ABSTRACT The article explores the problem of the discrepancies between the careers that the Russian education system currently prepares students for and the needs of the labor market. Employers on the labor market and educational institutions cannot function effectively without an established mechanism for social exchange. However, the reality of the current situation is such that the current educational services market exists almost entirely independently of the labor market. A document-based content analysis has allowed us to identify key problems for the Russian labor market. These include a shortage of certain specialists, which is particularly glaring in certain fields; a high level of youth unemployment; a lack of demand for certain highly trained specializations and thus the inability of the country to effectively compete on the international market; and Russia’s lagging position in the technology field. The education system also faces a number of problems. Some of the most pronounced ones include the brain drain of qualified and talented workers abroad; the insufficient funding of the research community; the decline in the prestige and quality of education; and the development of shallow thought patterns among young people that have resulted from the problem of fragmented culture. All attempts by the state to ease this crisis situation have not moved past creative window dressing. They have avoided addressing the fundamental roots of the problem. Our analysis has revealed a basic discrepancy between the types of subjects that educational institutions currently teach students and the needs of the labor market. Educational institutions have proven themselves unable to flexibly respond to changes on the labor market, and they have ignored its demands. In fact, most Russian schools do not subscribe to a unified system to help children choose a future career path. Schools use a formal approach to providing vocational guidance for young people: At best, students take one-time tests and receive brochures from for-profit institutions of higher education. If a unified, systematic model for career counseling were developed based on a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship, we would be able to establish an effective mechanism for social exchange between educational institutions and the labor market.

This article continues the topic of the first one in the series (see Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2017, no. 2). We rely on data from a number of nationwide surveys to analyze the specific features of the model of income stratification in Russian society in comparison with other countries (Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Mexico, and China). We show that the income stratification model, which is based on the principle of the correlation of the average per-capita income in a particular household with the median income in the country, does a good job of capturing the features associated with different models of society. Based on data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) comparative international study, we show that the model of income stratification in Russian society is normal for European countries. At the same time, when judged by the magnitude of income inequalities, Russia occupies an intermediate position between European countries and the countries of the former Third World.

Under the conditions of the protracted economic crisis in Russian society, a multitude of conflict-related contradictions are arising that are capable of turning into real sociopolitical conflicts. The emergence of conflicts depends on many factors, some of which stimulate the development of contradictions, while others help to smooth them out. The article assesses the conflict potential of Russian society by describing and analyzing the factors that contribute both to an increase in social tension and to its mitigation. The study makes it possible to identify a phenomenon for reducing conflict potential at a time of deepening economic crisis and worsening living conditions for Russians. An analysis of the existing contradictions in society makes it possible to identify more clearly the condition and trends in the development of Russian society and to take measures to prevent emerging social conflicts.

The article analyzes the results of individual in-depth interviews with members of the post-Soviet generation who demonstrate modernist and traditionalist behavioral tendencies. The main topic is the Crimean crisis of 2014. The research shows that a majority of “modernists” and “traditionalists” approve of Crimea and Sevastopol joining the Russian Federation. However, this support is more symbolic than practical: the respondents were not willing to sacrifice their own material well-being, much less to fight, for the Russian world. An insignificant number of “modernists” condemned the accession of Crimea, believing that it could have dangerous consequences for Russia.

We view the social organization of contemporary Russia as a continuation of the Soviet socioeconomic order, whose roots extend back centuries into the past of a country that has served as the vehicle for Eurasian Orthodox civilization. This article explores the various stages of the country’s development—from the thirteenth century to the present—and argues that the collapse of the communist system in Russia led to a transition from Eurasian civilization to a new stage in Russia’s evolution—a neo-statist socioeconomic order and classical authoritarianism.By 1917, the European type of development had yet to triumph in Russia. A key factor in this was the fact that private property was not a tradition for most Russians. This paved the way for the essential restoration of the soslovie system, the enslavement of social estates by the state, and the emergence of a special category of state servants (the nomenklatura) in the Soviet Union. In other words, path dependence theory came to be realized, reproducing in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries a relationship between power and social estates thought to have died off in medieval Rus.For centuries, within an exceptionally stable statist order and taking a variety of forms, a system has reproduced itself over and over that features a social estate hierarchy and a system of power under which property was conditional for everyone except an all-powerful sovereign (who across the epochs has gone by different names—prince, tsar, emperor, general secretary, and president).The socioeconomic system that has emerged in post-Soviet Russia is, by its nature, statism, but in a new phase of development—neo-statism. The role of the state remains decisive, but it is not the only role being played, as was the case in the Soviet Union. Now, there is a private-ownership market component. In Russia, a dualistic social stratification is in effect that combines a (dominant) soslovie hierarchy and a socio-professional hierarchy.

This article analyzes the estimates and opinions of experts (employers, representatives of recruiting agencies and municipal employment services, heads of labor departments in the regional administrations, heads of institutions for professional education) and graduates of universities and technical institutes (SSUZs) with respect to youth employment and matching up youth with jobs. The article shows that in most cases the professional skill of graduates does not correspond to the needs of regional labor markets. This particularly means undereducation and insufficient preparation, as well as a lack of practical skills and experience. There is also an obvious surplus of university graduates. As a result, the employer is forced to include in the company’s budget funds for continuing education of the young employees to further their professional growth and the subsequent economic return, due to increased labor productivity and competitiveness of the company. Continuing vocational education (CVE)* thus becomes a necessary means to adapt young graduates to the requirements of the labor market.

The artricle analyzes the relationship between fathers and children after the parents' divorce, identifying the following conditions that influence their relationship: the child's age at the time of divorce, the behavior of the child and other relatives, the father's desire to participate in the child's life, the place of residence, and the father's career. Three stages of development in this relationship are identified, and the types of paternal behavior during and after the divorce are clarified. Special attention is focused on the child's socialization after the divorce and the implications of this for socialization in contemporary circumstances.

This article is devoted to the study of practices of civic activism in Russia. The tasks of the study included determining the ratio between the political and the nonpolitical components of the activism, determining the scale of the prevalence and rootedness of the different forms of civic participation in life practices, analyzing the social base of civic activism, and discerning its main factors of development.

Based on data of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, Higher School of Economics, the article examines problems of the emergence of an independent judiciary system in Russia. It analyzes the dynamic of the public's trust in the courts and factors that prevent trust from rising.1

The article examines the characteristics of older people's sense of age identity, from the standpoint of the factors that condition this identity, and also the consequences. It is shown that a person's psychological sense of his age is an independent variable, and only to a certain extent is it determined by the respondent's objective sociodemographic characteristics, in particular by level of education and to a lesser extent by actual age and material condition. It is also shown that an aging person's sense of age identity contributes substantially to the way he organizes his life, and his attitudes in life.