Stock estimates of the US unauthorized foreign-born population are routinely published, but less is known about this population's dynamics. Using a series of residual estimates based on 2000 Census and 2001-2022 American Community Survey (ACS), I estimate the components of change for the unauthorized immigrant population from 2000 to 2022 by region and country of origin. Further, I develop and present novel measures of expected duration in unauthorized status and demographic impact of unauthorized entries (i.e., person-years lived in unauthorized status). Results reveal dramatic changes over the last two decades. In the early 2000s, the unauthorized immigrant population was dominated by Mexicans who tended to remain in the United States for extended periods of time and whose demographic impact on the US population was substantial. After the 2007-2008 Great Recession, a new pattern emerged. Unauthorized migrants now arrive from across the globe, including Central America and Asia (up through 2018), and most recently from Europe, Africa, Canada, Venezuela, and other parts of South America. These new unauthorized immigrants are more likely to arrive on temporary nonimmigrant visas (which typically allow a foreigner to live and work in the United States for six years) and, with the exception of Venezuelans, spend less time in unauthorized status. Overall, the demographic impact of this new type of unauthorized migration is lower than it was two decades ago.

Abstract A rich literature has documented the relationship between age at marriage and girls’ health and educational outcomes. The upheaval caused by the pandemic on household decision‐making has been hypothesized to have influenced the age of marriage, but the direction of impact is unclear. On the one hand, the pandemic may have increased the age at marriage if lockdown policies and negative income shocks to families placed a burden on household wealth and the ability to pay for weddings. On the other hand, the age of marriage could have decreased during the pandemic due to school closures that kept girls out of school, parental deaths that encouraged families to expedite weddings, and lower wedding costs because of government mandates to have smaller weddings. Using data from the National Family Health Survey of 2019–2021 of India, we explore how the pandemic impacted age at marriage for women using district and household fixed effects models. After accounting for secular trends in the age of marriage and contingent on the model and specification, we find a significant increase in age at marriage for women who got married during the pandemic by 1.1–1.2 years as compared with those married before the pandemic.

Abstract The long human lifespan enables long run forecasts of population size and age distribution. New methods include biodemographic research on upper limits to life expectancy and incorporation of early experiences affecting later life mortality such as smoking, obesity, and childhood health shocks. Some fertility forecasts incorporate education and quantum‐tempo insights. Statistical time series and Bayesian methods generate probabilistic forecasts. Yet recent decades have brought surprising changes in the economy, natural environment, and vital rates. In these changing circumstances we need new methods and the increasing use of probabilistic models and Bayesian methods incorporating outside information. The increasing use of microsimulation combined with aggregate forecasting methods is a very promising development enabling more detailed and heterogeneous forecasts. Some new uses of stochastic forecasts are interesting in themselves. Probabilistic mortality forecasts are used in finance and insurance, and a new Longevity Swap industry has been built on them. Random sample paths used to generate stochastic population forecasts can stress‐test public pension designs for fiscal stability and intergenerational equity. Population forecasting a few decades ago was a dull backwater of demographic research, but now it is increasingly important and is full of intellectual and technical challenges.

Abstract This essay expores demographic effects on the international order over the postwar decades and potentially through the next half‐century. Such effects derive from the relative sizes of populations and labor forces among states, contrasts in age distributions (resulting from the regionally staggered timing of fertility decline), and high levels of international migration, fueled by economic disparities and civil conflict. In coming decades, differential population growth and aging—in some states, entrenchment of population decline—will shift the global distribution of labor away from East Asia and Europe and toward South and West Asia and especially Africa. Short‐range migration may be pressed by environmental change; longer‐range migration toward rich countries, much of it illicit and already an intractable public policy issue in many of them, will face increased societal resistance and stronger efforts to police entry. The future international order will see a states system with the Global North further demographically marginalized; India as an emerging economic‐demographic superpower, joining a fast‐aging China and plausibly a less internationally engaged United States; and a demographically dominant Africa with as yet a wholly unclear place in the global political economy. Although not part of standard demographic projections, there are extreme global warming scenarios and other disaster eventualities that could be radically transformative of this order.

This paper focuses on age restrictions on access to infertility treatments and eligibility for their public reimbursement, exploring their relevancy in contexts of rising late birth rates (40+). I explore how age-based reimbursement policies for in vitro fertilization treatments have responded to these fertility trends in 27 high-income countries and in which regulatory frameworks for medically assisted reproduction (MAR) very late births (45+) have particularly increased. First, I show that while age limits for treatment reimbursement are well aligned with the prevalence of late fertility in some national contexts, in most countries, strict age restrictions are lagging behind the rise in late births. In others, pronatalist policies have prompted permissive age criteria or law revisions, anticipating or adapting to rising trends in late births. Second, the rise in very late births has been limited in some contexts with strict age-based rules. However, the analysis suggests that the impact of MAR on very late births may also be influenced by contextual factors other than regulations.

Abstract Standard demographic research has typically constrained the existence of identity fluidity, assuming that demographic categories such as race or ethnicity and sex or gender should be static across the life course and measuring them as such. However, recent research and changes in data collection practices highlight the limitations of this approach by demonstrating fluidity in both racial and gender identities that rivals levels of fluidity in other identity categories, such as sexual orientation, that are more commonly seen as changeable over time. This review examines what is known about current levels of fluidity in gender, sexual orientation, and racial identities as well as known correlates and consequences for research on inequality, based primarily but not exclusively on research conducted in the United States. The implications of fluid identities for data collection and analysis, as well as prospects for future levels of fluidity, are also discussed.

Abstract The conventional approach to gauging mortality convergence in Europe relies on life expectancy estimates () at the national level. However, mortality can differ within countries significantly. To better apprehend whether Europe's mortality patterns have been converging or diverging over recent decades, we must shift our focus to regional mortality data. Using data from statistical offices, we present annual estimates for 420 regions in 16 EU countries from 1995 to 2019. In our empirical analysis, we examined whether regions with initially high mortality levels caught up with low‐mortality regions, and we investigated changes in the standard deviation of Europe's regional distribution over time. Indeed, mortality variation has generally decreased from 1995 to 2019 due to larger gains in for regions with initially high mortality levels. The convergence phase took place mostly during the first half of the entire time period analyzed. Over more recent periods, however, we observe more heterogeneity in the development of . Some advantaged regions realized further gains in , even as improvements slowed for more disadvantaged regions. In conclusion, our analysis underscores the importance of addressing widening health inequalities. Policies should target disadvantaged regions to retard mortality divergence across Europe.

Abstract The Venezuelan exodus represents the largest known displacement of people in recent Latin American history. The regional crisis caused by this mass Venezuelan migration drove the development of multiple interagency initiatives (such as the R4V platform) as well as academic attempts to keep track of outflow intensity. However, little is known about the age and gender composition of the emigrants since most existing literature to date has focused primarily on total volume and country‐specific shares of migration outflows. This study examines the demographics of recent outflows from Venezuela, the chronology of associated changes, and the demographic implications for those remaining in the country. Official counts of Venezuelan‐born populations compiled in seven main destinations are used to estimate annual outflows by age and gender from 2011 to 2021. Changes in the demographic composition of emigration are traced using parameters of the Rogers–Castro model, specifically the children‐to‐labor force dominance, and by decomposing the age contributions to the annual gross migraproduction rate. In the early phase of the crisis (2014–2017), emigration flows had high child dependency ratios. As the crisis entered its most acute phase (peaking in 2019), the mean age of migrants increased. Outward migration has resulted in the current Venezuelan population having 20 percent fewer women of reproductive age and 17.8 percent fewer individuals of working age. Consequently, the share of the population aged 60 or older has increased.