O intuito deste artigo é demonstrar, a partir de alguns símiles, como Homero produz uma caracterização concisa de seus heróis. A perspectiva de abordagem neste estudo é comprovar a eficácia do uso dos símiles pelo poeta em consonância com a obra de Aristóteles, Investigação dos Animais, que nos permite aferir certo valor simbólico de determinados animais ainda no séc. IV a.C. Partindo de comparações com animais, o poeta produz símiles que formam um quadro imediato e eficaz do herói, projetado pela força simbólica e analógica que o animal evoca como termo comparativo na cultura grega arcaica e clássica.

I explore Leon Chwistek’s views on ontology and aesthetics through a philosophical analysis of his texts. I present and briefly discuss two main interpretations of Chwistek’s ontology, i.e. logical and epistemological, before analyzing Chwistek’s aesthetics to show how it may be based on his ontology. Furthermore, I link both interpretations to the problem of whether or not Chwistek’s four realities share a common domain; a problem which is associated with his aesthetics. Finally, I make suggestions regarding further research on his notion of transitional types of art and the corresponding realities.

The article examines the cognitive, metaphorical dimension of the pure theory of law and demonstrates that Hans Kelsen used metaphorical language in his description of law, and unintentionally created a unique set of cognitive metaphors in order to make the theory of law focused on the abstract "Ought" world comprehensible. The paper argues that it would be impossible for Kelsen to describe norms without metaphors. The paper uses Lakoff and Johnson's theory as a framework for the interpretation of this metaphorical aspect of the pure theory of law. Hence the following paragraphs will examine the cognitive context of the abstract categories crucial for the pure theory of law, such as: the category of Ought, imputation, basic norms and the dynamic (hierarchical) structure of law. This article is based on the position that an analysis of the cognitive dimension of the pure theory of law might yield promising results which could reveal new aspects of the central categories in this theory. This article is an attempt to explore the possibilities provided by merging these two theories and checking if the results brings some new knowledge about the pure theory of law and legal thinking in general.

Efekt ofiary zidentyfikowanej to błąd poznawczy polegający na znacznie większej gotowości do niesienia pomocy zidentyfikowanym ofiarom niż ofiarom statystycznym. Celem artykułu jest ocenienie, co moralnie powinniśmy czynić w świetle tego efektu, z punktu widzenia etyki utylitarystycznej. Jaka zasada podejmowania decyzji powinna zostać przyjęta? Czy powinniśmy zawsze pomagać ofiarom zidentyfikowanym, czy ofiarom statystycznym? Argumentuję za zasadą stanowiącą punkt pośredni między tymi dwiema skrajnościami. Następnie, opierając się na przykładzie polskiego sektora pozarządowego i mając na uwadze wspomnianą zasadę, opisuję zmiany prawne, które skutkowałyby wyższym poziomem zagregowanej użyteczności netto. Pierwsza zmiana dotyczy zasad alokacji środków w ramach tzw. mechanizmu 1 proc. Druga dotyczy warunków, jakie muszą spełniać organizacje pozarządowe, by otrzymać publiczne finansowanie swojej działalności.

The problems associated with understanding law as the regulator of social relations involve many separate issues which undoubtedly constitute intellectual challenges for the philosophy of law. In this context, the philosophy of law inquires, inter alia, about whether law exists as a universal structure of the category of being, and about the possibility of the objective cognition of law as an ontological and deontological category. However, it transpires that this task is by no means easy, when it comes to questions concerning epistemological and ontological issues in relation to law -and consequently its justification (the metaphysics of law), and then its legitimation -unequivocal answers are not forthcoming.

Analizy pojęcia prawa odwołują się do szczególnego rodzaju oczywistych prawd: tzw. truizmów o prawie, które wypowiadają członkowie danej społeczności, a które odzwierciedlają ich wspólne rozumienie ważnego społecznego pojęcia, jakim jest pojęcie prawa. Ogólne teorie prawa powstają w wyniku prowadzenia tego rodzaju analiz. W tym artykule argumentuję, że każde odpowiedzialne odwołanie się do truizmów w kontekście budowy teorii prawa powinno także uwzględniać procesy rozumowania, które doprowadzają do wykształcenia się truizmów w danej populacji, a są nimi rozmaite rodzaje heurystyk na temat prawa i powiązanych z nim zjawisk społecznych. Z uwagi na to, że zarówno same truizmy, jak i heurystyki nie mają jednolitej struktury i bywają niespójne, analizy pojęciowe stanowią główne sposoby przekształcenia tego „surowego” materiału dowodowego w racjonalnie uporządkowane teorie prawa.

In this article, I defend a non-classical version of descriptive theory of reference-fixing for proper names against objections raised by Kripke. I consider that descriptive information associated by speakers with a proper name has semantic value and thus should be taken into account by any theory of proper names. I do not defend any one descriptive theory in particular, only general assumptions that can underpin different elaborations of a descriptive theory of names. The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first part, I will briefly explain the notion of descriptivism and how taking temporal parameters into account influences the formulation of the theses of descriptivism. Next I will explain why Kripke’s modal objection does not apply to a descriptive theory of reference-fixing, formulate assumptions of the descriptive theory defended in this paper and respond to Kripke’s epistemic objection. In the second part (to be published in the next issue), I respond to particular strands of Kripke’s semantic objection and show that the defended version has all the virtues traditionally associated with descriptive theories.

Primeira parte da leitura do romance Como agua para chocolate , de Laura Esquivel, do ponto de vista da matriz simbolica que o aproxima dos contos de fadas e do lugar do feminino nessas narrativas contemporâneas, justificando seu espaco de leitura, ao contrario do que tradicionalmente se constituiu, tambem pelo publico adulto.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Confucian reflections on law. Interestingly, even such a general aim has not previously been realised. Stereotypical, literal and oversimplified readings of Confucianism seem to dominate even in the professional literature. As a result, the thesis of the anti-legal character of Confucian teachings is widely reiterated. In this paper, a reconstruction of the Confucian approach to law takes account of the most basic assumptions organising Confucian thought. Only in this way can we identify the essential themes of Confucian reflection on law: (1) placing law within an ontology of the social world based on categories of ‘roots-foundations’ (ben) and ‘branches-manifestations’ (mo) and (2) considering the impact of law on the self-cultivation processes which are, according to Confucianists, the ‘root-foundation’.