ABSTRACT Besides clear policy directives, the unresolved and open‐ended elements in policy communication also create discursive politics. This article argues that ambiguity in policy communication reflects the state's exercise of power within a fractured sociocultural landscape. Examining state policies around the platform economy, we demonstrate how China's techno‐politics are constructed upon visions of the future and their ambiguous articulations—ambiguous imaginaries. By integrating the concepts of sociotechnical imaginaries and strategic ambiguity, we conduct a longitudinal qualitative analysis to identify and trace the evolution of three functional imaginaries (transformative, conflict‐mediating, and regulatory). Together, these functional imaginaries co‐constitute an ultimate imaginary (healthy platforms). Each type mobilizes ambiguity respectively via metaphors, contradictory descriptions, and shifting emphases. This produces ambiguities that either evoke modernization or mediate tensions around the platform's role as an enterprise or capital within the socialist market economy. We argue that these ambiguous imaginaries serve as a discursive “glue,” temporarily reconciling deep‐seated ideological fractures through surface‐level uncertainty and future promises. This article contributes a framework that interprets the futuristic ambiguities embedded in policy as both an actionable instrument and a future gaze, making development possible in the (centralized) developmentalist state.

ABSTRACT Early AI policymaking in the United States appeared bipartisan, but subsequent developments raise the question of whether AI policy will become more polarized over time. To examine how partisanship takes root around novel policy issues, we perform a mixed‐methods study, analyzing survey data from 129 state legislators in 44 states and performing four case studies featuring legislative debates over enacted AI regulation in Idaho, Colorado, and Illinois. We articulate four potential partisan triggers that shape the emergence of issue polarization: (1) competing problem definitions, (2) preferred policy tools, (3) stakeholder participation, and (4) issue placement in policy subsystems, and we introduce the concept of subsystem shopping. Flexibility and compromise in subnational AI policymaking were initially common due to uncertain issue ownership over diverse problem definitions, the presence of disrupted industries, and deference to nonpartisan expert voices, which enabled subsystem shopping towards less controversial policymaking. However, bipartisan windows narrowed as AI became anchored in party‐owned domains, lobbying became more coordinated, and “soft” areas of initial legislative consensus hardened into disputes over more robust policy tools. These developments offer insights into how nascent policy domains can initially sustain bipartisan cooperation, and why it may erode unless actors work to preserve it.

ABSTRACTWhat opinions are generated by AI algorithms about different countries? Is there a systematic difference in the opinions generated about each region? In this paper we developed a machine learning model to classify labeled and unlabeled datasets of opinions about countries generated by ChatGPT. We used semantic network analysis to map the positive and negative opinions associated with each country. We found that ChatGPT tends to produce positive opinions, emphasizing countries' ability to attract tourism and offer job opportunities. We also found that Western countries located in North America and Europe were often described as a shining example of functioning economies and therefore wonderful places to visit, work or live in. Conversely, poorer countries, particularly those in the Middle East and Africa, were more likely to be described as dysfunctional places, politically corrupt, and unsafe to visit. Overall, ChatGPT focused on the economic performance of countries, and their potential contribution to the global economy.

Abstract In the digital sovereignty debate, countries and blocks seek to build technological and regulatory capacity to ascertain technological autonomy—definitions notwithstanding. Meanwhile, these actors seek to position themselves discursively, differentiating their own understanding of digital sovereignty from that of competing powers. In this context, the European Union (EU) elaborated the concept of digital sovereignty as something obtainable on an individual level, where regulations are put in place for users to be able to choose what personal data (not) to share. Meanwhile in China the government launched a number of artificial intelligence (AI) and data protection regulations along with an antitrust crackdown on numerous platform companies. This aimed at bringing technological giants (namely platforms), capable of handling massive amounts of data and influencing people's everyday lives, under stricter government rule. While the Chinese government has only partially framed these actions within frameworks akin to ‘digital sovereignty’, the purported aim was accruing individual autonomy vis‐à‐vis big techs, arguably falling close to the EU's ‘digital sovereignty’ discursive framework. By comparing EU and Chinese AI and data governance regulations, this article unpacks the EU discourse on the individual element of digital sovereignty and finds the EU regulatory effort insufficient to achieve its declared objective.

Abstract This study investigates how youth are navigating the regional and global Internet governance spaces using the Pyramid of Participation framework as proposed by the author, which is built on Arnstein's ladder. By understanding how youth participate in these spaces, this study seeks to understand the dynamics of meaningful youth participation by using the Youth Dialogue on Internet Governance (YOUthDIG) as an exploratory case study. The findings reveal that The Pyramid of Participation outlined in this paper provides a visual framework for decision makers to reflect on where and how participants engage with the process. This Pyramid of Participation also acknowledges that when there is no meaningful participation, that participants will choose to discontinue their participation and this motivation requires reflection on where we can enhance processes and change attitudes to ensure a better informed group of stakeholders and empowered actors.

Abstract The online environment has evolved with the development of emerging information technologies. In response to rising voices discussing the boundaries of collecting and using user data on platforms, this study explored Chinese Internet users' information sensitivity as an indicator of data classification governance. This study employed a two‐stage research approach. First, 60 types of information that users disclose to Internet platforms in the era of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) were identified. Biometric identification, travel records, preference, trace information, and other information reflecting the characteristics of network collection in the era of big data and AI were also included. Second, based on 397 questionnaires, the information categories were clustered into five groups: less‐sensitive social attributes, consumption traces, individual action details, potential risk information, and health and social sensitivity. Of the total disclosed information types, 61.7% were perceived as highly sensitive by Chinese users in the current Internet environment; the higher the sensitivity of the information, the less likely users were to disclose it and use the online platform. Moreover, newly added information types have a high sensitivity. These findings provide insights into the policy design and governance of Internet platform data collection and usage practices in the era of big data and AI.

Abstract China's approach to Internet governance is increasingly perceived as a Party‐centric model, aligning the state under the Chinese Communist Party's (the Party) leadership. The division of labor between the Party and the state in the context of political centralization and Party centrality remains unclear. This study aims to address this knowledge gap by examining the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a central player in Internet governance, which also functions as a Party organ under the name of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (OCCAC). Utilizing a novel data set of policy documents, this study explores how CAC's dual Party‐state status plays out in China's Internet governance. The findings indicate that policies on Internet development are predominantly issued under the Party's name (OCCAC), while regulatory policies concerning the Internet industry are primarily issued under the state's name (CAC). Nevertheless, the Party's nameplate (OCCAC) is increasingly utilized for social regulations related to the Internet sector. These findings present nuanced insights into the practices of China's Internet governance, suggesting a conceptual need to differentiate the roles played by the Party and the state in shaping Internet governance under authoritarianism.

Abstract Since time immemorial, the hegemonic imposition of cultural and political power asymmetries has resulted in the de jure and de facto exclusion of certain groups from the common weal. Withe the introduction of digital information and communication technologies (ICT), the rifts between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have‐nots’ have expanded at nearly exponential rates. To provide an instrument for analysing the complexities of bridging the digital and knowledge divides, a conceptual framework is presented that provides different perspectives on agency in the commonwealth and the infosphere, which, in turn, leads to a discussion of the operationalization of ethics and justice in human rights that directly affect the entelechy of wellbeing. This discussion provides a basis for exploring certain aspects of social‐cultural barriers to wellbeing, the commodification of human rights, digital imperialism and cultural hegemonies in the world polity, including the infosphere, that have a direct bearing on the wellbeing of all in the common weal. A summary and a call‐to‐action complete the study.

Abstract In the landscape of environmental governance, controlling water pollution through the regulation of point sources is vital as it preserves ecosystems, protects human health, ensures legal compliance, and fulfills global environmental responsibilities. Under the Clean Water Act, the integrated compliance information system monitors the compliance and enforcement status of facilities regulated by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program. This study assesses temporal and geographic trends for effluent violations within the United States and introduces a novel metric for quantifying violation trends at the facility level. Furthermore, we utilize a linear parametric approach for Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) causal analysis to quantify the heterogeneous effects of EPA and state enforcement actions on effluent violation trends at facilities with NPDES permits. Our research reveals insights into national pollutant discharge trends, regional clustering of all pollutant violation types in Ohio ( Z‐score of 2.15), and priority pollutants in West Virginia ( Z‐score of 3.07). The trend metric identifies regulated facilities that struggle with severe and recurring violations. The causal model highlights variations in state compliance and enforcement effectiveness, underscoring the successful moderation of violation trends by states such as Montana and Maryland, among others.