Abstract Citizenship education aims to compensate for the lack of a stimulating political home environment. However, not all scholars are convinced that schools are great equalizers, as citizenship education might reinforce rather than reduce socioeconomic inequalities. This paper investigates whether citizenship education compensates, reproduces, or accelerates inequality in students’ internal political efficacy (IPE) and how this relationship differs across educational tracks. IPE is considered a key political attitude that predicts political participation and taps into self-confidence in a political setting. This political attitude is especially interesting considering the stigmatizing effects of educational tracks. We study the effect of citizenship education among senior high school students in Flanders. We examine three kinds of citizenship education: civic learning experiences, an open classroom climate, and active student participation at school. We conduct three-way interactions in multilevel models to study the moderating effect of these types of citizenship education at school on the relationship between a political home environment and IPE across educational tracks. We show compensating effects for the three citizenship education types. However, looking across educational tracks, there is a clearer compensation in the academic track compared to the technical and vocational tracks. Our findings indicate that citizenship education contributes to a democratic society where all citizens feel confident participating in the political arena. Still, technical and vocational tracked students not only receive less citizenship education, but the reduction of socioeconomic inequalities in feelings of IPE when receiving higher amounts is also less articulated than in the academic track.

Incumbents often make unpopular policy decisions. But can they remedy their negative electoral consequences? We extend the wide literature concerning retrospective voting to the case of unpopular policies and examine whether voters reward a responsive withdrawal of an unpopular policy proposal or punish the disclosed policy intention despite the withdrawal. To test this, we use granular data on Swedish local election results from 2002 to 2018 and the case of widely unpopular school closure proposals, some of which were implemented and others not. We exploit within municipality variation in voting over time to causally estimate the consequences for incumbents in the neighborhood surrounding the schools. Our results confirm that even if a school remains open, voters punish the incumbent and consider the initial proposal as informative for their vote. Our findings have implications for the understanding of democratic accountability and which information voters take into account when casting their vote.

Abstract A growing body of research documents how shrinking local newsrooms undermine political accountability and local fiscal and policy performance in the United States. We extend this work to examine political impacts from the level of information content in local news, which has been jeopardized by reductions in newsroom staffing. To understand how information content affects public response to news coverage of a local issue, we focus on the case of preventive spending on infrastructure maintenance and repair. Inefficiently low levels of infrastructure investment are often attributed to low public knowledge about the risk of failure events. In a preregistered survey experiment, we test how the level and type of information in a news article affect support for infrastructure investment across two different types of infrastructure risk (repeated nuisance versus catastrophic failure). For both types of risk, we find that more information-rich reporting, whether investigative or event-driven, increases public support for preventive spending and imposes accountability penalties on local leaders who fail to invest in prevention.

Accountability relies on voters accurately evaluating government performance in addressing the important issues of the day. This requirement arguably applies to an even greater extent when addressing fundamental societal crises. However, partisanship can bias evaluations, with government partisans perceiving outcomes more favorably, or attributing less responsibility for bad outcomes. We examine partisan motivated reasoning in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, using panel data and a survey experiment of over 6000 respondents in which vignettes prime respondents about the UK government’s successes and failures in tackling the pandemic. We also propose a novel extension of the partisan bias thesis: partisans arrive at biased judgements of government competence by recalling the past performance of the government differently, according to whether or not their favored party held power at that time. We find that even in the relatively consensual partisan context of the UK’s response to Covid-19, where both major parties endorsed both lockdown and vaccination programs, there is evidence of both current and recall partisan biases: Opposition partisans are more likely to blame the government for negative outcomes and less likely to recall positive aspects of the government’s recent and past performance unless prompted to do so. Our findings have implications for understanding the limits of democratic accountability under crisis conditions.

Abstract Scholars often highlight the roles that group threat and intergroup solidarity play in shaping attitudes toward outgroups. Competition among social groups, including over values and culture, can underlie negative attitudes toward outgroups. Meanwhile, perceptions of discrimination against outgroups can drive feelings of solidarity, sympathy, or empathy, which may foster more positive attitudes. These social identity concepts are often studied in the context of racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice, with less attention to how they apply to attitudes toward transgender and gender diverse people. Using a 2022 national survey, we assess how respondents’ perceptions of cultural threat from the LGBTQ community and perceptions of discrimination among a range of outgroups are related to attitudes about transgender rights policies, including access to public restrooms, participation in school sports, and medical transition care. We find that cultural threat is consistently associated with support for policies that restrict the rights of transgender people, but perceived outgroup discrimination tends not to show a significant relationship with these attitudes.

Abstract We consider how frames highlighting religious values shape opinion among individuals who may experience social identity conflict. White evangelical Republicans have ardently supported Donald Trump’s restrictionist stances towards refugees, yet those partisan policy stances exist in tension with evangelical Christian values emphasizing care for vulnerable strangers. Our pre-registered national experiment tests whether a religious message can move white self-identified evangelical Republicans’ opinions relating to refugees. The pro-refugee Christian values message increases favorable attitudes on some, but not all, measures. The effect is comparatively stronger among those who are more committed to their evangelical identity; unexpectedly, those who identify as strong Republicans are not more resistant to the message. These results demonstrate that moral reframing, which is known to shape attitudes in other domains, can affect self-identified evangelical Republicans’ attitudes on refugees, potentially shifting the national discussion of refugees in the U.S. The finding is all the more significant given highly partisan debates over refugees during the Trump presidency, which may have made partisans’ opinions especially rigid at the time of our experiment. Our results also speak to the relevance of identity strength in conditioning the impact of religious values frames.