Abstract Conspiracy theories are widely viewed as harmful to politics, and a growing number of studies have sought to identify their detrimental effects. Our study adds to this literature by examining whether brief, realistic exposure to conspiracy theories about a major political event can undermine individuals’ commitment to a broad set of democratic norms. We rely on two online survey experiments conducted in Brazil with a total of 8 thousand respondents. Participants assigned to the treatment conditions were exposed to conspiracy theories surrounding the stabbing of then–presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro during a campaign event; control group participants viewed either the official account of the event or unrelated content. Subsequently, participants answered questions about democratic norms, institutional trust, and political hostility. We find some evidence that exposure to conspiracy theories reduces support for democracy, particularly in the electoral dimension. Surprisingly, non-partisans are more affected than partisans. Results also indicate that exposure to conspiracy theories reduces institutional trust but does not affect political hostility. However, the effects of conspiracy theories are not consistent across narratives, emerging more clearly in the one that blames the right for the event. These findings underscore the nuanced and specific nature of the influence of conspiracy theories on democratic values, which can help calibrate our concerns about these narratives.

Scholars frequently measure dispositions like populism, conspiracism, racism, and sexism by asking survey respondents whether they agree or disagree with statements exemplifying those constructs. This agree/disagree format is known to introduce acquiescence bias, which can inflate endorsement rates. The evidence is less clear, however, on how acquiescence affects criterion validity. Though many survey researchers are aware of the problem of acquiescence, we show that political scientists frequently overlook it. First, across 160 tests we show that acquiescence bias can severely distort the magnitude of relationships between constructs and even produce sign errors. Second, an internal meta-analysis indicates acquiescence bias varies in size across samples and constructs. Third, we evaluate balanced scales and measurement models as potential solutions and find that estimated relationships between constructs are sensitive to both measurement choices. We conclude with survey design advice and recommendations for redesigning several popular measures of political and psychological dispositions.

Abstract Some argue that the American public is extreme and polarized along party lines. Paradoxically, others argue that members of the public lack meaningful policy preferences and exhibit low constraint across issues. These conclusions are typically drawn from binary policy questions or scales with ambiguous values, both of which are ill-suited for measuring extremism, polarization, or constraint. In this paper, I reassess these claims by analyzing policy questions that allow respondents to express their preferences on a well-defined continuum. Across a wide range of issues, most Americans appear to have moderate preferences over policy. As expected, Democrats tend to be more liberal than Republicans, but there is significant overlap on every issue, and the average extent of disagreement is modest. Lastly, positions across issues appear more constrained than standard tests suggest.

Abstract Citizens infer policy information from partisan cues, yet their utility varies cross-nationally. In weakly institutionalized democracies with short-lived political parties and volatile party systems, partisan cues are likely of little heuristic value. I argue that in these contexts, citizens leverage alternative political markers, such as ideological or political movement-related categories, to make sense of the political arena. I test this argument in Peru, a country with an extremely volatile and distrusted party system. Using a survey experiment, I show that political cues significantly influence policy preferences even in the absence of clear and strong partisan brands. Further analysis using causal forest reveals that movement-related political identities are the primary moderators of cueing effects, outweighing traditional factors such as partisanship or ideology. Notably, while non-partisan cues influence attitude formation, only outgroup cues effectively shape preferences. I theorize that this asymmetry could potentially stem from two distinct features of the Peruvian political landscape: deep mistrust in political parties and patterns of affective polarization marked by stronger outgroup prejudice than ingroup favoritism. Overall, this study underscores the importance of alternative forms of political identification in weakly institutionalized party systems, extending existing theories of public opinion formation to diverse democratic settings.

Abstract When citizens vote in primary elections, they have good reason to consider each candidate’s electability—the chances of winning the general election if they become their party’s nominee. Although electability perceptions are potentially a critical determinant of who wins, little is known about how voters form such perceptions. Using a pre-registered survey experiment conducted on voters in advance of several real competitive senatorial and gubernatorial primary elections in 2022, we examine three candidate attributes that plausibly shape and are correlated with voters’ perceptions of electability: ideological moderation, experience in elected office, and campaign fundraising success. We find evidence that providing new information about candidate attributes affects perceptions of electability, with fundraising being most important. Subsequent analysis shows that this effect is largely driven by Republican voters. Our results highlight the need to better understand differences across the parties in perceptions of electability and how voters learn about campaign finance information.

Abstract How has the unprecedented salience of anti-Asian racism resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic influenced Asian Americans’ coalitional attitudes, both within-group and towards other racial minorities? Asian Americans, as the fastest-growing racial minority group in the United States, could play a key role in advancing racial justice. However, Asian Americans’ ambivalent racialization as valorized relative to Latino and Black Americans raises uncertainty as to how they will engage with other communities of color and racial politics. Using observational survey data from the 2016 and 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post Election Study and an original survey experiment, we find that COVID-19 era anti-Asian racism can begin to facilitate Asian American alignment with other communities of color, but it depends on how the issue is framed and only specific subsets of Asian Americans who are less socialized in racial discourses are persuaded by these frames. This study assesses the challenges and possibilities of facilitating Asian American solidarity with other racial minorities.