenophon's Hiero to trace their views on the aptitude of philosophy to redeem the tyrant and indicate some intertextual points. On this basis, I analyse the meaning and extent of Simonides’ proposal in the Hiero rejecting the idea of a mere pragmatic approach. Finally, I examine the platonic Hipparchusto find a key to figure out the election of Simonides as Xenophon’s spokesperson. Paying attention to the context of the discussions among the Socratics, this approach enhances our understanding of these authors, regarding tyranny, the possibility of its abandonment, and the role of the intellectuals in this process.

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_19_5