The global Peter Lombard research reinaugurated in 1990s has resulted in a number of recent publications, but the Master of the Sentences' theology proper is partially underreseached. In particular, a more detailed exposition of the distinctions 35-41 of his Book of Sentences is needed in order to clarify his doctrine of God's knowledge and its relation to the human free will. The article builds on the earlier established evidence that, for Peter Lombard in distinctions 35-38, God's knowledge, in general, is not causative, although some causative power has to be ascribed to God's knowledge of the good. The last part of distinction 38 and the content of distinction 39 further analyze the capacities and functionalities of the divine omniscience and explain how it interacts with acts of human will. The key question here deals with the problem of alternative states of affairs: whether something may be otherwise than God foreknew. As it is shown, Master Peter agrees that it is possible for created things and events to be otherwise than they are, but insists that God's knowledge must be in any case exhaustive and infallible. He uses a number of logical tools to defend the thesis about God's perfect knowledge and the possibility of things happening otherwise, but lacks strict definition of the notion of "possibility" used here. The study concludes that in few cases Lombard's posse could mean a potency or a simple logical possibility, or the diachronic contingency, but the overall theological statement is clear: potentially, God's knowledge can be different or include alternative state of affairs but it cannot change.&nbsp

The author describes new interpretations of the problem of theology’s influence on John Locke’ philosophical doctrine. The main subject of the analysis is the latest publications by Victor Nuovo, the most famous contemporary researcher of mentioned problem.

: , , -, ? , ? , ?

Since the mid-90’s the figure of Peter Lombard and his Book of Sentences has regained the importance in scholarly world and been studied from both historical-theological and historical-philosophical perspectives. But some aspects of his thinking, encapsulated in the written form, which was to become the material basis for the thirteenth- through the fifteenth-century theological projects, remained somewhat insufficiently researched. Therefore this article analyzes the select parts of the Book of Sentences with the purpose of looking at how Peter Lombard handled the issue of God’s knowledge. The article shows that for Peter Lombard God’s knowledge is God’s awareness of everything knowable. It has no causal power which belongs to the divine will. Nevertheless, this knowledge is able to function in two different modes: it can be either a purely cognitive act as awareness alone, or a double cognitive and voluntary act as awareness and simultaneous volition in the form of approbation. Hence, God’s knowledge in general is not causative, but God’s knowledge of the good must be causative because he simultaneously knows and wills what is good. The article reasonably suggests that Lombard’s logic implies the compatibility of God’s (fore)knowledge and voluntary activity, on the one hand, and the contingency of the created order and the rational creatures’ free will, on the other hand. But the details of this conception remain unrevealed as Lombard’s presentation of the problem is to be declared underdeveloped.

The article deals with the national identification of philosophy. The author critically examines seemingly radical position of Stepan Ivanyk – as the adherent of analytical philosophy – on this and other issues.

The first Ukrainian translation of the famous B. Stroud’s article, where Kant's transcendental argument is interpreted as a means of the elimination of skeptical doubt about the existence of objective world outside of mind.

The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical acceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might have expected.

The article focuses on the formation of Kant's table of judgments. The author proves the dependence of Kant's table of judgments on the doctrine of judgment in German 17th century logic. The author proves the influence of George Meier’s «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre» on formation of the Kantian doctrine of judgment and the table of judgments. This effect consists in the fact that (1) the starting point for Kant's search of the concept of judgment was Meier's definition of judgment in § 292 of «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre», (2) Kant's table of judgments in «Critique of Pure Reason» appeared as a follow-up of twenty-five critical reflection at §§ 292-352 of Meier's treatise. However, Kant's table of judgments depends also on transcendental logic. The original forms of judgment in Kant's table of judgments contain functional unities, which create the subject of a judgment. Kant's table of judgments depends on both German tradition of 17th century logic and the theory of subject as a part of Kant's transcendental logic.

Дослідження присвячено творчості кримського мислителя Ахмада бін Абдаллаха аль-Кримі, одного з найвидатніших інтерпретаторів суфійської філософії ібн Арабі та Садр ад-Діна аль-Кунаві. Доведено, що Ахмад аль-Кримі використовував поняття ібн Сіни про розрізнення між сутністю та існуванням (поряд із деякими концептами матуридиського каляму). На основі рукопису праці «Настанова для розгублених та ключ для вимогливих», автор досліджує головні особливості вчення кримського мислителя: 1) поняття «буття» у філософії ібн Арабі та Садр ад-Діна аль-Кунаві він інтерпретує як ідею обов’язкового існування, запропоновану ібн Сіною; 2) концепцію тотожності абсолютного й необхідного буття він розуміє як єдиний правильний підхід до зняття суперечок між прихильниками й критиками суфізму; 3) концепція «співвіднесеності» постає у нього як розв’язання проблеми співвідношення мислення та дійсності.