Abstract This seminal study seeks to determine whether people deemed to be wise are more likely to uphold the principles of Western democracy in a civil society. Such a study has theoretical and practical significance for understanding the nature of a wise polity, which currently seems at risk. The paper first provides seven propositions that characterize the principles of democracy and civil society from Greek political philosophy to contemporary times. We then outline the principles of wisdom used in making good judgments, essentially good reasoning capacity and a wisdom disposition. The results indicate that the wise voter displays certain characteristics of temperament characterized by taking the long-term view, being tolerant of plural values, balancing self-interest with the common good, seeking to find areas of common interest with others, and showing moderation and temperance in times of rising partisan hatred. These findings contribute significantly to political science research by defining and characterizing the wise voter. The contribution to wisdom research, given that wisdom is domain-specific, is to open another domain of practical wisdom.

Abstract Donald Trump has been a prodigious flouter of political norms. His willingness to violate informal standards of behavior that political observers had long viewed as sacrosanct raises significant questions for scholars of American politics: how norms operate, when and why they are respected, and what happens when they erode or shatter. The common belief that norms are enforced, directly or indirectly, by public opinion has fared poorly under Trump; so, too, has confidence in institutional checks and balances. As Arthur Bentley argued in his classic work, The Process of Government, laws, norms, institutions, and democratic ideals are all likely to be consequential only insofar as powerful political actors are willing to exert pressure on their behalf. To better understand politics in the Trump era, we must better understand who has power, what they want, and when and how they will exert pressure to uphold or undermine key political norms.

Abstract The news coming out of China in recent years points to cracks in an imposing structure—a gilded age gradually losing its luster. Against this backdrop, China's Age of Abundance offers a timely and authoritative account of both China's path that has led the country to its current juncture, as well as its possible future trajectory. Whereas a preponderance of writings has largely attributed China's economic growth to its cheap labor, here, drawing on meticulous data and analyses, Wang Feng powerfully argues that the driving force underlying China's remarkable rise was its good labor, made cheap under institutional arrangements that are both predicated upon and reinforcing China's profound rural-urban dichotomy. Challenging the narrative of the exceptionalism of a “China development model,” China's Age of Abundance traces China's path to an economic boom through the trails of human toils and tolls, foregrounding the individual—their agency, livelihood, and struggles—within structural and historical changes.

Abstract Drawing on Tyler Jost’s Bureaucracies at War: The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation, this review article engages with the book’s themes and examines the institutional causes of failures in international crises. It first outlines Jost’s core argument, that variation in national security institutional design explains why leaders misjudge the likely costs and outcomes of conflict more than regime type or leader personality. It then situates Jost’s theory within broader literatures on misperception, cognitive bias, and organizational behavior, and reflects on key assumptions about bureaucratic competence, the reliability of intelligence, and the clarity of information to explore how even accurate information can be distorted by individual and institutional filters. The review also considers additional pathways to miscalculation beyond those explored in the book and examines the policy implications of Jost’s framework for alliance durability, the behavior of authoritarian states like China, and the risks posed by fragmented institutions in democratic nations. Jost’s work is an important contribution to the study of foreign policy decision-making, and this article raises further questions about the limits of institutional design in a world shaped by uncertainty and political self-preservation.

Abstract Alice Hunt Friend's book, Mightier Than the Sword: Civilian Control of the Military and the Revitalization of Democracy, represents an expansion of the scope of what scholars of American civilian-military relations tend to study. In recent decades, scholars of American civilian-military relations have largely focused on the military itself and the role of military leaders in respecting and maintaining the norm of civilian primacy over the institution. In a detailed look at the civilian appointees and politicians who oversee the military, she shifts the debate from the question of whether or not we can trust the military to “how do civilians exert control over the institution?” The work is all the more salient as in the current administration appointees almost uniformly lack the political or deep bureaucratic and foreign policy experience that appointees typically bring to these positions. Instead, they appear to have been chosen almost entirely for their loyalty to the president and are showing little hesitation in politicizing an institution that has traditionally received a great deal of deference from leaders of both political parties. This raises important questions about the motivations driving those civilians engaged with the military and whether they can uphold the civilian ethic, which Friend defines as “to act as society's trustee, using the military responsibly and ensuring that other civilians do the same.”