Abstract Intrinsic safety is one of the explosion protection techniques implemented in an industry where a flammable substance is present. It is a technique that reduces the electrical energy level at the hazardous area below the ignition curve so that it is not sufficient to initiate an explosion. In addition to limiting the energy to the field, the energy stored in the circuit and thermal ignition due to hot surfaces in hazardous areas must also be considered. Intrinsically safe is the preferred explosion protection method for instrumentation and control signals as it allows live maintenance, the use of an uncertified simple apparatus, and is applicable to all Zones. All intrinsically safe circuits must carry out a safety assessment and verify their compliance with intrinsic safety before implementation to avoid explosion. The verification process could be complex for mixed circuits and non‐simple intrinsically safe systems; moreover, there has been much confusion for many years until the 4th Edition of the installation standard, IEC 60079‐14, provided a clearer picture. This paper carries out an intrinsic safety verification assessment on a mixed circuit involving surge protection devices according to IEC and NEC standards. It also highlights the common mistake made by system designers when verifying the safety parameters.

Abstract One of the process safety management (PSM) concepts that so many have struggled with is management of change. It seems so simple on the surface, but it has resulted in serious incidents. Using a story format, two incidents are recited to illustrate what went wrong with management of change (MOC), and how the incidents could have been avoided. A fairy tale story based on the incidents was created to illustrate the importance of MOC. The fairy tale uses familiar character types and forms to illustrate: why the change was not recognized; hazards of uncontrolled changes; and the importance of MOC in the prevention of process safety incidents. The fairy tale story communicates lessons learned from two incidents that resulted from MOC failures.

Abstract These articles explain the background of lithium‐ion battery systems, key issues concerning the types of failure, and some guidance on how to identify the cause(s) of the failures. It also provides an overview of the series and some further comments on risks, mitigations, escalation, and insurance aspects.

Abstract In 2020, a fire and explosion accident occurred in Taiwan because of the reverse flow of high‐pressure recycle gas. This accident resulted in three minor injuries and caused the Taiwanese government to instruct the top three chemical groups in Taiwan to conduct procedural hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies in addition to normal HAZOP studies. The cause analysis based on the accident timeline and cause factor chart indicated that improper control of the protection logic bypass and the lack of four process safety management (PSM) elements, namely mechanical integrity, process safety information (PSI), operating procedures, and process hazard analysis (PHA), were the root causes of the aforementioned accident. The deficiencies leading to accidents are related to planning problems in PSM promotion but unrelated to the implementation of PSM programs. Maintenance processes should be evaluated and developed according to PHA results or equipment structure to guarantee equipment integrity. The incompatibility of process chemicals with pipeline materials should be considered; then, the construction materials mentioned in PSI should be extended to those of pipelines, not just equipment. In addition to the hazards of normal operations, those of non‐routine operations should be identified to ensure the completeness of the PSM program. Protection logic bypass should be appropriately controlled, and a complete safety evaluation must be conducted before resetting the initiated protection logic. A majority of the deficiencies identified in this study exist in most Taiwanese chemical companies, including the leading ones performing PSM. The lessons learned from the aforementioned accident provide advance information that can be used to develop an improved PSM system.

Process Safety ProgressVolume 41, Issue 1 ISSUE INFORMATIONFree Access Info for Authors First published: 10 February 2022 https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12266AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume41, Issue1March 2022 RelatedInformation