The concept of the cultural self can be derived from the phrase "cultural self-confidence."Examined in its linguistic formation and function, the word "self" in the Chinese expression "cultural self-confidence" () carries two layers of meaning.First, it can be the object of the verb zxn (), which in Chinese functions as both a noun ("self-confidence") and a verb ("to believe in oneself").Hence, the term, when explicitly linked with and modified by "culture," can mean "to believe in" the self within culture or "to believe in" a culture-defined self.In this sense, a notion of "cultural self" is already present.Second, the "self" in "self-confidence" can also be read as an anaphoric pronoun referring back to the subject (unstated in the phrase), essentially meaning "I myself believe in myself."However, when is used as a verb, it requires an object (otherwise most sentences would be semantically incomplete).In such cases, the "self" is no longer merely an anaphoric pronoun but is further specified by the object that follows.Consider the following examples.Liang Qichao wrote: "I regard Mr. Lizhou as the Rousseau of China, and I myself am confident () that this is not an exaggeration." 3Hu Shi declared: "I myself am confident () that I am the pioneer in studying the history of philosophy in China, and this is a great fortune for China." 4 Mao Zedong proclaimed: "I myself am confident () that I will live for 200 years and will be able to swim 3,000 li." 5 In all of these constructions-"I myself am confident () that . . ."-the "self" is, on the one hand, an anaphoric pronoun referring to the grammatical subject.Yet, on the other hand, it also acquires content from what follows the verb: it relates to the self that asserts the statement in question.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract remains the source of much controversy. It is one of the first and most prominent formulations of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. It outlines the (self-)constitution of the sovereign and inalienable authority of the people over itself and any form of government, institutions, and laws. However, it has also been the subject of persistent critique by liberals ever since the French Revolution, alleging that its reproduction of the conceptual form of absolutism (“sovereignty”) would inevitably also end up reproducing its despotic political form and undermine individual liberties. Rousseau’s doctrine has thus been identified as the intellectual genesis of the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, twentieth century totalitarianisms, and contemporary populism. This article contributes a genealogy and critique of these post-revolutionary critiques of Rousseau’s Social Contract, followed by a historical recontextualization and reinterpretation of this classical work, which shows that these widespread critiques are mistaken and that this work constitutes a highly unique and insightful analysis of the formation and implications of popular sovereignty, which remains relevant to this day.

We often have the experience of intuiting something without being able to precisely define what that intuition is. Sometimes this intuition leads to a more well-defined insight, and sometimes it might lead to some kind of action, even in the absence of clear conceptual definitions. Yet it is difficult to ascertain what kind of knowledge or awareness such intuitions consist of. What is an intuition as opposed to a defined concept of something? How seriously should we take such intuitions? Are they something separate and qualitatively different than concepts? Are they just fuzzy concepts? Do they really exist at all? These are crucial questions because they lead to conclusions about the status of concepts themselves. If the alternative to clear concepts is nothing at all, then the sociopolitical corollary would be that the alternative to conceptual knowledge and the holders of such knowledge would also be nothing at all. By contrast, if intuitions are separate from concepts and real, then expert knowledge might possibly have some deficiencies in comparison with intuitions. The essays in this issue of Telos explore in one way or another this question of the status of conceptual knowledge as opposed to intuitive awareness.